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INTRODUCTION
Part 1: Contextual background of agricultural markets in sub-Saharan Africa 
Many farmers and breeders in sub-Saharan Africa face significant difficulty when trying to bring their products 
to market. They also complain about the low level of profit that they are able to earn from their products. One 
constantly hears complaints that “prices are too low,” “erratic price fluctuations,” as well as reports that denounce 
“unstructured markets” and “disorganised supply chains”. In order to confront these difficulties, farmers, breeders 
and their institutions are developing collective and individual strategies. 
These initiatives remain too few in number and are not well-known. Neither shared nor reinforced, they are rarely 
used by or for rural development practitioners. One still encounters among farmers (and others), persistent and 
inaccurate caricatures of market function and of other actors in the marketing process, particularly merchants. 
The poor level of knowledge about local initiatives and the functioning of markets and their actors are prejudicial, 
in the first instance, to farmers who cannot position themselves favourably in these markets. These factors 
create problems for local rural development, and in a more general way for entire countries. It is in this context 
that in 2004 Inter-réseaux initiated a program to analyse and collectively reflect upon these matters in a Working 
Group devoted to “Market Access and Agricultural Product Marketing.” 
Part 2: Choices that impacted the methods and results of the Working Group
The theme of market access and agricultural product marketing being extremely vast, choices were made to 
selectively limit the scope of the Working Group’s field of study. 
The first choice was to examine only initiatives undertaken by family farms and breeders, because family-scale 
operations constituted the large majority of agrarian production in the countries where the Working Group 
operated. This restricted the field of study by only a small amount, since family-scale operations are highly 
diverse. This document therefore presents a partial view, but attempts to encompass the diversity of different 
family-scale farming operations. 
A second choice was made to focus on concrete cases: initiatives where farmers, breeders and their organisations 
(FO) worked effectively to improve market access and the marketing of their agricultural products. 
A third choice was made to follow a program of collective reflection, designed to place actors at the centre of 
the process. These actors thus participated in exchange visits, carried out comparative studies and worked on 
written materials, video films and audio media to describe these initiatives on a case-by-case basis. Specific 
forms of support were provided by Inter-réseaux to carry out these activities: organisation/oversight of the 
process, logistical support, and financial support. The case-by-case analyses of initiatives and exchange 
visits were followed by further comparative analyses allowing researchers to take a step back from individual 
initiatives that each had their own particular features. The study then involved drawing general insights from the 
specific context of each of these initiatives. 
Part 3: Objectives and audiences for the present document
This document is intended to compile and validate (i) the process of collective reflection developed within the 
Working Group to study and share case studies, and (ii) the comparative studies carried out and the insights 
taken from the various initiatives. It is meant to both support information sharing and encourage discussion of 
these points. 
It can be used by anyone working with methods of collective reflection and validation of local initiatives as tools 
for change (in particular chapters 1 and 3, which focus on methods and tools). However, it is above all intended 
for people involved in activities to organise actors in agricultural product marketing: farmers and FO staff and 
also people working in support of these actors. 
The case studies are situated in sub-Saharan Africa, but their significance and their use should not be limited to 
actors in this region, nor to the African continent. 
OVERVIEW
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CHAPTER 1: Elaborating a collective reflection process and the selection of local initiatives for study 
and comparison 
Part 1: Principles and major steps in the method guiding the Working Group
The method of the Working Group was based on a double process of (i) highlighting initiatives by farmers and 
(ii) building collaborative thinking around these initiatives. Two key principles guided this work: a focus on local 
dynamics, with diverse analytical frameworks and collective reflection involving local groups of directly involved 
actors; and comparative analysis, comparing projects across different locales, and assessing the long-term 
evolution of single projects. 
The Working Group of course involved groups of farmers not only in the case studies of local initiatives, but 
also in the creation of support exchange groups aimed at spurring debate around these initiatives, to gain 
a wider perspective on specific cases that were presented. To this end the Working Group relied on pre-
existing dynamics between actors already engaged in activities or thinking about the marketing of agricultural 
products. These included farmers and their organisations, and support organisations in the rural development 
world. A number of field visits, concrete case studies and information exchange activities (written work, sound 
recordings, videotapes) were carried out between 2004 and 2007, with the participation of actors in Benin, 
Cameroon, Guinea and Mali, who were the main drivers of the project. Actors in Burkina Faso, Madagascar, 
Niger and Senegal also contributed. For each experience, attention was paid to the analysis of processes 
enabling an awareness of the evolution of activities of each FO: the historical approach allowed us to have a 
dynamic understanding of the initiatives, since something that works at one moment for one FO can become 
obsolete a few years later. The initiatives were then shared via presentations and other forms during workshops 
and forums, which brought together representatives from more than ten countries in Africa. These materials 
describing the initiatives were also distributed on the Internet. 
Through these different events and methods of exchange we were able to highlight the FOs’ initiatives and open 
them to discussion. Comparative analyses that looked at case-by-case examples across different FO actors took 
place on various occasions, in particular through workshops and forums (for example, comparison of different 
warehousing activities undertaken by different FOs). These studies grounded in specific types of activity were 
intended to give critical distance from the specific cases of each FO, and to extract general knowledge which 
could be useful to other actors in different contexts. The style used to present the activities of farmers and FOs 
was also intended to enable objective distancing as well as to make the information more useful. Chapter 2 
presents some comparative studies by type of activity carried out by the FO, while chapter 3 draws some more 
general insights from these case studies. 
Part 2: Overview of FO initiatives studied by the Working Group and emblematic cases chosen to 
enrich comparative and transversal analyses. 
The numerous initiatives studied by the Working Group – and briefly presented here – show the diversity of 
buyers and markets. Depending on the case, farmers may sell their goods to an intermediary, an FO, individual 
merchants, businesses, cooperative organisations, the final consumer, or to an institutional actor (public office, 
WFP). Transactions can be done at the farm gate, in the village, at a local, regional, urban or export market. 
The product may be on display or not (traditional physical markets or agricultural exchanges). The methods of 
sale are also quite varied: in cash or credit, before harvest, at the peak of production, or later during the lean 
season, etc. 
The initiatives illustrate different types of activities that FOs carry out to facilitate access to the market and 
the marketing of products: direct or indirect services and functions to move products, improve production, and 
obtain better conditions of sale and/or marketing, particularly through the creation of strong support networks 
for dealing with buyers. 
Among the initiatives studied, ten emblematic and exemplary cases were chosen for comparative and 
transversal studies in chapters 2 and 3. These consist of long-established FOs that have carried out a number 
of long-term collective marketing activities. 
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CHAPTER 2: Individual and collective activities by farmers: comparison sheets 
Among the activities that farmers and FOs have carried out in terms of access to markets and marketing, fifteen 
are presented here. They follow one after the other in the form of relatively independent “information sheets” 
to be used “a la carte”. For many farmers, sales are made individually with buyers or intermediaries at the farm 
gate (sheet 1) or at nearby markets (sheet 2). All of the FO activities illustrated here can be grouped into four 
main categories:
1) FO activities to support farmers by increasing the value of a given product: transportation of the member’s 
products by the FO to distant markets or buyers; purchasing and warehousing of stock to enable it to be sold 
after a period of storage; credit provided by the FO for the marketing of products (warranted credit given by 
the FO can allow farmers to defer sales); transformation and conditioning of products post-harvest to create 
added value; access to other markets where there is the possibility of selling for a better price later on (sheets 
3 to 6).
 These activities, which we might term “classic”, often seek an increase in price levels for products: gains 
from a geographic differential (price difference between village and town), gains from a temporal differential 
(price fluctuation between harvest and shortfall periods), gains from value added. These gains are in fact 
highly variable for farmers and their FOs; many attempts are marked by failure and finally by a move toward 
contracts with private companies or external organisations to carry out these activities. 
2) FO activities well upstream of the marketplace, seeking to improve production techniques and quality and 
reduce the cost of bringing produce to market (sheets 7 and 8). 
 These activities, developed for given markets (specific places, volumes, qualities and buyers) can often help 
improve access to markets for produce and boost demand, to the benefit of farmers. 
3) FO activities seeking to improve transaction and market conditions, with a favourable environment and 
greater transparency between supply and demand for products. In this case we find: buyer searches, steps 
to improve the transparency of supply and demand, better weighing and measuring stations, concentrating 
product sales in one specific area of the market, regulating supply, organising agricultural exchanges, etc. 
(sheets 9 to 13). 
 Here the FO plays an intermediary role between farmers and buyers, but does not itself purchase products: 
it brings actors together, facilitates transactions and the creation of contracts. As well as reducing the cost 
of transactions, these activities tend to create a better balance of power and negotiating positions between 
farmers and buyers. Farmers who sell their products within certain common guidelines see their position 
improve thanks to better access to the market and higher earnings from the sale of their products. 
4) Activities and participation by the FO with other sector actors at the level of consultation platforms, 
interprofessional regulatory spaces and/or with the State. In this case, agreements and regulatory policies 
can be established to help the FOs improve their positions and participate in setting up policies, rules and 
agreements for markets that are more favourable to them. FOs can also participate in policy negotiations in 
the agricultural sector, such as action by FOs concerning borders (sheets 14 and 15). 
 Here the action of FOs seeks to establish rules and regulations of operation that are durable over the 
long term, as well as to develop activities among suppliers that benefit individual farmers. The forms of 
interprofessional organisation are quite varied, and do not always work when they have too many aims or 
when members are too widely dispersed. In the interprofessional organisations that do work, the FOs are only 
present if they are well-prepared and intervene with clearly defined positions. At the political level, FOs have 
gained considerably in terms of legitimacy and awareness, but there is still a long road ahead . 
Each sheet gives a complete description of objectives, principles and concrete examples, as well as critical 
analysis underscoring important aspects to be considered by FOs, NGOs and other organisations carrying out 
similar activities with farmers. 
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CHAPTER 3: Insights from the participatory analysis of local initiatives
This chapter discusses the main points and key questions related to initiatives by farmers and FOs to improve 
the marketing of agricultural products. We cannot deny the important role played by FOs in facilitating access 
to markets and the marketing of agricultural products grown by farmers. However, are FOs always capable of 
assuming all of these types of activities? Can or should they try to do everything? 
The question of the relation between farmers and their FOs is a constantly recurring one. Farmers may see 
themselves as more or less involved, as indebted, or as simple users of collective activities carried out by FOs, 
which itself is not without problems. Are FOs simply service providers among a host of others available on the 
market? 
This chapter also addresses reflections on the method and tools used by the Working Group, and more broadly 
the methods and tools used to reinforce the activities of FOs in terms of the marketing of agricultural products. 
What results can we gather from this entire process, with its multiple spaces of exchange and reflection between 
actors (case studies, work exchanges and forums held with their involvement)? What are the impacts and 
possible consequences, if any, of adopting “best practices”? What structures with a larger geographical scope 
can be envisioned, extending beyond local initiatives? 
Participatory methods of collective reflection are complicated and take a long time to put in place, requiring 
specific forms of funding that allow for effective involvement. Still, despite limits in human and financial capital, 
it is necessary to address this issue.
Conclusion
The conclusion summarises some key findings drawn from our experience and work with this methodology: 
- Improved product marketing is a key factor in order to increase farmers’ revenue. This activity that should be 
given high priority. 
- Ingrained prejudices and set notions do not provide the key to finding solutions. Merchants are not necessarily 
thieves: they offer services, and their “opportunistic” behaviour can be attributed to a shifting and insecure 
environment. This same low level of security can lead farmers in a precarious position to adopt short-term 
individual strategies that hinder the collective dynamics of a FO. 
- There exists a range of possible collective and individual solutions. These are more or less complex 
depending on the individual circumstances of farmers. 
- Processing, marketing and transporting goods are activities that require knowledge. These professions 
cannot simply be picked up, without training, and FOs cannot substitute themselves for professional workers. 
Furthermore, these kinds of “frontal attacks” are not the most profitable for the farmers themselves. 
-  In order to be effective, farmers and their organisations need to be actors in the initiatives and projects that 
concern them, working closely with development actors. Adequate methods, tools and time are required as 
communicating and sharing work between these different families of actors calls for preparation and follow-
up to maintain the process. 
10 11
CONTRIBUTORS
This document is the result of work and information exchange carried out by the thematic Working 
Group devoted to “Market access and agricultural product marketing”. 
This thematic Working Group led by Inter-réseaux Développement rural directly involved more 
than 300 people from sub-Saharan Africa in field work, between 2004 and 2007. Participants came 
principally from Benin, Cameroon, Guinea and Mali, but also from Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ivory 
Coast, Madagascar, Niger, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Senegal. The participants were 
drawn from more than 50 different organisations, primarily farmers’ organisations (FOs) but also 
traders’ organisations and bodies supporting FOs and rural development (NGOs, projects).
We would like to highlight in particular the efforts of individuals and organisations1 that were heavily 
involved in the Working Group.
Actors from Farmers’ Organisations (FOs)
Men and women from farmer’s organisations in different countries in Africa, elected farmer members 
of FOs as well as paid staff from these organisations, were the central actors in the Working Group. They 
did not withhold either their valuable time or their energy. Without their ability and their willingness to 
share information, discuss their thoughts and learn from others, this work would not have seen the light 
of day. We highlight in particular the efforts made by members and staff of the following FOs: 
• Benin: CCR, Fupro/UDP Atacora, Udoper and the women’s farming and processing organisations;
• Burkina Faso: Coopérative de Mogtédo;
• Cameroon: Afebid, Binum, Fferudjal, Nnem Mbock, Nowefor;
• the Democratic Republic of Congo: the Asali network;
• Guinea: Avic, CNOP-G, CNOP-GF, FPFD, UPBM, Upik, Woko;
• Ivory Coast: Anopaci;
• Madagascar: Fifata and the Soa network;
• Mali: AOPP, APPS, FOPB, Jèka Feeré, ULPC; 
• Niger: the Fucopri and FUPSN Sa’a federations;
• Rwanda: the IMBARAGA union, the Roparwa, Ucorirwa network;
• Senegal: the Fongs and Ujak organisations.
Actors from bodies supporting FOs and rural development 
A number of actors from local NGOs and international development groups contributed highly valuable 
assistance to FOs on the ground. Without them, work with the FOs could not have been carried out. We 
appreciate their trust and cooperation. In particular we thank: 
1 List of countries, organisations and individual names in alphabetical order. It is worth noting that certain people may have 
changed organisation since the fieldwork carried out by the Working Group. For more information on in people and their 
organisations, see Appendix: Participants in the Working Group.  
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• Benin: Huberte Djevi and Anne-Claire Outtier from ABD-Geres (NGO), Anastase Kiche with the 
team from Alternatives (NGO) and François Geay with the PPAB-Paimaf teams (French cooperation) 
and the consultant Paul Onibon;
• Cameroon: Sylvie Mbog, her team from Odéco (NGO) in particular Dieudonné Moudié, Valentine 
Achancho, Christian Huet and the team from Pari, in particular Martin José Ndonna Mimbiang 
(French cooperation), Guillaume Fongang from Saild (NGO) and Aurélian Mbzibain (Belgian 
cooperation/Nowefor FO);
• Europe: Cécile Beaure d’Augères and Laure Hamdi of Afdi, Caroline Bah from Afrique Verte 
International, Géké Appeldorm and Franz Van Houf of Agriterra, Valentin Beauval (French farmer, 
study for the Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement);
• Guinea: Dany Lanoé and the CNOP-G support teams (French cooperation), the teams from Dynafiv, 
Thierno Bah with his team from Inader (NGO), Lucien Gnekoya and the team from Maropa in 
Guinea Forestière;
• Mali: Mamadou Goïta, Mohamed Haidara, Mamadou Bathily, and the entire team from Amassa 
Afrique Verte Mali (NGO), Baba Mamadou Kone and Abdoulmaye Ndiaye from the Chambers of 
Agriculture and Apcam.
Members of Inter-réseaux Développement rural who were particularly involved
Finally, we would like to highlight contributions made by founding members and/or administrators of 
Inter-réseaux. These contributions varied depending on the types of intervention and the individuals 
involved, but each one was valuable and always appreciated: 
• Valentine Achancho, from the leadership of the PAOs and support to agricultural production, in 
charge of the PAOs and the national coordinator of the Pari project (CMR-AFD) in Cameroon, 
founding member and administrator of Inter-réseaux. His efforts and the mobilisation of his teams 
were indispensable to the success of work in Cameroon.
• Daouda Diagne, in charge of information and communication with the Fongs Action Paysanne 
Federation in Senegal, founding member and administrator of Inter-réseaux. His involvement at 
various steps in the process and in particular as the primary organiser of the Bamako workshop in 
January 2007 were very valuable.
• Souleymane Ouattara, Director of the Jade Productions press agency in Burkina Faso, founding 
member and administrator of Inter-réseaux. He directly contributed to the creation of video 
recordings and also graciously shared his experience and thoughts about video as a tool and its use in 
the development field. 
All of these individuals and organisation contributed to the activities and result of the Working Group, 
and therefore to the present document. 
The analysis and reflection discussed here took place in the field between 2004 and 2007. Since then 
the FOs discussed in this document have been able to evolve and adapt their activities to improve the 
marketing of their members’ products (keeping current circumstances in mind and in particular the 
economic crisis in 2008-2009). We think this work and analysis are worth sharing more widely, and will 
be useful for provoking debate and constructing actionable collective thinking. 
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“One must always concede that there is an element of truth 
in what others say, and not that the whole truth is what I, my 
country, my race, my religion believe. If you know that you do not 
know, so you will know. However, if you do not know that you do 
not know, you will never know.”
Amadou Hampâté Bâ
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INTRODUCTION
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Many farmers highlight the difficulties they encounter when trying to sell 
their products and the low levels of profit that they are able to earn. Market 
access is an initial difficulty, but it is only one aspect of the problem: once at 
market, they must sell for a price that generates sufficient income for them. 
In order to deal with these difficulties, farmers have developed individual 
and collective initiatives. These initiatives often remain little-known and 
many preconceptions and caricatures about how markets work continue to 
block and constrain them at the local level. 
It is against this background and in the framework of the Working Group, 
“Market Access and Agricultural Product Marketing”, that Inter-réseaux 
initiated a process of collective thinking based on shared analysis and case 
studies. 
On its own, this theme is extremely broad and could be approached from 
multiple angles and at different scales. Furthermore, the diversity of socio-
economic and agro-environmental contexts confronted by farmers and 
breeders translates into a large range both of production systems and 
collective organisations put in place to improve their marketing activities. 
Various choices concerning methodology and angles of approach were 
made in order to steer the Working Group and limit the scope of its work. 
These choices, particularly the choice to work only with case studies 
involving family farmers, are outlined in this section.
Among other things, these choices provide the reader with a clearer 
understanding of the aims of this document, its structure and content, and 
the audience we hope to reach.
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1 – CONTEXT
1.1 – Difficult market access and marketing conditions
An unstable supply of agricultural products
Agricultural output, on the African continent as in other regions, is characterised by irregularity 
due to the annual and even multi-annual seasons of biological processes (there is no such thing as 
continuous production; instead it “spurts” in periods of harvest) and their subordination to disease and 
climatic changes. Agricultural output depends upon complex processes linked to living and changing 
beings; soil and plant interactions with micro fauna; plant-air exchanges, etc. In agriculture we work 
with living things and not with dead matter (as is the case with the automobile industry, for example). 
Certain systems of agricultural production seek to distance themselves from the agro-environmental 
setting by introducing elements of artificiality: in these systems, it is not a matter of adapting seeds to 
a specific setting, but of adapting the setting to suit a certain type of seed (high-capacity seed stock 
used with specific types of fertiliser).2 As a general rule, however, agricultural systems are dependent 
on the weather, on the climate, the time period of biological growth process, and the perishable nature 
of numerous agricultural products. The supply of agricultural products is characterised by instability, 
both quantitative and qualitative. 
Added to the difficulty of mastering production is the weak elasticity and even rigidity of demand 
among buyers: no matter what happens, populations require agricultural products to feed themselves. 
This leads to an absence of spontaneous adjustment of supply to meet demand for agricultural products 
and to instability in pricing (agricultural markets have always been unstable). 
Non-optimal operation of markets
Analyses of sub-Saharan Africa reveal less-than-optimal market mechanisms that strongly shape 
the poor adjustment between supply and demand for agricultural products: failing infrastructure 
for warehousing and transportation, weakness in the banking system with the absence of credit 
and insurance markets, non-competitive situations (a limited number of buyers in dominant and/or 
concentrated positions facing a multitude of disorganised sellers), asymmetries in access to and quality 
of information, rules and norms applied in a discriminatory fashion, formal and informal taxation 
leading to higher costs (lack of transparency in pricing and the factors that govern it). Agriculture is not 
merely about agricultural products: it involves all of the socio-economic processes and organisations 
that drive it, including the relations of production (differential access to the means of production such as 
land, money, equipment, labour), the balance of power between actors in both the supply chain and the 
markets that give actors more or less room to make choices and confront risks. 
Instability in prices
In the end all of these factors, at both the supply and demand levels, result in uncertain and unstable 
market prices and often in poor remuneration for farmers. This is not without its consequences: 
weakly remunerating and/or unstable prices do not motivate farmers to risk making mid- to long-term 
investments in agricultural production (one doesn’t invest in a perennial plantation for only one year!). 
Agricultural price instability obviously also affects consumer prices and consumer purchasing power 
(most often but not always in cities). It is a general factor of instability at the country level. 
2 These system scan also introduce new forms of dependence, for example if farmers do not have a choice among sources of 
fertiliser and their suppliers. 
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It is worth noting a simple fact: agricultural products, in particular staple nutritional foods, are not like 
other types of merchandise. The recent changes in agricultural markets and crises related to purchasing 
power and access to food among populations in the underdeveloped South are a reminder: while we 
might be able to put off buying a new television set or a pair of shoes, the need to eat is a daily one. The 
impossibility of deferring the need for this good according to market availability and price is of course 
a major source of tension and instability, which can be dangerous for civil peace. 
Markets that do not self-regulate
It is well-known that agricultural markets are not self-regulating. There is no meeting point between 
supply and demand with optimal allocation of resources for the common good. The “invisible hand” 
is not only invisible, it is also often clumsy. In fact, if the invisible hand’s regulating actions are hardly 
perceptible (because in agriculture more than in other sectors, the market is not regulated by itself), 
it can have very sharp claws! At the risk of taking an overly strong “pro-farmer” position against 
urban consumers, it is nevertheless urgent to find solutions to improve rural conditions, to preserve the 
stability of countries. 
Stability for whom? (Stew, GDS 25, 2003)
Limits and new opportunities for farmers
Today, economic deregulation, population growth, urban expansion, and highly fluctuating prices (both 
upwards and downwards) are important factors to consider because they materially change the conditions 
of access to markets and marketing.3 We might wonder whether the increase in prices is structural or 
3 Améliorer le fonctionnement des marchés agricoles d’Afrique de l’Ouest. Alary P., Blein R., Faivre Dupaigre B., Soule B.G. –    
Farm, February 2008. – 75 p.
- Empowering Smallholder Farmers in Markets. Working document from  Esfim. – NRI-Cirad-WUR, 2007. – 5 p.
- Filières agroalimentaires en Afrique: comment rendre le marché plus efficace? Griffon M. et al. – Cirad, 2001.
- The Coffee Paradox: Global Markets, Commodity Trade and the Elusive Promise of Development. Daviron B., Ponte S. – 
Cirad-CTA, 2007.
- The Agricultural Potential of West Africa. Blein R., Faivre Dupaigre B., Soule B.G., Yérima B. – Farm, 2008.
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circumstantial, and if these factors can represent opportunities to be seized by farmers (local markets, 
demands to satisfy, better prices). Can farmers benefit from price increases? What consequences does 
this have for consumers, remembering that farmers are also themselves consumers? Outside of their 
ability to innovate and organise, the strategies and room to manoeuvre available to farmers are limited, 
in particular by the purchasing power of consumers and competition from imported products. 
The risk of moving toward a dual agriculture (of the South American variety) cannot be ignored. The 
stereotype is of an agricultural model based on a limited number of “modern advanced” farmers, with 
highly specialised systems of production oriented towards cash crops for export markets, and a large 
mass of rural poor who are dependent on food aid. There is also the risk that production systems may 
break the fragile balance of local ecological, nutritional and social systems and introduce imbalances 
between rural areas. This can foster emigration from the poorest rural areas towards those that have 
more resources (where there are irrigation ditches, for example), with the associated human and 
environmental consequences. Finally, the measures in favour of urban populations taken by several 
States following the recent food crisis in 2008 should not be allowed to mask the risk of national 
imbalances. 
1.2 – Worthwhile but under-valued initiatives 
Confronted with these market failures, farmers and their organisations have not remained inactive 
and passively accepted market conditions.4 A number of them have developed strategies, activities 
and services at different levels and on different scales in order to gain access to markets and sell their 
products on more favourable terms. These steps include organising production, managing supply, 
joining forces to sell collectively, negotiating and building alliances with different actors in the supply 
chain (merchants, transport, local officials, etc.), participating in multi-actor consultations, organising 
markets to make them more transparent, etc. 
These local initiatives illustrate the ability of farmers and rural people to adapt, innovate and organise. 
They organise among themselves or in connection with other actors in the supply chain to position and 
market their products on the best terms possible. All of this takes place despite the above-mentioned 
failures in the markets, which are “unstructured” and do not always work in their favour. Nevertheless, 
this wealth of responses is little known or misunderstood by actors working in rural development. A 
number of the possible causes are discussed below, including technical reasons as well as those linked 
to institutional development aid processes. 
Human reasons: actors with divergent interests
The actors involved in these initiatives may give priority to activities already underway and not have 
the time, the interest and/or the means to describe their own activities. Other local actors who might 
also be interested in the experience perhaps simply do not know about it. Experts in development, for 
their part, are reluctant to share information in the competitive “development marketplace”, because 
information constitutes a form of capital that can be used in project proposals, funding appeals, or job 
applications. Those who commission studies on these subjects may refuse to share the information for 
reasons of confidentiality. 
Lack of useful information makes analysis of initiatives difficult
Information that is too highly compartmentalised, or incomplete or imprecise in the use of terminology, 
numbers, and vocabulary, is often a barrier. In fact, economic and technical data that is incomplete, 
4 Economists have also evolved with the development of new theories (institutional and organisational economics) that point 
out the role of organisations as a means to coordinate and reduce imperfections in the market.
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incoherent or not properly situated in context (time, place) can lead to meaningless comparisons 
between prices at different times and places. 
On the other hand, overly general information can also create limits. This can happen in the case of an 
FO that prefers to present grand action plans that it would like to carry out in the future, rather than 
talking about activities that have already been completed and could help convince other FOs of their 
ability to predict and act effectively. How many plans have been made without ever having been carried 
out? This is also the case with regards to “experts”, who “distance” themselves so much from the 
field that their discourse becomes too conceptual and difficult to put into practice. How many reports 
have been produced in which the information presented is so general that it could have been obtained 
from interviews with key people from cities in the North or South, without the need for actors on the 
ground? 
Lastly, information which is too static, unsorted and all jumbled together like a picture with no sense of 
perspective, does not permit analysis of processes, conditions of growth, key change factors, etc.
Difficulty sharing initiatives: lack of adequate tools and spaces for exchange 
Long-distance exchange of information via new technology also has limits: e-mail, forums, and 
websites are very useful for disseminating information to a mass public, but they do not necessarily 
guarantee fruitful dialogue between farmers and their FOs. 
At the same time, external studies are also fraught with limitations: numerous studies have been carried 
out, but often due to a lack of time and means, the principal actors, the farmers themselves, are only 
peripherally involved in carrying out research. Consulted to provide information that fills these reports, 
the results that farmers receive are provided in hastily-organised workshops, dense reports that are too 
long to be read, or specific key projects on the ground.
We can also confirm the minimal impact derived from most workshops: the small amount of preparation 
beforehand, as well as the return to busy everyday life after the workshop, means the participants rarely 
have a meaningful exchange or derive much benefit post-workshop. There are also limitations in paired 
exchanges, which are often too short to provide a real analysis of local conditions. 
The difficulty of information exchange and communication between farmers or with their financial, 
commercial, and technical partners is also an important issue. 
1.3 – Deep prejudices and idealised stereotypes
It is unfortunate that initiatives started by farmers and their FOs are not more widely shared between 
farmers, FOs and other actors working in rural development. In fact, many farmers (although they aren’t 
the only ones) have little understanding of how markets function, of the mechanisms that drive pricing, 
and of the activities, roles and positioning of the actors who participate in them.5 A large number of 
farmers have views of the market that are based on caricatures, or on the contrary, idealised views of 
stereotyped “models” that do not exist. These views lead FOs to develop activities and services that are 
not well-adapted to the often complex realities and that do not meet the needs of farmer members. The 
examples below illustrate misguided positions and proposals meant to improve the lot of farmers. 
“We need a truck to transport our products to a place where prices are better!”
One stubborn misconception concerns merchants and intermediaries; farmers tend to see them as 
speculators and greedy profiteers: “Merchants are thieves!” Strategies to “eliminate” these actors are 
desired, researched and developed by farmers or promoted by aid organisations. 
5 NGOs and support projects are not exempt from this criticism
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However, these “eviction” strategies prove in many cases to be difficult to maintain over the long term, 
in particular when development projects run their course. 
We ask if these strategies – conceived in situations where the balance of power is unfavourable to farmers 
– ignore, or at the very least undervalue, the actual roles that merchants and other intermediaries play 
in the economy? Are these strategies always of benefit to farmers? 
“We need shops and funding for the FO so that it can purchase from farmers when they 
need money and sell when prices are highest!”
Because they need money, farmers are sometimes forced to sell at harvest time, when prices are at their 
lowest. As a result, any opportunity to obtain short-term capital is seen as a boon for farmers and their 
organisations: these funds allow the FO to buy the harvest at a good price from farmers who can thus 
obtain money without having to sell off their products. 
However, stories of short-term capital melting away like snow in the sun are also common. Is there 
always a gap in prices between harvest time and the shortfall season? Is warehousing really a good 
option for farmers in order to sell for better terms? Furthermore, upon closer examination, it appears 
that merchants do not always adopt these same strategies over the long term. In fact, FO purchasing 
freezes a large amount of capital with a largely uncertain outcome. 
“We need equipment to process our products to improve sales”
The implicit sub-text here is that “processed products sell for a higher price”. If we understand that a 
processed product includes a higher amount of added value, it remains to be seen who gets this added 
value. Is processing always synonymous with higher added value for the farmer? Is this true if farmers 
remain a weak link in the supply chain when it comes to negotiating power? 
“We need better information about markets in order to receive a higher price”
One common notion is that farmers lack information, that they do not know real prices, and that they 
are subsequently exploited by merchants who do not pay them fairly. This implicitly suggests that “if we 
knew which places offered the best prices, we would earn more money”. 
One obvious solution is to set up and give widespread access to price and market information systems 
(MIS). But does this solution always work? Is it enough for farmers to simply have information about 
market prices in order to access that market and/or orient their decisions in terms of production and 
marketing strategies? 
“Farmers are not sufficiently organised, they just need to come together to be 
stronger”
This is another way of saying that “if things are bad when we are on our own, they will be better if we 
are in a group. The only way is to organise to have more power to negotiate with merchants.” 
The problem is that in a context of price fluctuations, insecurity and/or poverty, collective strategies are 
much more difficult to maintain than individual strategies. When problems arise, the latter “opportunist” 
or “survivor” strategies will multiply, to the detriment of long-term collective strategies. Thus it is when 
“playing together” is most necessary that it is also the hardest to maintain group cohesion. 
In uncertain situations, betting on the future is risky, and it is more common to settle for “one” today 
instead of “two” tomorrow: “One in the hand is worth two in the bush”. 
The prevalence of “short-term individual strategies” is thus exacerbated. To add to the difficulty, 
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collective strategies are time-consuming and costly to put in place, while individual strategies spring 
readily from the numerous and tempting offers of buyers. 
“For successful marketing, we need a well-organised supply chain!”
Farmers often say that supply chains are “disorganised” or “unstructured”. They have in the back 
of their minds a nostalgic memory of the so-called organised supply chain model, referring to the 
integrated supply chains for cotton , or in other similar sectors where the State is deeply involved, 
notably export crops such as coffee and cocoa). 
However the “success” of the past6 appears to be less the result of modes of organisation and 
coordination of supply chains than the consequence of favourable international market conditions with 
higher global prices. Meanwhile, sectors that were previously highly regulated (with or without State 
intervention) are in the throes of profound restructuring in the current context of deregulation and no 
longer function “as before”. 
When it comes to other commodities, such as cashew nuts in Benin or other food sectors, can we really 
call them disorganised? Or are they organised in ways that the farmers do not understand or have not 
mastered? Or perhaps these sectors do not interest them, either as farmers (where prices are too low) or 
as consumers (where prices are too high). 
“The commodity chain is disorganised, we should create an inter-professional 
association!”
Another idealised stereotype, the interprofessional organisation model, is very popular at the moment. 
It is often initiated by development financiers, and is also popular with certain States and idealised by 
farmers. However in practice, there is no one single model. There are, on the contrary, many ways that 
farmers and other actors in the supply chain can organise themselves, each designed to address specific 
problems. 
Furthermore, what should we expect from a field in which the stakeholders (farmers’ organisations, 
processors and/or merchants) are very different in terms of level of organisation, information and 
power? Can multi-actor dialogue solve these problems? Is it enough to put actors side by side in multi-
actor forums so that measures are agreed across groups? Are these forums for consultation tools that 
are really favourable to farmers? 
“In order to sell our products, we need to protect our borders!”
Protectionism is often seen as a necessary and sufficient solution to resolve the problems of marketing: 
“stop importing rice so that we can sell our own rice”. We often hear the example of the trade embargo 
placed on Dutch potatoes and the subsequent success of the “Belle de Guinée” sold by the Fouta Djallon 
Federation.
But can local rice completely replace imported rice, in the desired quality and quantity, at the right 
places and at the right times? We might ask why other efforts to block imports of onion at the Guinean 
border, following complaints by the Fouta Djallon Federation, have not met with similar success. The 
erection of trade barriers is not a miracle solution. Besides, are there not instances, in the absence 
of trade protection, where organised farmers are able to access markets and sell their products for 
acceptable terms?
6 Of course not everyone is in agreement about the positive outlook on these statist societies. Farmers’ work was not always 
remunerated at a fair price.  
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1.4 – Overly general solutions, disconnected from reality
The facts have been known for several decades
Innumerable reports on the agricultural sector have been submitted to political and financial officials, 
based on teaching and research, the private sector, agro-business and farmers. All of these have 
explicitly pointed to multiple failures in markets. 
These studies regularly remind us of: (i) the lack of information and transparency; (ii) the lack 
of financing and suitable credit; (iii) problems of land management; (iv) infrastructure problems; 
(v) weaknesses in human resources; (vi) the low level of involvement by the affected parties in 
formulating programmes and policies; (vii) the lack of rules, or when they exist, corruption and absence 
of enforcement (at borders notably, but not exclusively). This list is not exhaustive.. 
The solutions have also been known for a long time
Where solutions are concerned, numerous studies have formulated lists of key measures that can 
improve the lot of farmers. 
They proclaim the need: (i) to minimise uncertainty in production; (ii) to improve transparency and 
access to markets; (iii) to improve infrastructure, notably roads; (iv) to invest in agricultural research; 
(v) to encourage innovation and its uptake; (vi) to facilitate access to varied forms of credit that meet 
different needs (short-term seasonal credit, medium- and long-term credit for investments in equipment); 
(vii) to improve border controls (viii) to embark on land-reform initiatives; (ix) to eliminate corruption 
(x) to involve local populations and adopt “participatory” models; (xi) to improve skills, etc.
For FOs to better market products, it is deemed “necessary” in particular to improve: 
• Access to transport, notably to profit from the difference in prices between cities and rural areas;
• Access to means of processing to increase added value; 
• Access to credit or short-term capital to enable storage, allowing farmers to benefit from the price 
difference between the harvest and the off-season. 
• Access to information about prices and markets, in order to gain from greater transparency and 
optimal market choices. 
It is also often said that collective action by organised farmers is necessary: increasing the negotiating 
power of farmers; creating pluri- or inter-professional organisations or discussion forums; setting up 
supply chains, etc. The list of a priori solutions is not exhaustive either. 
Impractical solutions
Why do so many studies and workshops continually repeat themselves? Is it because the researchers 
were not aware of previous work carried out by others? “Many things have already been written, but 
not all of them have been read”.7 Then the problem becomes how to keep track of what has already been 
said or written by others. 
Perhaps these studies repeat themselves because they are too disconnected from reality and do not 
propose truly satisfying solutions. Is it realistic to think that we can arrive at a point where farmers and 
their FOs would have access to credit, would have short-term capital and could produce, store, process, 
transport and sell their products directly to the final consumers (after having been fully informed of the 
best market conditions thanks to a functional information system)? Is this not a vision of an idealised 
7 Roger Perelman.
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world based on solutions that contradict local realities? Can farmers really be expected to internalise 
this entire process? Is this not an attempt to push them to retreat from connections with other actors and 
realities? Are there situations where farmers operate without keeping track of other actors and/or in an 
environment where “everything works” (credit, infrastructure, transparent markets, etc.)? 
Does reality not demonstrate the difficulty of working in an environment that is not ideal, nor a priori 
favourable? Farmers are not the only ones making decisions, either as to how supply chains should 
work, or at the policy level. Doesn’t this view incite farmers to fold in on themselves and take an 
isolationist stance that increases their risks?
Furthermore, are these solutions – as much as they can be adapted to local situations – fully effective? 
One-size-fits-all solutions that begin with “You just need to…” have a tendency to ignore the specificity 
and diversity of local situations, and rarely explain “why” they have not yet been suggested or applied. 
These solutions rarely propose the “how”, which is needed to apply them in concrete terms at the local 
scale. Local actors appear too infrequently in these “cure all” solutions which very rarely manage to 
“cure” local dynamics and produce dialogue. 
The We-Know-What-To-Do tribe (Samson, 2009)
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2 – SCOPE AND FRAMEWORK OF PROJECT
Rather than starting with what local actors, farmers and rural people could or should be doing, Inter-
réseaux started from existing local initiatives led by actors and their organisations. From this base Inter-
réseaux developed a process by which the actors analysed their own initiatives. 
2.1 – A choice of method: to study real initiatives using actors who are directly 
involved 
The starting point chosen to tackle this vast theme of “market access and agricultural product 
marketing” was to analyse existing reality, concrete cases, and what had already been done, rather than 
seeking general or generic solutions for “what should be done”. A second decision was made to carry 
out research with local actors, so that they could participate in “dissecting” and understanding local 
situations in all their complexity. In this way they were able to use existing examples to support local 
dynamics and/or improve decisions at the organisational level as well as with decision makers at higher 
levels. These choices are also intended for Inter-réseaux’s “target audience”: rural development actors 
for whom the analysis of concrete case studies by other practitioners could be enriching and could 
expand their tool kit of activities and references. 
This method of working around a specific theme, called the Thematic Working Group, was applied to 
the analysis of initiatives that farmers, rural people, and their organisations are carrying out to improve 
their access to markets and the marketing of their agricultural goods. Overall, the analysis looked at 
initiatives that had already been completed or were still ongoing, making up a rich wealth of experience. 
This work capitalised on these experiences so that other actors in rural development (agriculture, aid 
organisations) could be made aware of them and could extract knowledge that might be used in their 
own activities. 
Studies of initiatives were carried out with local actors from 2004 to 2007 in Benin, Cameroon, Guinea, 
and Mali primarily, and also in Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger and Senegal. The method 
focused on (i) analysis and comparison in different times and places (study of processes in a variety of 
places) rather than static descriptions, and (ii) collaborative reflection through the creation of forums 
and tools for discussion, as well as exchanges pertaining to farmers’ initiatives (visits, creation of 
documents, audio and video recordings ). 
2.2 – A field of study “limited” to family farmers 
Farmers whose strategies are based on family-scale holdings
Using the Working Group approach, we worked alongside farmers and breeders, individuals and 
members of organisations. This group of men and women who were part of “family-sized” farming 
operations was quite diverse. 
One definition of family agriculture that we refer to frequently in this document is as follows: 
A definition of family farming
“One could say, in order to simplify, that family agriculture is characterised by the predominance of work by 
family members and a family-based organisation in the production process, on the one hand, and on the 
other hand, by the existence of a clear link between production, consumption, and birth rates among those 
tied to the farm.
Defined using these characteristics, family-scale agriculture comprises highly differentiated situations with 
regards to access to land (land-owning farmers with very different types of land rights, landlords and tenant 
30 31
farmers, landless farmers, etc.), production techniques (manual labour, animal labour, mechanisation), 
productivity, and final destination of farm production (home consumption, local exchanges, supplying 
national and international markets).”   
Source : MR. Mercoiret, p. 149, in “Les organisations paysannes et les politiques agricoles”. Afrique contemporaine 
n°217. – AFD, 2006-1. – p. 135-157.
Families are rooted in the land, and strategies employed by family farmers to run their operations are 
also very often linked to a specific territory, that of the village or the community where the family lives. 
It is for others therefore to talk about family-based rural agriculture.
We have chosen this definition among others because it corresponds to the study group of the present 
work.8 
 “Views” on family agriculture (Stew, GDS 44, 2008)
Family-scale farmers possess different levels of access to the means of production (labour, land, capital), 
as well as to markets for agricultural products, land, and credit. Also, due to their relationship to the 
family unit and local territory, family-scale farmers behave differently from more wealthy investors 
and/or “capitalist” or “absentee” landowners, who are of another order, economically and financially 
speaking.9
We are careful to avoid the easy and misleading confusion between “family farmers” and “small 
farmers” (cf. box below). Family farmers have constraints and strategies to overcome them, which 
differ from those of the other types of farmers discussed above, and it is interesting to consider these 
in greater detail. 
This choice of focusing on family agriculture can be justified by the fact that family farms predominate 
in the countries where this work was carried out, and more generally throughout sub-Saharan Africa, 
where they play an essential role. 
8 Pour l’agriculture familiale: Oui, mais laquelle ? / GDS 43, p 29. – Inter-réseaux, 2008. – 2 p.
9 If family farmers have strategies linked to the family’s life cycle, wealthy investors and absentee landlords have strategies 
that are mainly geared toward the maximisation of profits taken from invested capital and/or income linked to land speculation. 
Their strategies and means of accessing markets and selling their products are therefore very different.  
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“African agriculture is highly diverse but for the most part, consists of family agriculture. Their 
contribution to production remains high in most of the countries on the continent; they cannot 
however be understood simply through their productive function: they also play an important role in 
food security, employment and revenue, as well as in the management of renewable environmental 
resources; they thus contribute in an important way to the territorial, social and political balance of a 
number of countries.”10
Family farmers and their organisations also constitute part of the target audience for Inter-réseaux. The 
initiatives for marketing discussed in this document are exclusively conducted by family farmers. 
Subsistence crops, cash crops, sale crops and commercial crops farmers
In the literature as in common parlance, distinctions are often made between the following activities: 
• On one hand farmers who produce subsistence crops which are rapidly consumed by the families 
themselves. These “little” farmers are considered to be disconnected from the markets. 
• On the other hand farmers who grow so-called cash crops, which are easily absorbed as export crops 
(cotton, coffee or cocoa).11 These farmers are considered to be “real farmers” with an actual function, 
producing food or primary materials destined for sale to consumers and industrialists. 
It is thus easy to assign family production to the “small-scale subsistence” category, which is intended 
only to meet the nutritional needs of the individual family. Reality is of course more complex. 
Subsistence crops can be produced to feed urban centres, above and beyond what is required for the 
family. While less visible, because they come from a multitude of dispersed farmers, these crops are 
no less important for feeding the cities.12 Subsistence crops might initially be planted to be consumed 
by the family (in order to avoid purchasing foodstuffs at a higher price) and end up being sold to meet 
an immediate need for money. Elsewhere, a single farmer might combine subsistence crops, whether 
destined for the market or not (tomato, onion) along with crops that are clearly intended for sale (ginger, 
cashew nuts, cotton etc.). 
We thus see that individual cases are much more complex, and cannot be reduced to the simple 
stereotypes set out above. 
Farmers consumers: is selling a commercial choice? 
It is possible to talk about marketing strategies used by farmers who produce ginger or coffee crops for 
sale, when they seek to improve their marketing efforts by acquiring better knowledge of the actors in 
the supply chain and the mechanisms that set prices, for example.
But what should be said of products that were not initially intended for sale, when the grower is forced 
to sell his or her rice, at the immediately available price in order to get cash (to set up other agricultural 
activities or to pay for healthcare or education)? Indeed, the grower’s product ends up in the market. 
However, is it appropriate to refer to issues of market access and agricultural product marketing in 
this type of situation? Can one address market access and agricultural product marketing without also 
considering questions like access to credit, food security, and the vulnerability of populations? 
It is important avoid mixing up objectives, and to differentiate between problems related to “market 
access and marketing” and other kinds of problems (access to credit, very vulnerable populations). This 
10 MR. Mercoiret, 2006.
11 Talking about “cash” crops when they are produced by family farmers, and for small amounts of money, is perhaps a misuse 
of language:  When does something become a cash crop? Are farmers in Mali who grow cotton, cash croppers? If export 
production is assimilated into cash crops, might fair trade products and supply chains become the latest cash crop market 
entrants?“
12 Cf. the numerous works by Cirad on this subject.
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said, these questions remain interdependent: farmers are also consumers, and farm populations still 
constitute an important proportion of the total population in many countries. It is therefore necessary 
to consider these questions along with those pertaining to food security and policy choices about the 
decisions and means required to feed populations, whether rural or urban. 
Family farmers, rural folk, small farmers, rural poor?
Despite the plethora of different terms employed, we must not confuse “family” with “small” production 
(cf. box below). Family farmers produce agricultural food, whether they consume or sell their products. 
The “farmer” used throughout this document refers to men and women who pursue agricultural or 
breeding activities on family-based farms, whether the products are consumed or sold. Likewise, the 
term FO designates farmers’ organisations that bring together men and women who pursue agricultural 
activities on family farms.13
Family agriculture: persistent myths that are difficult to debunk
Family-based agriculture is still often misperceived as being small, archaic, not modern, unproductive, 
limited to subsistence, obsolete, a thing of the past, incapable of innovation, resistant to change, rigid, anti-
capitalist, non-competitive, not adapted to the market, and synonymous with poverty. Inversely commercial 
agriculture, which possesses much higher concentrations of capital (and fertiliser), is almost always 
qualified as modern, dynamic, entrepreneurial, integrated with markets, productive, profitable, and capable 
of feeding the world. However reality is not so simple.
“Family-based” = “small”?
A “small” family farmer in Brazil cultivates around 100 ha; a farmer with 1 ha in a rice plain in Vietnam could 
not be considered to be a small farmer. Family-scale agriculture exists in a plurality of types and offers 
extremely different examples depending on the societies in which they are located. They span a large 
range of situations, from small tenant farmers to mechanised farming, maybe even employing paid labour. 
A family-scale farm can also be very large! 
“Family-based” = “anti-capitalist”?
Numerous analyses show the competitive advantages of family agriculture in terms of getting the maximum 
out of inputs: family farms can be more economically efficient than other forms of agriculture that are 
considered “modern”! 
“Family-based” = “rigid”?
Family-scale farmers have demonstrated their dynamism, flexibility, capacity to innovate, ability to adapt 
innovations to the requirements of the market, readiness to respond to market signals and to adapt to rapid 
changes in the economic and political system – sometimes at an unfortunately high social and economic 
cost. 
“Family based” = “marginal”?
Family agriculture plays an important role in terms of contribution to the economy (percentage of GDP) and 
employment for the population in Africa as well as on other continents: 1.3 billion people are active in family 
agriculture in the Global South, and close to 2.5 billion people if we also count those who depend directly 
on this activity (41% of the global population).
“Larger” = “more profitable”?
In agriculture, productivity is not proportional to the land area under cultivation: large farms do not always 
provide economies of scale.
Source: Insert in GDS n°23 on “l’agriculture familiale” / A. Lothoré. – Inter-réseaux, 2003.
13 In these family farms, agricultural activity might not be the only form of support, with rural populations often engaging in a 
number of different activities. Cf. GDS n°45: Activités rurales non agricoles. – Inter-réseaux, 2008. – 16 p.
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2.3 – Diversity of contexts and strategies that defy exhaustive categorisation
The limitations to our work also derive from the diversity of strategies used by farmers and their FOs. 
Within family agriculture itself, the diversity of activities conceived and developed by the farmers to 
market their products is enormous, as reported in several African countries targeted by the Working 
Group. The FOs themselves are highly diverse: groups of individual farmers, intermediaries and 
federations, can all represent different kinds of farmers and engage in a broad range of economic, social 
and/or organised activities. This pluralism is the result of a multiple changing contexts, particularly 
agro-environmental and socio-economic, as well as the diverse and evolving objectives of farmers and 
communities.. This illustrates that no single activity is intrinsically the best response; an activity may 
be useful at a given moment, and turn out to be poorly suited later on.
Initiatives by FOs that were judged to be potentially interesting were identified beforehand according to 
their characteristics: types of sales, size of the initiative, volume, number of people involved, etc. 
The initiatives finally chosen by the Working Group were determined by ongoing local dynamics: 
availability and immediate priorities, relevance for specific marketing activities, outcomes of collective 
action and thinking.
The ten FO initiatives that appear throughout this document do not cover the entirety of those studied by 
the Working Group. The target FOs share the common feature of having existed for a number of years, 
and thus having had the opportunity to experiment with a large array of activities, some of which were 
successes while others were failures. The analysis of both successes and failures enabled the Working 
Group to better understand the factors that led to success for FOs and their marketing activities. 
Activities by FOs at the level of agricultural policy or international negotiations are not covered in the 
scope of this document. The present work therefore does not make a claim to exhaustiveness, and this 
document presents only a partial vision of the existing reality. 
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3 – OBJECTIVES OF THIS DOCUMENT AND INTENDED AUDIENCES
3.1 – A wealth of information to share and discuss
This document can be considered a resource compendium of methods and tools used by the Working 
Group to create different forums and forms of debate and exchange. But as readers will have already 
noted, it devotes a great deal of space to analyses from case studies carried out with farmers and support 
organisations. 
The aim is to publicise and relay information about the local initiatives run by farmers and their 
organisations, describing the diversity of initiatives that exist to help improve access to markets and the 
marketing of agricultural products. 
This document testifies to the capacity for innovation and adaptation by actors in the Global South in a 
context of opening borders and economic liberalisation, trends which are not always in their favour. 
It is also intended to fuel debate. It is an invitation to look at local dynamics and experience for the 
benefit of future activities and to improve the practices dealing with access to markets and the marketing 
of agricultural products. 
This document is not a manual. It is a tool for the organisation of discussions about approaches and 
practices: 
• Methods of building collaborative exercises and the case for local initiatives as tools for change 
(chapters 1 and 3); 
• Methods used by farmers and/or organisations that support them, to improve access to markets and 
the marketing of agricultural products (chapters 2 et 3).
It is particularly intended for farmers and those who support their activities: organisers, development 
workers, staff from FOs, NGOs, and other rural development support organisations, political decision-
makers and funding agencies. Although this work was carried out in sub-Saharan Africa, this document 
might be useful for those actors who work in other geographical areas, even those outside of the African 
continent. 
This desire to encourage exchange and collective discussion explains in particular the decision 
to organise chapter 2 (comparative studies of individual and collective activities by farmers) into 
individual information sheets on the different types of activities carried out by FOs. 
3.2 – Comparative-analysis sheets on FO initiatives to promote debate 
The comparative analyses of initiatives dealing with market access and agricultural product marketing 
constitute the heart of this document (chapter 2). We could have limited ourselves to a few lines 
summarising general findings. This would have meant writing in general terms, covering topics 
discussed by others elsewhere, already known to readers and of little use for actors on the ground. 
These sheets on the other hand accord importance to examples that illustrate in each case the common 
points between types of activity: according to context, the degree of FO organisation, chances for 
success, etc. Each of these sheets can be used separately to guide reflection about the themes chosen by 
discussants. 
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Highlighting the risks and the limitations of activities: constructive criticism
For each type of activity described in chapter 2 (purchasing and storage, warrantage credit, etc.) we 
intentionally emphasised the risks, limitations and difficulties encountered by the FOs that attempted 
them. 
This does not suggest that these activities were not “good” or useful, or that the FOs conducted them 
poorly. Highlighting risks and limitations in fact serves a double objective: 
• On the one hand, to show that for the most part, these activities are not easy to develop, and often 
emerge over the long term, through trial, error and collective learning; 
• And on the other hand, to encourage careful reflection before embarking on such activities because it 
is the farmers, members of FOs and others that we are trying to help who ultimately bear the burden 
of risk and suffer the consequences. Over-analysing the risks inherent to these practices might seem 
to be a form of short-term thinking, however this is also applicable to the long-term: if collective 
dynamics take a long time to successfully construct, they can also be quickly and permanently 
destroyed. 
Slices of reality: a choice to facilitate reading and allow users to hand-pick information 
We have chosen to present the activities carried out by farmers and their organisations in information 
files organised “by activity” or “by sheet”. 
This should not give the reader the impression that these activities are independent from one another: 
in reality, FOs often combine a number of different activities. Presenting the totality of activities in 
separate sections simply allows this document to be more easily absorbed piece by piece, with users able 
to choose “à la carte” when leading discussions about initiatives to market agricultural products.
No preference is expressed in the order of presentation of activities by farmers and their FOs. 
Nonetheless, the most widely known activities are often presented first. 
Tools to complement the comparative-analysis sheets
Complementing the comparative-analysis sheets from chapter 2, which present the activities of the FOs 
in a segmented fashion, there are other materials available: experience summaries, audio and video 
recordings as well as filmmaking guides. These materials relate to the cases studied by the Working 
Group.14 They can be usefully read, listened to or viewed for a better understanding of the experience 
of each FO mentioned in the analysis sheets below. 
These other written and recorded materials present the experiences of the FOs using a historical 
approach. They analyse the failures and successes of the FOs over the course of their evolution and 
across multiple activities aimed at improving the marketing of their members’ agricultural products. 
14 All of these materials are available online at www.inter-reseaux.org.
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Construction d’une réflexion collective
et sélection d’initiatives locales 
à étudier et à comparer
CHAPTER 1
Elaborating
collective reflection
and selecting local initiatives
for comparison and study
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The claims advanced in the introduction are of three different types:
1) Market access and agricultural product marketing are difficult tasks 
for farmers;
2) Local initiatives remain little-known by actors in the agricultural sector 
itself, as well as by local and foreign aid organisations; 
3) Local farmers – and they are not the only ones – maintain stereotypical 
misconceptions about the market. 
Conscious of the high stakes and diversity of different situations, Inter-
réseaux initiated a collective thinking process to analyse and share 
knowledge about initiatives led by FOs to improve market access and 
agricultural product marketing. 
This method was developed through “Thematic Working Groups” by Inter-
réseaux. It is presented here in this first chapter on methods. 
The first part presents the approach used in the framework of the 
Working Group on “Market access and agricultural product marketing” 
to study, collect and exchange information about local initiatives using 
a participatory process of group reflection. In this section, we explicitly 
discuss:
• The general principles guiding this approach;
• The methodological tools (in particular the comparative approach) as 
well as communication tools (written and recorded materials, videos) 
that were used. 
The second part describes the main initiatives studied over the course of 
this process, and in particular those targeted for the comparative studies 
written up in the sheets in chapter 2. The target initiatives all share the 
common feature of coming from FOs which have existed for dozens 
of years, and have therefore experimented with a diverse spectrum of 
marketing activities. 
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1 – PRINCIPLES, APPROACHES AND TOOLS USED BY THE WORKING 
GROUP 
1.1 – General principles of the approach for a collective process 
The collective analysis approach of sharing case studies and building group reflection that was used 
here originated with the thematic Working Group approach used by Inter-réseaux, based on a set of 
common principles.15
The main principles are as follows:
• Rely on concrete experience and local dynamics; 
• Strongly involve local groups of actors in the case studies and the reflection process; 
• Move beyond the static description of experience to provide dynamic analyses emphasising a 
historical approach and the study of processes. This enables one to see the entire “film” (study of 
transformations and their causes) rather than simply the “snapshot” (current situation);
• Emphasise comparative approaches and attempt to establish a critical distance from one’s own 
experience and activities, as well as those of others. Such comparisons can take place over time 
(study of the evolution of marketing activities by a single FO) and across locations (study of activities 
carried out by FOs in different contexts); 
• Emphasise and encourage dialogue by actors about their activities: this does not mean simply talking 
about their own experiences or trying to transport their particular experiences elsewhere; 
• Help draw out useful insights from other contexts; 
• Emphasise the use of paired exchanges to build expertise and increase collective knowledge; 
• Promote wide dissemination of information to share results and encourage debate. 
1.2 – Field work spread out over a three-year period 
Over the course of the study process, several phases of activity were conducted with local partners 
and financial assistance from CTA. Several hundred people participated directly in the work16. This 
included farmers who helped perform analyses, participated in meetings/workshops and helped with 
the creation of support materials. To this list must also be added the organisers and NGO staff of 
projects that supported these activities. 
Pre-launch activities
A series of prior activities allowed us to clarify the main objectives, the geographic scope and the desired 
outcomes of the thematic Working Group: (i) a survey of existing information from key organisations 
and individuals, (ii) organisation of networks, and (iii) exchange of ideas and questions on the debate 
themes (via an electronic forum on “Commerce de produits agricoles dans les pays ACP et son rôle dans 
la dynamisation des économies locales ” in 2003, and additional field trips). 
The primary objective was to cover a diverse array of local marketing initiatives. It was the local actors 
themselves who presented these initiatives. 
15 Cf. on www .inter-reseaux.org: General presentation of the Inter-réseaux Thematic Working Groups. (in french)
16 Cf.: appendix.  
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Four countries were chosen: first Benin was selected as a “test” country, followed by Cameroon, Guinea 
and Mali. Each of these countries hosts a wide spectrum of different activities and ongoing dynamics 
affecting local actors. Neither the actors, nor the agricultural products concerned were identified from 
the outset; instead they were chosen according to local dynamics that we identified. In addition to the 
collaborative exchange of ideas, the goal was to produce and test the effectiveness of tools for sharing 
information about initiatives (written material, audio and video recordings, workshops, forums). 
Organisation of “groups from the South” to study local initiatives 
Certain local dynamics were then identified. Exchange and meetings on the ground with farmers, FOs 
and support structures allowed us to identify: (i) marketing activities that were potentially interesting 
and worthy of analysis, and (ii) groups of actors already engaged in thinking or working in this area, 
and potentially interested in participating in the process. In each of the countries, this step took place 
over a period of three to six months. 
Next came the task of organising the initiatives into study groups, which took place in different steps: 
choosing a limited number of initiatives and locations to visit; choosing pairs of farmers or breeders to 
do the studies; discussing methods of analysis and the necessary resources (logistics, etc.); developing 
terms of reference on a case-by-case basis according to their specific features and the availability of 
groups. Four or five groups of actors per country were trained to visit and analyse the initiatives that had 
been chosen, during exchange periods lasting three to six months,. 
The process of exchange trips and analyses of FO initiatives was then launched:
• Preparation of visits with sharing of information, selection of research topics, and delegation of tasks 
(who would conduct interviews, who would write, who would oversee the collection of information 
etc.); 
• Field visits, opportunities for dialogue between exchange partners and the collection of 
information; 
• Periods of data analysis alternating with visits, enabling participants to take a step back and think 
about upcoming steps and field visits. 
This work of exchange visits and analyses took place over a period of 6 to 18 months, depending on 
availability and the amount of time needed to make collective decisions. This step involved dozens and 
even hundreds of people from each country involved in the study. This required logistical support and 
funding that the FOs would not have been able to supply on their own. 
1.3 – A variety of discussion forums and support materials 
The next step in the process was to publicise the results of the visits and the studies of initiatives. The 
knowledge exchanged during the field visits was used at a number of different levels: organisation and 
selection of information for publication; support to the participants of the Working Group to categorise 
and present their ideas; direct work with journalists and filmmakers to ensure that the content and 
format corresponded to the vision and requirements of the people involved in the experience. 17 
This enabled the production of a large quantity of support materials with the help of participants: 
intermediate reports, articles, PowerPoint presentations, dossiers, audio and video recordings. These 
materials presented the initiatives undertaken by farmers and their organisations. Discussion guides 
were created to accompany the video recordings and to help viewers clearly understand the experiences 
put on film. (cf. box below).
17 As much as possible given the time constraints
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These materials were used during meetings, development workshops, national, regional and international 
forums, to share and discuss what had been seen and analysed (meetings attended by 50–100 people 
over 2–3 days in each case).18 A forum can bring together many people, but it is a once-off event, 
requiring a great deal of prior preparation in order to extract the greatest value and share experiences 
effectively. It is not enough to speak the same language in order to understand one another and exchange 
useful information. Unfortunately, in the majority of workshops organised for actors working in the 
South, there was a serious lack of preparation on the part of participants, resulting in a shortage of 
useful information and prepared materials that would have made the presentation of data more useful 
and comprehensible for participants. 
These materials were also distributed on CD-ROMs. The Internet was another useful communication 
tool: all of the exchange materials produced on the FO initiatives were posted on the Inter-réseaux 
website to reach a wider audience. Television and local press were seldom used to transmit information, 
since this work and the materials created were intended to help guide detailed discussion and not for short 
bursts of communication. However, even if radio did not figure in the Working Group’s dissemination 
plan, a number of participants used the support materials for subsequent radio shows, many of which 
were broadcast in their own language (cf. box).
Materials on the FO initiatives: constructing/exchanging representations of reality 
Information sheets
Information sheets were produced to provide an overview of the FO experiences that were studied. 
A relatively short format (around 10 pages) was chosen to benefit the reader, to avoid being overly 
descriptive and to present a minimum of essential information and content that could be used in an 
objective manner. Complex situations are not easily encapsulated in simplified summaries. However, to 
enable the dissemination of knowledge to a wider audience, short summaries were produced: one page to 
“inform” hurried readers, and an even shorter blurb of just 4–5 lines for those more pressed for time. These 
different formats are intended for different audiences. It would have been interesting to include even more 
illustrations, photos and diagrams to make the information sheets more attractive and enticing to those 
who otherwise wouldn’t read a lengthy description, but time and constraints ruled this out. PowerPoint 
presentations were used to present this information orally, and served as a useful tool during workshops. 
The creation of these sheets represents an attempt to exchange information from a multitude of voices. 
They are the outcome of complex situations and multiple actors: groups of farmers from different FOs, 
staff from FOs and aid organisations. Each person brought his or her own knowledge and point of view, 
reflecting a particular life experience, perspective, and understanding. The participants explained and 
shared their specific way of approaching a situation, thinking about problems, and/or developing practices 
in response to the situations encountered over the course of the exchange. For example: how do the 
different people involved in the group view ”reality”, what are the features they notice, the advantages, the 
problems, the lessons to be learned? 
This phase was an essential and sometimes long step in the elaboration of the collective thinking process, 
with iterative, back-and-forth discussions between farmers, FOs and support organisations. It was also an 
indispensable first step to creating the content for video and audio recordings based on the experiences of 
the FOs. 
Audio recordings
On the basis of early discussions and the information sheets that had already been produced, a series of 
audio recordings was made. Local teams organised the recording sessions with nearby radio technicians. 
Sessions of 10 to 20 minutes were recorded on the subject of the Jèka Ferée in Mali, the UPBM in Guinea, 
and Udoper in Benin. These recordings elicited a great deal of interest from participants, even if some 
of them would have preferred images and other accompanying materials. However, certain participants 
requested audio recordings to pass along to local radio stations. Others translated the content into their 
18 Workshops: Benin (2003), Cameroon (2004), Guinea and Mali (2005-2006). International gatherings: Workshop IR, CTA, 
Amassa Afrique Verte (Bamako, 2007) ; Esfim (Tunis, 2007) ; Farmer innovation fair (CTA, Fida, Ouagadougou, 2008) ; APRI 
(Cirad, Ouagadougou, 2008) ; Agriculture, Trade and Development Network (Afd, Paris, 2008).
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local language or distributed tapes about their experiences to partner organisations (which could help 
increase awareness in the future). 
Video
The information sheets created with local actors and support organisations provided the first opportunity to 
discuss writing outlines, identify potential interview subjects and begin talks with journalists and filmmaking 
teams. The sheets presented a “shared vision of the situation”, and with this in mind we discussed the 
primary messages and content that we wanted to express, the main people to be interviewed on film and 
the possible times and places for filming. 
This was effectively another space for collaborative thinking: deciding how to represent reality, as well as 
how to communicate and share it. Participants needed to ask themselves, “What message do we want to 
send? What images do we want to use to express reality, and ourselves, while remaining comprehensible 
to viewers?” This was not an exercise in making video films for the purpose of political lobbying or 
“publicity” (that would tend to present an idyllic vision of reality), nor was it intended to provide a pre-
packaged solution, or advocate a solution that could magically solve a variety of problems. On the contrary, 
the purpose of the video films was to share the experience of FOs on topics related to the marketing of 
agricultural products, and to transmit this experience to practitioners, farmers, FOs and people working to 
assist FOs, with the goal of opening up the “field of possibility”. A number of video films were produced to 
this end: on a local autonomous rice market in Mogtédo in Burkina Faso; on an onion export market by the 
Mogtédo cooperative; on management of the supply of ginger in a local market by Nowefor in Cameroon; 
on organisation of cereal markets by Amassa Afrique Verte in Mali.
Discussion guides
We realised that video films would be a more effective information sharing tool when accompanied by a 
viewing guide. If people who already have first-hand experience (local actors, members who participated in 
the research process) are present when the video is shown they can serve as discussion guides. However, 
we rarely have the means to ensure that an experienced guide is present for every public screening. 
Consequently viewing guides to accompany the videos were created by the Working Group. In this way the 
video films have a fruitful “independent” life after production, and can more effectively circulate “on their 
own”. 
Presentations combining PowerPoint slides and audio materials
Another tool was also tested: a montage combining a PowerPoint presentation (with photographs, text, 
and diagrams) overlaid with a recorded soundtrack. This demonstrated that it was possible to achieve a 
compromise between video and audio recordings.
Materials (in both French and English) available online at www.inter-reseaux.org 
1.4 – The value of comparative analyses
In order to draw more general insights from the research (strengths, weaknesses, necessary precautionary 
measures), the Working Group organised comparative analyses. These helped farmers, FOs, NGOs, 
support organisations, and even the decision-makers themselves, objectively examine initiatives before 
launching their own activities or assistance. 
Comparative studies: why?
The objective stance adopted in these analyses allowed researchers to better communicate what had 
already been achieved, and to collectively project or anticipate what might come in the future. It also 
helped in better formulating the propositions, requirements, and claims made to partners (merchants, 
transporters, researchers, banks, funding agencies), as well as political officials. The objective was to 
give the farmers a voice and allow them to be heard. 
Being able to see one’s own experience “from the outside” makes it easier to communicate to others. 
It also makes it easier to listen and to position oneself in relation to other ways of acting. This can 
be accomplished even more rapidly if other situations are also objectively presented by actors who 
themselves have taken a step back from their own experiences. It is the same for a symphony: one 
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doesn’t simply combine musicians at random, which would obviously produce a horrible racket of 
disorganised players. Instead, each musician must know his or her own part, and the orchestra is 
organised into small groups of players, so that in the end all of the musicians can listen to cues from one 
another and can create beautiful music together in concert, above and beyond what each would be able 
to produce individually. 
At the same time, in order for a dialogue to take place between farmers themselves and with other 
development actors, – through interviews, discussions etc. – they must share a pre-existing vocabulary 
that is sufficiently meaningful and precise. It was necessary to avoid pointless discussions characterised 
by disconnected information. As one participant pointed out, “It isn’t enough to speak the same language 
in order to understand one another.” By talking more effectively (about one’s own experiences) one can 
better absorb a variety of voices, one’s own as well as others. 
The ability to “step outside” of one’s own experience, to “see the forest” and not just the trees when it 
comes to one’s neighbours, enables one to avoid remaining locked into positions and with demands that 
sometimes go unheard and might not be justified. This also helps actors prepare for possible meetings 
with other actors in the supply chain, in other economic sectors (industry, urban populations) or with 
politicians and administrators. 
For example, how can the government of Benin possibly accede to a demand by farmers who say “Close 
the borders to protect our local rice from imports”, when at the same time, urban consumers – numerous 
and potentially a threat to State security – want “cheaper products19” that better fit into their modern 
ways and standards of life?  
Governments are likely to ignore a call to close the borders to trade, while being receptive to other 
questions, such as: “What can be done to get our rice onto the market in Cotonou? How can we improve 
quality while still remaining competitive?” In essence, this leads actors to search for solutions such as 
the distribution of high-quality seeds, the improvement of technical processing techniques, drying, 
shelling, research on new varieties, etc. This takes place in conjunction with well-argued requests for 
funding and improvement of the capacity of FOs to manage themselves and organise. In this context 
protectionist demands or requests for government support for local commodity production become 
more audible and legitimate. 
Comparative studies: how?
The analysis of FO experiences in marketing was a progressive, iterative, and collective process. It 
enabled farmers to become more aware of other actors in their particular sectors, of other methods of 
organising and the mechanisms at work in the operation of markets. 
Of course the initiatives that were studied were not treated as models to be copied. It would not make 
sense to push for quick transfers of knowledge, given the specific features of each case. Instead, the 
initiatives were treated as practical examples that could help elicit questions and foster discussion with 
farmers and members of FOs, support staff, etc. These analyses sought to help actors find potential 
solutions to allow farmers to better organise, better position themselves on the market, better phrase 
their questions or requests to other actors (partners, researchers, etc.). 
Relying on carefully-scrutinised case studies 
Each FO initiative was first studied by groups of actors (the same group could of course visit and study 
several initiatives). These group analyses took place thanks to regular exchanges over the course of the 
project. These exchanges were accompanied by outside observation by aid organisations and by Inter-
réseaux. The goal was to assist visitors in extracting contextualised information, both in terms of place 
19 Imported rice might be less expensive than local rice, and might be easier to cook than traditional varieties. 
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(local situation) and in time (historical approach with attention to processes, key factors in the change 
of FO activities). This allowed the researchers to render individual analyses more comprehensible to 
potential audiences that might not be familiar with the individual cases or their contexts. 
“Setting straight” one’s own experience is a first way of gaining critical distance
Create spaces for discussion in groups and over multiple occasions
A number of exchange materials were then created by the participants20: information sheets, audio and 
video recordings. They gave actors the opportunity to tell the farmers’ actual stories, each one a unique 
experience. These materials not only enabled their creators to describe, communicate and share, but 
also to confront other ways of expressing, questioning and reflecting on their own experience. They 
also enabled creators to view the different roles that a FO can potentially fill to improve the marketing 
of its members’ agricultural products. These materials were conceived as aids to encourage moments of 
group exchange, debate and reflection about different marketing strategies, on different occasions: 
• Prior to forums, during their creation: “What do we want to say, write, or film? What should we say 
about ourselves, and how?”;
• During the forums themselves, national or regional meetings between the FOs organised as part 
of the Working Group, where materials helped facilitate discussion and communication between 
numerous participants (50 to 100) in a short period of time;
• Following the forums, in order for participants to have the tools to tell their own organisations what 
they had seen and discussed, and also to prolong the collective thinking process. 
Creating opportunities for repeated group discussion about concrete cases, using a variety of 
support materials, is a second way to promote objectivity and critical distance.
Promoting comparative studies
Once each particular case has been studied, and its individual characteristics understood and explained, 
the following step is to promote comparison between the different case studies. Indeed, each situation 
is different depending on the nature of the product sold, the type of activity undertaken, the socio-
economic or geographical context, the history of the FO, etc. 
These comparative studies took place during organised forums. After having become aware of various 
FO initiatives, the participants worked in small groups that enabled them to make comparisons by 
picking apart the individual case studies. These were not taken tackled in their entirety, but rather 
organised by type of activity. For example, a comparison of price-management schemes in Mogtédo 
and Nowefor, or a comparison of supply management systems at the UPBM and Mogtédo.
These comparative studies were pursued and continued voluntarily by participants outside of the 
forums, according to the priorities of the FO, and with support available in different formats (on paper, 
CD-ROMs, Internet): 
• Detailed case studies presented in different formats; 
• Video viewing guides, to help guide discussion and promote objective analysis; 
• Articles and transversal study notes, drawn from discussions and debates during the forums. The 
present document (in particular chapter 2) continues this comparative-study approach: it presents 
15 types of activities carried out by FOs and in each case includes examples drawn from initiatives 
under study, along with insights and possible directions for future work; 
20 Technical and logistic support was provided to help with the creation of support materials.  
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• Complementary topics: on the role of FOs in marketing, Market Information Systems, the operation 
of markets, interprofessional organisations, etc. 
Promoting comparisons between unique cases is a third way used by the Working Group to 
encourage objectivity and critical distance. 
1.5 – Additional tools with which to achieve more
On the Inter-réseaux website, a series of complementary files on certain themes are regularly updated 
to continue to feed and enrich discussion. These files include information about the specific practices of 
actors, analyses, etc. They cover specific topics such as “Observers and Market Information Systems”, 
“The Organisation of Markets and Agricultural Trading”, and “Inventory Credit”.21
A new Working Group has been set up on the subject of interprofessional organisations, to further the 
exchange of practices and information using a specific network approach.22
21 Cf. Chapter 2: Sheet 5’ on inventory credit and sheet 10 on SIMs.
22 Cf. Chapter 2: Sheet 14 on interprofessional organisations.
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http://inter-reseaux.org/groupes-de-travail/
Working Groups
A number of Thematic Working Groups have been established by 
Inter-réseaux Développement rural.
These Working Groups seek to develop spaces for exchange and 
debate, through the analysis of the practices and experiences of 
actors in rural development.  
Among other things, they participate in the publication of Inter-
réseaux dossiers which are the product of the collective thinking 
carried out within the Working Groups. 
Objective distance from and collective thinking about these 
concrete cases is intended to open up the realm of possibilities 
– to see and understand how other actors work – so that local 
practitioners can then better choose and improve their own activities. 
The process of conducting this kind of group reflection consists of 
having actors discuss their experiences with concrete examples.  
In general, Inter-réseaux Working Groups: 
4bring together people from diverse backgrounds: farmers and 
their partners, representatives and staff from FOs, aid organisations 
from the North and South, researchers, officials, funding partners…  
4are carried out over a long period: several months and 
sometimes years, depending on the theme covered and the 
dynamics of each individual country. 
4are defined according to local needs - issues that are important 
to members of the network, and priorities among the elected Inter-
réseaux members (General Assembly, Board of Trustees).
Translated for this report from the French original
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2 – DIVERSITY OF CASE STUDIES AND CHOICE OF EXEMPLARY CASE 
STUDIES 
A wide array of initiatives to market agricultural products for local and regional markets 23 was chosen 
by the participants of the Working Group to be studied by local research teams according to local 
dynamics. This choice was made according to the level of interest in the initiatives themselves (methods 
of sale, size of initiative, etc.) and according to the farmers’ priorities (enthusiasm for marketing, 
dynamics of group reflection and activities). 
The concrete cases studied over the course of the Working Group illustrate a group of activities that can 
be described as “classic”, “innovative”, successful or not. The cases were always full of insights and 
challenged the stereotypes and preconceived notions about the operation of markets and their actors. 
Some of them were chosen to illustrate the different types of activities used by FOs.  
2.1 – Varied agricultural products and marketing activities 
The initiatives studied represent a wide diversity of types of buyers and market conditions. Depending 
on the case, farmers sell their products via an intermediary, to an FO, to merchants or individuals, to 
companies, to negotiating cooperatives, to the final consumer, or to an institution (for example, an 
institution that store products). These sales can take place at the farm gate, in the village, at a local, 
urban, regional or export market, in the presence of the physical product or not (traditional market 
or trade fairs). Finally, the time of settling sales is also quite variable: before harvest, at the peak of 
production or later during the off season, in cash or with credit. 
The initiatives studied involved individual sales carried out by farmers. When possible, farmers sell 
products with the benefit of services provided by an FO, to which they might feel more or less attached 
and engaged.24
The initiatives studied involve different types of activities carried out by FOs to better market the 
products of members and/or acquire greater power vis-à-vis buyers. The FO can play a direct role, to a 
greater or lesser degree, in facilitating the sale of products, improving production and/or the conditions 
of market entry and marketing. 
Initiatives studied by the Inter-réseaux Working Group
Initiatives to defer sale through storage, for greater value due to price differentials (between the 
period of harvest and the off season): 
• purchasing and warehousing of corn (maize) for bulk sale by the Binum FO in Cameroon; 
• organising inventory credit (warrantage credit) to increase the value of farmers’ rice, by the FO Fifata 
and agricultural credit & savings Unions (CECAM network) in Madagascar. 
Initiatives to facilitate the financing of production/marketing: 
• organising the marketing of cereals with external financing: the case of a local union of cereal farmers in 
the Dioïla circle (ULPC) in Mali;
• organising collective fields to fund individual marketing activities around processed cassava by the 
Nnem Mbock Commercial Interest Group (GIC) in Cameroon;
• organising inventory credit (warrantage credit) to increase the value of agricultural products, but also 
23 With a few small exceptions: coffee in Guinea today is mainly destined for the Senegalese market, with other opportunities 
sought in the European “Fair Trade” market, and cashew nut from Benin is exported to India.  
24 The farmer can benefit from collective action (organised markets, bulk sales), without being particularly engaged vis-à-vis 
the FO, which can be viewed as simply one opportunity among other private buyers. 
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to secure the supply of quality fertiliser for the production of tiger nuts by the Federation of Tiger Nut 
Farmer’s Unions in Niger (FUPNS Sa’a).
Initiatives to collect and transport products for greater value due to geographic price differentials, 
and/or to access new markets and buyers:
• taking charge of the task of collecting and transporting cashew nuts from the point of production to the 
port of departure: the case of the Atacora Departmental Union of Farmers (UDP) in Benin; 
• Nowefor’s experience with ginger and tomato in Cameroon.
Initiatives to increase added value due to the processing of products and/or the improvement of 
their quality:
• drying and marketing of processed cassava flour (akui) by women farmers in Benin; 
• organising the marketing of white rice, instead of paddy rice, by farmers in the Mogtédo cooperative 
and by women processors (parboilers) of Mogtédo in Burkina Faso;
• contractual agreements by the Woko of Macenta (Guinea Forestière) Agricultural cooperative for the 
marketing and supply of high-quality coffee;
• sale of processed cassava by women of the Nnem Mbock GIC in Cameroon.
Initiatives to improve the relationship between farmers and buyers to facilitate negotiations and 
possible contractual or interprofessional agreements:
• setting up contracts between rice farmers from the Rice Growers’ Consultative Committee (CCR) and a 
private sector trader in Benin; 
• setting up contracts between onion farmers in Burkina Faso and buyers in Ghana;
• interprofessional agreements between the Union of yam and sesame Farmers’ cooperatives in Kankan 
(UCPISK) and the Association of Yam Sellers of Conakry (Avic) in Guinea;
• experiences related to the marketing of potatoes in Southern Mali by cooperative structures, 
specialised to a greater or lesser extent, according to their function (production, supply, export); 
• negotiating with large distributors to sell tomatoes: the case of the North West Farmers’ Organisation 
(Nowefor) farmers in Cameroon.
Initiatives to facilitate the relationship between farmers and transporters to increase product 
sales:
• marketing activities by the Fouta Djallon Federation of Farmers (FPFD) in Guinea.
Initiatives to improve the commercial environment to facilitate transactions: 
• setting up a market information system: the case of the National Association of Professional 
Agricultural Organisations in Ivory Coast (Anopaci).
Initiatives to organise markets:
• organising markets and bulk sales of cucumber seed by the Women and Girls Association of Biwong-
Bane for Development (Afebid) in Cameroon;
• organising markets near a town centre by banana growers that required changes to Bamako market 
regulations in Mali;
• organising local markets and management of the supply of ginger by the Nowefor FO in Cameroon;
• organising rice sales in a regulated market by the Mogtédo cooperative in Burkina Faso;
• organising a self-managed cattle market with more transparent transactions, by the Regional Union of 
Professional Ruminant Breeders’ Organisations (Udoper) in Benin.
Initiatives to improve the organisation of agricultural commodity trading:
• negotiating prices and agreeing on marketing between farmers and merchants: the mini trading 
exchange of the Macenta Banana Farmers Union (UPBM) in the Guinea Forestière region;
• mediation by the GIE Jèka Feeré to set up the exchanges and the marketing of grain, without storage 
or credit, in Mali. 
Initiatives to regulate imported products:
• interventions by the FPFD in Guinea on blocking imports (potato, onion) and imposing tariffs coupled 
with contractual agreements.
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2.2 – The specific features of products, contexts and farmers 
A number of initiatives to market products were chosen according to local dynamics, to be studied by 
local groups. They covered a wide range of activities led by FOs of varying sizes and in different types 
of configurations across the different countries. Faced with such diversity as well as specific features 
in the conditions and types of marketing, one might question whether these experiences could be 
meaningfully compared. Indeed, can we compare situations that are simultaneously very different and 
specific to farmers in the local context? 
Before continuing, it seems useful to re-state an important point. The variety of products reflects 
a diversity of production conditions and farmers that have their own constraints, objectives and 
approaches. Consequently, the way one product is marketed in a given location cannot be carbon-copied 
for other products, farmers, or locations. Certain specific conditions also hinder such quick transfers, as 
is explained in more detail below. 
Factors specific to each farmer
The farmers rarely constitute a homogenous group, in particular because of the diversity of agro-
environmental conditions under which they work, the differences between systems of production used 
and their unequal capacity to overcome contingencies. The collective strategies put in place by the FOs 
are difficult to “stick to” because generally no changes to the collective rules are anticipated to limit the 
impact of dissident strategies, whether random or structural. 
Are farmers selling agricultural products that they planted with the intention of selling later? Or are 
they selling products that were originally intended for their own consumption, because of a need to raise 
capital? In other words, should one be asking “How can sales be improved” or rather, “How can access 
to credit be improved?” The strategies needed within FOs and/or aid organisations will differ greatly in 
nature, depending on the question. 
Specific features related to the products themselves
The perishable nature of products directly influences the possibilities and conditions of storage or 
transport. Thus, farmers should organise themselves differently according to the products they grow. 
Grains or livestock are relatively easy to keep in order to limit the supply on the market or wait for an 
increase in price. On the other hand, manioc, tomato, onion, potato and banana crops must be sold 
quickly if one lacks the specific means to store them at a realistic cost (which is rarely available). 
Meanwhile, some products can be sold and/or consumed in variable amounts (such as corn), while 
others are intended only for sale (such as coffee). For products that are intended uniquely for sale, it is 
generally easier to estimate in advance the amounts to be sold according to the overall land area and the 
average yield. This can sometimes aid in the preparation of grouped sales. 
On the other hand, the behaviour of individual corn farmers (as consumers more often than as sellers) 
can translate into notable differences between volumes produced and volumes put on the market. These 
variations tend to make it difficult to anticipate the market price and organise grouped sales, because of 
an overestimation of the amount to be sold. 
Specific local conditions of production
Among the factors influencing production, the management of water is the major determinant. Irrigated 
production is relatively predictable compared with crops that need rain and are subject to the whim 
of the climate. Among other things, irrigation allows several crop cycles to be grown per year, which 
facilitates the regulation of volumes. While rain-fed crops reach a peak of production during the annual 
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harvest season, irrigation allows production to be distributed over the year, and price volatility can be 
reduced.25
At the same time, the concentration of production in specific areas is an important factor that influences 
marketing. For example, rice in the area of Niger Office in Mali, or in Mogtédo in Burkina, as well as 
the Fouta Djallon potatoes in Guinea, are all produced in irrigated zones or river valleys in a relatively 
concentrated area. The geographic proximity of production facilitates their technical oversight and 
management. This is much more difficult to accomplish where production is dispersed (for example 
tomatoes in Fouta Djallon or migratory livestock breeding).
This geographical proximity also introduces closer ties in social relations and/or farmer activities when 
it comes to strategies that require collective organisation (management of irrigated land and valleys). 
This experience of collective labour often facilitates group activities around marketing.
Specific features related to the environment external to farmers 
The structure of the commodity chain also conditions the modes of marketing chosen by farmers. In 
local and rather short supply chains, the organisation of farmers can have a strong and positive impact 
(for example the supply of parboiled rice in Mogtédo in Burkina Faso). On the other hand, in the case 
of long and complex supply chains oriented toward foreign markets and dominated by a small number 
of exporters, farmers are forced to defer to market forces (for example coffee growers in Guinea). The 
international market, as well as national trade or agricultural policies that are more or less protective, 
greatly affect farmers’ room for manoeuvre, with their prices “capping” that of local production. 
2.3 – A selection of exemplary cases
Certain cases were chosen for the comparative analyses. The majority of them share the common point 
of having been run by existing FOs for many years (sometimes for several decades). These FOs have 
experimented over the course of their existence with a wide variety of activities and services for their 
members, with both successes and failures. They have a sense of perspective about these experiences, 
which illuminates many of activities presented in chapter 2: 
• The case of rice farmers in the Mogtédo cooperative in Burkina Faso appears a number of times 
in this document to illustrate different kinds of activity: verification of weighing scales, management 
of supply, price setting, supervision of markets, links created with local authorities, etc.
The Mogtédo rice-growing cooperative organises rice supply from production to the regulation of the local 
market by bringing different services to members: it provides credit for fertiliser and carries out research 
into quality via work on technical pathways. 
It does not purchase paddy rice from members, except in cases of extreme need. On the other hand, 
it takes payment in rice for services rendered (perimeter management, supply of fertilisers). The large 
volume of rice that it holds allows it to release rice on the market when there is a shortage: the limitation of 
rice supply enables it to keep prices stable and worthwhile for farmers. 
The cooperative and its members sell the rice to local women who parboil the rice. These women have 
access to individuals who do the work of hulling the grains, and then they sell the white rice on the market. 
The cooperative has also set up different systems to oversee weighing and in partnership with local 
authorities, the overall operation of the rice market in Mogtédo.
Materials available: an information sheet, a video recording and viewing guide (English and French).
25 A classic case of irrigated rice with several cycles per year. But this is not always true: for example, during the peak of 
production, the price of onion varies by 1 to 4 times, much more so than it does for dried cereals.  
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• The case of Udoper cattle breeders in Benin, with a self-managed livestock market, is also 
discussed several times to illustrate different facets of organising activities to improve (i) the 
conditions of sale between breeders and buyers, and (ii) the management of a market by breeders in 
partnership with other local actors.
The breeders were tired of “being swindled” by intermediaries (the Dilani who previously controlled a 
highly opaque market) who carried out indirect transactions between breeders and buyers. The farmers 
organised a marketplace to render the sale of livestock more transparent. Here they brought together 
different actors (breeders, and also traders, intermediaries, butchers, transporters). The establishment of 
self-managed markets for cattle was made possible converting intermediaries into witnesses whose job 
it is to record transactions. They also set up a system to tax transactions and redistribute the tax receipts 
between different actors in the market (secretary, auctioneers, inspectors, food vendors, etc.) as well as 
local development authorities (mayors). 
Materials available: an information sheet, a sound recording (English and French). 
• The case of banana growers from the UPBM in Guinea is used to illustrate in particular a system 
of negotiating prices, the rationalisation of sales between farmers and merchants, and a system to 
oversee weighing.
The UPBM is an interesting example of a well-organised FO with a solid marketing strategy to deal with 
marketing challenges and improve the production of bananas in the market segment that it controls. It is 
a truly dynamic economic entity with its own rules of marketing, along with a group of associated local 
merchants. 
The farmers implemented a system to monitor weighing. They established a fixed day for selling, when 
they come to an agreement on a price per tonne with buyers from Macenta. This eventually led to the 
establishment of a mini exchange for banana sales with negotiated prices and scheduling of sales between 
farmers and merchants from Conakry.
Materials available: an information sheet, a sound recording and an audio montage (English and French). •
• The case of Nowefor farmers in Cameroon illustrates the management of supply of ginger to a local 
market. It also shows the organisation of transportation to find opportunities in distant markets for 
additional sales of ginger and tomato crops. 
The Nowefor FO discovered the price of success with its initiatives pertaining to ginger production: 
the members of this federation from Cameroon were so successful at improving production (technical 
improvements, supply of fertilisers on credit, oversight of production) that they actually saturated the market 
and caused a drastic decline in prices (a five-fold decrease in under three years). 
The farmers then put in place different strategies to sell their ginger at a better price. In 2004 they 
organised the local market to make transactions more transparent and limit the supply of ginger. The local 
ginger supply was managed in order to prevent the saturation of the market and negotiate better prices 
with buyers; the surplus of ginger was then directed towards new markets thanks to the organisation of 
transport and sale to distant buyers. Experiments with storage also took place along with the beginnings of 
a strategy to network farmers. 
Materials available: an information sheet, a video recording and viewing guide (English and French).  
Other cases will be discussed more briefly to illustrate a particular activity26, for example:  
• The experience of rice farmers from Fifata and Cecam in Madagascar and the case of tiger nut 
farmers from the Sa’a Federation in Niger. It shows that providing credit for storage (“inventory 
26 Materials that are available for all of these initiatives: information sheets of approximately 10 pages in length. 
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credit”) can be a worthwhile tool for increasing income among farmers. But this is possible only in 
certain circumstances, and when FOs have a firm understanding of the mechanisms that influence 
pricing;
• The case of the Anopaci in Ivory Coast is illustrative of a system to provide information about 
markets; 
• The experience of the Jèka Feeré GIE in Mali as an intermediary for the sale of rice in the Niger 
Office (NO), along with the organisation of agricultural bourses by Amassa Afrique Verte will also 
be discussed. These organisations help farmers to better market their rice by acting as an intermediary 
between buyers and sellers, and by working to improve quality. The GIE does not engage in storage 
and therefore does not require banking credit, but it helps facilitate transactions. In a context where 
farmers in the NO area have trouble selling their rice, and where credit for marketing activities is 
limited compared with demand, the system developed by the GIE has potential advantages; 
• The experience of farmers from the Fouta Djallon Federation in Guinea is very rich and we use it to 
illustrate two particular aspects: (i) the control of borders and the importing of competitive products 
and (ii) information about agricultural product prices and volumes. 
Market access and agricultural 
product marketing           
(launched in 2003)
A WorkingGroup focusing on this theme was launched in 2003, led by 
Inter-réseaux with support from the CTA (Technical Centre for Rural and 
Agricultural Development) as well as numerous partners from Africa. 
A number of FO initiatives were targeted for deeper analysis and 
presentations by the FO members themselves in a variety of forms 
– PowerPoint presentations, information sheets, videos, audio 
recordings.  
These experiences were shared and discussed during forums and other 
national meetings held in Benin (2004), Cameroon (2006), Guinea 
(2006) and Mali (2007). 
A regional forum held in Bamako in January 2007 enabled participants 
to exchange thoughts about these experiences with other partners from 
the North and South.
http://inter-reseaux.org/groupes-de-travail/
commercialisation-de-produits/
Translated for this report from the French original
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2.4 – Initiatives that were not studied, but that are essential
A certain number of important activities carried out by FOs were not discussed in the scope of the 
Working Group. 
We cite here a few of these that can also contribute to improve the marketing of agricultural products. 
Other activities that influence and improve the marketing of agricultural products:  
•  activities to improve access and rights to land, thus encouraging investments to improve and 
other farming practices with long-term effects; 
•  activities to improve education and literacy; 
•  management consulting;
•  the implementation of bank accounts and deposits that, despite the higher costs and 
commissions, allow farmers to sell without having their money stolen upon leaving the market; 
•  the study of markets and the organisation of visits to various points in the commodity chain 
to better identify demand, possible markets and the quality of products. This enables actors 
to adopt strategies that can respond to demand and to the needs of certain market segments in 
terms of processors or consumers;
•  activities related to fair trade, the establishment of standards, and the tracking of products; 
•  lobbying activities, in defence of local interests, the implementation of negotiation platforms, 
participation in the drafting of agricultural laws and their administration (such as in Senegal or 
Mali);
•  development of research partnerships.  
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Individual and collective 
activities 
undertaken by farmers
Comparative-analysis sheets
CHAPTER 2
58 59
We have seen in the first chapter that there is a great diversity in the 
activities undertaken by FOs to improve access to markets as well as to 
better market their agricultural products.
Among all these individual and collective actions carried out by farmers, 
fifteen are presented in this chapter in the form of information sheets. They 
can be grouped into five major categories:
1) individual sales undertaken by farmers (sheets 1 and 2); 
2) collective activities undertaken by farmers in order to sell more once the 
harvest is in (sheets 3 to 6);
3) collective activities undertaken farmers upstream of the market in order to 
manage production (quality and quantity) as well as costs (sheets 7 and 8);
4) collective activities undertaken farmers to organise markets in general 
in order to improve selling conditions (sheets 9 to 13);
5) collective activities undertaken farmers in collaboration with other 
actors in the supply chains as well as those involved in the development 
of sector policies (sheets 14 and 15).
Each sheet contains the following:
- description of the type of activity involved, with concrete examples of 
how they are carried out; 
- the advantages and limitations of the activity. These include more 
analytical considerations and particularly seek to highlight some 
generic questions: “What are the important issues that a FO needs to 
take into consideration before engaging in such an activity, or when an 
organisation wants to support a FO’s endeavours?”, “What difficulties 
or risks need consideration?”
These questions provide lines of thought about the activities. 
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OVERVIEW OF ACTIVITIES IN THE FORM OF INFORMATION SHEETS
The fifteen types of activities presented can be grouped into five major categories:
1) Farmers sell their products individually
The cases most frequently observed in the Working Group are the following:
l  Individual sales at the farm gate or near the farms: These farm-gate sales are made to intermediaries 
or collectors acting on behalf of traders (sheet 1). This set-up is found in many of the stories narrated 
by farmers and it is the most common case for farmers in the countries that have been studied. Which 
strategies do farmers adopt with respect to these intermediaries?
l  Individual sales at nearby markets (sheet 2): The farmer carries products to nearby markets and sells 
them (or at least tries to sell) to traders or to final consumers. The experiences differ in terms of farmers’ 
access and remuneration. The initiatives studied highlighted many key factors: the level of organisation 
of the market and more specifically the level of farmer participation in their organisations. Moreover, 
individual sales had a higher chance of being positive for most farmers if they were involved upstream 
in the organisation of the market. As a general rule, the farmers are most often the major losers in these 
individuals.
2) Farmers organise in order to sell more
The activities carried out in this case by FOs are found downstream of the production stage and seek to 
facilitate the sales of a given product. Among the cases studied there are “traditional” activities such as:
l  Organisation of transport for products by FOs (sheet 3): The FO organises the collection and bundling 
of the members’ products and handles transportation of these products in order to access distant 
markets or buyers. The FO then sells the products itself or merely facilitates the process (in this case the 
farmers remain the owners of the stock). The question remains: Are the transportation activities carried 
out by the FO always profitable for the farmers?
l  Purchase and storage of members’ products by the FO (sheet 4): The FO buys the products from 
the members and takes charge of looking for buyers with the hope of re-selling the products at better 
conditions. Sales are made done after storage. The FO becomes the owner of the stock for some time. 
The unanswered question is whether the FO is a better buyer than traders. Is this purchase–storage 
mechanism necessarily beneficial for the FO and for its members? 
l  Facilitation of access to credit for marketing (sheet 5): In instances where marketing remains individual, 
the FO conducts collective actions so that the farmers have the means through credit to engage in 
market-oriented production of quality products or simply to market their products. The warehouse receipt, 
inventory credit or warrantage credit system is a possible credit option which can also be facilitated by 
the FO. But are these ways of facilitating access to credit always beneficial to the farmers?
l  Processing and post-harvest packaging (sheet 6): The FO helps in the processing and packaging of 
products through the acquisition of processing equipment. There are many objectives: (i) to create and, if 
possible benefit from the added value; (ii) to access other markets (local or export markets with or without 
branding); (iii) to acquire necessary processing resources to avoid hasty sales at low prices at harvest 
time and to gain some time in order to sell the products later when prices are better.
These traditional activities often aim at improving profits by obtaining higher prices due to: (i) improved 
negotiating power (given the higher volume of product supply); (ii) timing of sales (through storage and 
deferred sale); (iii) geographical location of sales(transportation of the products to find new buyers and 
markets, “elimination” of some costs or intermediaries).
We will see that the profits generated from these types of activities undertaken downstream of the production 
process differ greatly for farmers and their organisations. Many experiences pinpoint some failures which 
lead FOs to change course and contract with external individuals and organisations in order to carry out 
these activities.
3) Farmers organise in order to manage production as well as costs
l  Activities to facilitate the supply of inputs and advisory–support services to members to improve the 
technical production pathways (sheet 7);
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l  Specific advisory–support services carried out by the FO to improve the quality of products (sheet 8) in 
order to obtain better prices and/or simply to be able to access markets.
These activities can be considered as being traditional or classic if they are seen from the perspective of 
attempts at improving production “for production’s sake”. It is different when they are developed to improve 
production with a market-oriented perspective or in anticipation of placing the products on the 
markets. Managing supply (timing, volumes and quality levels) and production costs are indispensable 
requirements which enable farmers to organise in order to meet commitments to buyers and to sell larger 
volumes of produce or obtain better prices.
We will see that these activities, which are developed before the products are brought to the market or in view 
of accessing specific markets, increase product sales and get farmers better prices for their products.
4) Farmers organise to obtain better trading conditions
Lastly, there are other types of activity which are less often developed but which aim at improving 
transaction conditions and market-making between farmers and buyers. Here the activities which are 
developed enhance transparency between farmers and buyers. With the organisation of agricultural markets 
and fairs, matching the supply and demand of products is facilitated, through better visibility for both the 
supply and the potential demand in terms of prices and volumes. These FO activities aim at:
l  improving the tools used to measure the weights/quantities in order to ensure correct measurements 
(sheet 9);
l  improving market information. This can take place through price information systems; the FO can also 
facilitate access to and understanding of the factors influencing price signals (sheet 10);
l  gathering supply at a single place in the market (sheet 11);
l  bringing farmers and buyers together. This ranges from the search for buyers to the organisation of 
regulated markets or agricultural exchanges. The FO plays the role of intermediary between farmers and 
buyers but does not buy the products. It facilitates the meeting, transactions and contracting between the 
parties (sheet 12);
l  regulate the supply of local products on the markets (sheet 13).
Here the actions of FOs aim to facilitate supply and demand to meet and in general “improve” on the 
market mechanisms. In addition, the actions seek to reduce transaction costs thereby improving the 
competitiveness of the products. These actions tend to help balance negotiations and power relationships 
between farmers and buyers. 27
5) Farmers organise in collaboration with other actors in the supply chain or other 
public actors
l  The FO participates in dialogue and negotiation of sectoral agricultural policies. For example, actions 
regarding imported products which compete with local products (sheet 14);
l  FOs are active in dialogue platforms or in interprofessional or multi-actor regulatory discussions. 
The goal is to establish agreements and modes of regulation involving other actors. The FOs try to make 
known their positions, ensure that their viewpoints are valued, facilitate interprofessional agreements and 
put in place rules and market organisations which do not work against farmers (sheet 15). 
Here the actions of the FOs aim at establishing modes of operation and regulations. These are designed to 
make it possible for the FOs to carry out their activities over time, and also to develop activities in the supply 
chains and/or in rural areas so that farmers end up better off.
27 Transaction costs are the costs related to a market transaction. C.J Dahlman categorises them into: search and information 
costs (prospection, price/quality ratio assessments proposed by interested parties, market research, etc); negotiation and 
decision making costs (writing and termination/conclusion of a contract, etc); monitoring and transfer/implementation costs 
(quality control of the transaction, verification of the deliveries etc.).
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SHEET 1
FARM GATE SALES TO INTERMEDIARIES: NEGOTIATING MARGINS AND 
POWER RELATIONSHIPS THAT ARE DISADVANTAGEOUS TO FARMERS
1.1 - Illustrated description of farm gate sales
For farmers who are far away from transportation routes and/or who do not have access to means of 
transport, the sale of their own products is very often done on their farms or in the immediate vicinity. These 
types of sales are referred to as “farm gate” sales.
Traders rarely go door-to-door themselves in order to buy products from these farmers who are often 
scattered over large areas that difficult to reach, especially in the rainy season. They usually resort to 
intermediaries who take charge of the initial collection of products. The farmer in most cases has only a 
limited choice of buyers to sell to.
These intermediaries may be individuals. This is the case for many women cucumber seed farmers in 
Southern Cameroon and many ginger farmers in North West Cameroon who sell their products to other 
village women and or to those passing through (intermediaries called “Bayam sellams”). Sales are often 
made on the basis of personal relationships or proximity: the farmers know the intermediaries who come 
regularly to the region. This situation is also found among livestock breeders in the north of Benin who sell 
their livestock to village intermediaries in their camps (box 1a).
In the case of export-oriented products, the intermediary often acts on behalf of a distant trader who 
never comes to the local market (box 1b).
(1a) Livestock breeders and Dilani intermediaries in North Benin
Just a few years ago all livestock breeders in the north of Benin sold their animals from home 
or at traditional collection markets. Each transaction between the livestock breeder and the 
buyer was indirect, taking place through an intermediary called the “Dilani”. 
Furthermore, many factors drove livestock farmers to sell their cattle from home: (i) migratory 
breeding (camps very far away from markets), (ii) administrative hassles which deterred many 
of them and (iii) difficult access to transport facilities needed to take the animals to the markets.
After negotiations the animals were sold by the head, sometimes on credit and often at prices that were 
unprofitable for the livestock breeders. Conflict was common. 
Ref.: Self-managed cattle markets in North Benin/P. Onibon. - Udoper, 2004. - 58 p.
Self-managed cattle markets: a Beninese example. - SOS Faim: Peasant Dynamics n°10, 2006. - 8 p.
(1b) Intermediaries in the export supply chains of cocoa in Cameroon and cashew nut in Benin
In the most traditional case in Benin, cashew nut farmers sell their products at the farm gate to collectors. 
These intermediaries pay them with advances from the (mainly Indian) traders.
In the cocoa–coffee supply chains in Cameroon, the intermediaries (“coxeurs”) are often subordinates of 
exporting traders. The intermediaries are sent out by the exporters. They give them instructions on how to 
negotiate and provide them with advance capital. The exporters do not go to the field to check the truthfulness 
of the information they receive from the intermediaries (quantities available, quality).
Consequently the intermediaries can filter the information between farmers and exporters and in some cases 
withhold information. For example, they do not tell the exporters that there is no produce in the field because 
they know that this type of information can push the exporters to go to the field to check with the farmers 
themselves. The intermediaries go as far as making very high commands and promising to buy at higher 
prices (which they may or may not be able to honour).
The strategy of the collecting intermediaries is generally short-term and is based on the volumes collected and 
on the barest minimum investment. They buy products at a price which does not take the quality of the product 
into consideration (coffee in Cameroon, cashew nuts in Benin), and which they sell quickly after collection. 
Their profit margins are derived mainly from the price differential between locations.
Ref.: An interprofessional organization for coffee and cocoa in Cameroon, for which services and for whom? - CTA, Inter-
réseaux Développement rural, 2008. - 10 p.
Réflexion paysanne sur un modèle de commercialisation collective de l’anacarde au Bénin – UDP Atacora, 2004. – 20 p. + 
résumé, 2005. - 6 p.
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1.2 - Obvious limitations and hidden interests
It is clear that the farmer has a very weak negotiating position in farm gate transactions with intermediaries 
acting on behalf of a trader. Information and negotiating power are highly asymmetrical: in contrast to the 
farmer, the intermediary has at least partial information on the supply situation, demand and prices for the 
product at different locations. The strategies used by the intermediary are often not aimed at achieving 
transparency in the transactions in terms of volumes available and prices, nor are they aimed at remunerating 
the quality of the product. The intermediaries have a monopoly situation. In the end the farmer usually gets 
a price that is well below the market price. The farmer can also be cheated during weighing, calculating and 
paying. He is no more empowered with regard to types of payment (advances, cash and credit).
Are intermediaries useless actors who should be removed from the chain?
“How can intermediaries be eliminated?” is a question that is heard often, and many attempts to 
circumnavigate them are have been made by individuals, at the level of FOs and sometimes with the support 
of NGOs and yet… 
Different roles and functions of intermediaries
It is important to recall that the intermediaries or collectors who buy the products at farm gate level provide 
many services and play essential roles for isolated farmers. They arrange to come and collect products 
from distant places with difficult access, considering the state of the roads. They have to remain informed, 
organise rounds, hire transport facilities when they do not have any in order to transport the products.
Moreover they often grant loans to the farmers, provide pre-payments for harvests and carry out on-the-
spot purchases. These services are paid for by the farmers at very high interest rates. No formal financial 
organisation accepts to provide these services which in effect are needed by the farmers and their families. 
This applies not only to agricultural activities but also to the education of their children and the purchase of 
medicine.
Through these intermediaries and networks of associated traders even very small farmers who are isolated 
and far way from markets are in fact integrated into the market system. This enables the farmers to sell their 
products when they are in need of money, to access credit and/or to buy the products they need to consume 
during periods of scarcity.
Intermediaries who do not necessarily want to go away
Eliminating the intermediaries is certainly not easy. Individual farmers who bring products to a market 
might encounter traders who refuse to buy their products. This can even go as far as denying them a place 
in the market (this is often the case with “Bayam sellams” in Cameroon).
If an FO takes over an activity, the farmers must succeed in taking collective charge of the functions 
habitually carried out by the intermediaries. Assuming that the intermediaries refrain from engaging in this 
activity; if the collective activity is carried out badly by the FO and takes a long time to implement, it is easier 
for intermediaries to disrupt these activities. They can propose prices that are higher than those negotiated 
by the FO or they can support the dissident strategies of some farmers that counter the collective action and 
discredit the FO in buyers’ eyes, etc.
To quote a FO member: “If all our products were sold in batches, the intermediaries would lose money and 
even their jobs because they would no longer have a reason to exist. They know this and often sabotage 
batch sales by discrediting us.”
Eliminate intermediaries to get the added value? This can work… sometimes
There are many cases of batch sales organised by farmers to cut out the intermediary collectors and sell 
directly to wholesalers. In this case the farmers recover at least some of the added value that would otherwise 
go to the intermediaries. This happens among banana farmers in Macenta in the Guinea Highlands or in the 
Federation of Onion Farmers in Fouta Djallon who have organised collection points. By dealing with FOs 
which are able to offer a given quantity of produce, the wholesalers save time, reduce their costs and do not 
have to pay advances to intermediaries. In this way they can pay a higher price to the farmers.
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Collaborate and negotiate with intermediaries: this can work too!
In areas where farmers are isolated and less organised, eliminating intermediate collectors appears to 
be a short-term strategy which would not be beneficial for farmers. Rather than trying to eliminate the 
intermediaries, who despite everything provide certain services, farmers developed another option: dealing 
and negotiating with intermediaries. This may be counter-intuitive and it is particularly difficult to establish 
long-term relationships if the intermediaries change frequently. But dialogue, negotiation and changes in the 
behaviour of actors is always possible.
The case of livestock breeders in northern Benin illustrates this well. After negotiation with the livestock 
breeders Dilani intermediaries have been given new responsibilities in the self-managed market. They 
oversee transactions between livestock breeders and buyers and are in charge of recording the taxes on 
behalf of the market. It is true that this was made possible only through the intervention of a highly charismatic 
traditional leader who played a very important role in the negotiation process. This example shows that in 
other situations support organisations can also facilitate these types of negotiations. 
Sometimes collectors offer farmers a price per kilogram which is about the same as the price proposed by 
wholesalers. However when this is analysed critically, it is observed that the intermediaries’ margin does not 
come from the price differential as would be expected but from a quantity variable. In this case the issue 
is not eliminating the intermediaries but instead working with them to improve measurement units. By so 
doing farmers’ share of the added value can be substantially increased. Of course, intermediaries will not 
necessarily want to lose the gains transferred to farmers when accurate scales are used. But they will accept 
if the balance of power is not in their favour, and/or if they find other means of recouping the difference (see 
sheet 9 on weights and measures). 
Add actors to the supply chain and thus increase farmers’ revenue!
This is the case of cocoa farmers in Madagascar who use an organisation that serves as intermediary 
between isolated farmers and buyers (box 1c).
(1c) Transactions between farmers and an exporter via an “intermediary” organisation
Cocoa from Sambirano, the cocoa production zone in Madagascar, is famous for its high quality product 
destined for high standard export markets). The farmers, however, derived very limited benefit from their crops 
given that they individually sold their cocoa beans to collectors who paid very little for the product.
These farmers had very bad memories of the State-run cooperatives of the 1970s. About fifteen of them 
created an association called Adaps (Development Association for Agriculture and Rural Life in the 
Sambirano) in 2000. Adaps is organised into some 20 village cooperatives and currently has close to 1,000 
members.
These cooperatives bundle their members’ products in order to amass sufficiently large volumes that enable 
them to negotiate directly with exporters. They also process (fermentation, drying) fresh cocoa beans into 
cocoa of good market quality which can be traced by customers (something which cannot be done by 
individual/isolated farmers).
Adaps facilitates the direct relationship between cooperative members and the exporter. It coordinates 
the actions of the cooperatives, mainly by negotiating marketing contracts with an export company. This 
contract set the purchase price for the cooperative members and different bonuses and premiums (for 
processing, sorting, quality and organic produce certification). To gain credibility, Adaps has emphasised the 
quality of the cocoa beans, organising numerous technical training sessions to support the cooperatives in 
crop maintenance as well as in processing. It also oversees and controls compliance with organic farming 
requirements.
Of course the creation of the cooperatives impinged on the market intermediaries’ activity, and they tried to 
destabilise the system. However the system survived and today the farmers receive a higher price which 
buyers are ready and willing to pay. It is a win-win situation in which all the actors benefit.
N.B.: This system should be seen in its specific context. In fact the traders find it difficult to obtain good-quality 
beans. Moreover, they often lose the advances they pay to the collectors. They are therefore ready to pay the 
farmers’ higher prices by dealing through Adaps, which facilitates the transaction.
Source: Afdi (www.afdi-opa.org).
It is important to give another example (box 1d) which may seem anecdotal but which contradicts the 
generally accepted idea that “to have more income, the intermediaries have to be eliminated from the supply 
chains”.
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(1d) The example of the Mogtédo cooperative which adds other actors into the supply chain
In Mogtédo, the farmers voluntarily included other actors in the supply chain in order to sell more of their 
rice. These new operators carry out processing of the product: parboiling by village women and hauling by 
private individuals and companies. They are paid for their services based on the gains obtained from the value 
added. 
They can be seen as intermediaries who deprive the farmers of added value. But the farmers prefer this 
system because it benefits them much more than selling paddy rice in the local market. These examples of 
new functions developed by or in collaboration with a FO are repeated and described in detail in the following 
information sheets.
Lose –lose strategies? (Titi, GDS 28, 2004)
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SHEET 2
INDIVIDUAL SALES AT A NEARBY MARKET:                                        
 CONTRASTING REALITIES
Case studies show that when farmers carry their products individually to the local market, different situations 
are observed. This depends mainly on the level of organisation of the market and more specifically on the 
participation of the farmers in market organisation.
2.1 - Illustrated description of individual sales at nearby markets 
In many cases, the individual farmers go to the market and try to find a place and a buyer for their product. 
This is not always easy and sometimes it is even impossible, given that the market is often dominated by 
a small number of traders who control the movement of products as well as prices. The farmers, who are 
unable to negotiate prices, are at a disadvantage. For this reason farmers often declare that, “the traders 
are the ones who fix the price!” .
One can cite examples from the case studies of farmers who sold their products directly and individually 
on the market under less favourable remunerating conditions, before they organised themselves to obtain 
better prices.
l  In Cameroon, ginger farmers sold at a loss on their local market because the supply of the products to the 
market was much higher than the demand of the traders. Excess produce in the market was ideal for the 
traders, and the farmers who managed to sell were those who agreed to lower their prices. Faced with this 
situation, the FO Nowefor got involved to better organise the market and manage the supply in 
order to regulate the products which were brought to the local market (box 2a);
l  In Benin, individual livestock breeders were losers on the collection markets when the Dilani 
were intermediaries. But the livestock breeders took part in the process to change the 
rules regarding the operation and management of the local market. On this self-managed 
market, managed by professionals – i.e. livestock breeders themselves, negotiations now 
take place directly between the breeder sellers and the trader buyers. The livestock breeders 
and traders have since been in a win-win situation. The Dilani intermediaries who are now in charge 
of overseeing the transactions are not losers either in the process (box 2b);
l  In Burkina Faso, farmers in the irrigated zone around Mogtédo were badly paid for their rice by traders 
who had a dominant position on the market (price agreements, excess supply at some periods). This went 
on until the Mogtédo cooperative participated in a major reorganisation of the local market by working on 
the regulation of supply, on market transparency and on the prices negotiated (box 2c).
(2a) Individual ginger sales at a loss on the local market of Bafut in Cameroon
Farmers – mainly women – in Bafut traditionally cultivated ginger but this had been replaced by the production 
of coffee. With the fall in the price of coffee, interest in ginger was rekindled. When they were not selling to 
Bayam-sellam intermediaries- (who buy and resell) the farmers sold their ginger on the local market in Bafut.
The farmers usually sold their products individually each in his own location in the marketplace. Given that 
they were dispersed and unorganised, the farmers had no visibility of either supply or demand for ginger. They 
were subject to highly variable prices and the Bayam-sellams and other traders were in a dominant position 
with a strong influence on the prices (in the absence of competition). There was also cheating on the quantities 
(modes and measurement units).
Different support organisations (such as Saild) enabled significant improvements in the production practices of 
this crop (variety, yields, quality, productivity). But with an increase in production and a stagnant demand from 
traders, the price fell considerably, from 2.500 Fcfa per bucket of 15 litres in 2000 (production of 100 tonnes) to 
500 Fcfa/bucket in 2003 (production of almost 500 tonnes). This only contributed to worsen the situation of the 
farmers.
Lack of organisation on the part of the farmers (selling individually) and excess production resulted in losses 
for the farmers during sales. This situation continued for some time until the market was organised by Nowefor 
to allow farmers to obtain worthwhile prices for their products.
Ref.: Supply, demand and equilibrium price: a case for study. Improved prices for farmers through the organization of 
the local market and the regulation of the supply of ginger by Nowefor in Bafut (Cameroon) / Lothoré, Delmas, based on 
contributions of Saild and G. Fongang, E. Deniel. – Inter-réseaux, CTA, 2006. – 12 p. + summary 1 p.
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(2b) Unprofitable individual cattle sales for livestock breeders in the North of Benin on a regular 
market… to controlled sales on a regulated and self-managed market
Livestock sales on the traditional markets take place through the “Dilani” (see above) and are unfavourable 
to the livestock breeders. The hearsay circulation of information on prices is not reliable in this system, and 
sellers run the risk of undervaluing their cattle. The creation of a self-managed cattle market with strong 
participation of the livestock breeders in the management boards made it possible for the Dilanis to be 
converted into overseers of market transactions.
Sales now take place without any intermediaries between the buyers and the livestock farmers. The livestock 
breeders readily prefer to sell on these self-managed markets than to sell at home or at traditional markets. 
Transactions in the self-managed markets are done strictly on a cash basis because credit sales are 
forbidden. The incomes of the livestock breeders are increasing and the intermediaries now converted to 
market overseers also have a source of income and are better respected in the communities. There are fewer 
conflicts and a larger volume of cattle is sold on the self-managed market.
Ref.: idem supra.
(2c) Individual sales by rice farmers of the Mogtédo cooperative on a regulated market in Burkina 
Faso
Rice farmers had many difficulties selling their rice (see below, the evolution of marketing systems in 
Mogtédo). This led them to question the role of their cooperative and its ability to sell rice. Finally the 
cooperative decided to let the farmers sell their paddy rice directly on the market.
After each farming season the cooperative receives only two bags of 100 kg paddy rice from members for 
the farming season credit (for seeds, manure). Apart from this deduction each coop member stores his/her 
products at home and sells them on the market located opposite the cooperative.
The cooperative plays various roles on the local market (management of supply, price negotiation), but it does 
not buy the rice. The farmers sell their paddy rice on the local market and exclusively to women processors 
from the region. The women resell the rice, which they have husked and processed, to traders who come to 
buy rice in the local market. 
The farmers sell the rice at a designated place in the local market, not only to comply with the decision taken 
collectively at the level of the cooperative but especially because this common selling location enables them to 
obtain better prices and to correct measurements for their rice.
Ref: Creation of a secured and self-managed market by rice farmers of the Mogtedo cooperatve in Burkina Faso / Inter-
réseaux, CTA, based on contribution of FENOP, 2006. – 10 p. + summary 1 p.
2.2 - Limits of individual action and market advantages
Compared to the situation of sales of products at the farm gate or from home, the existence of a market in 
which products of a given type are sold in one spot enables farmers to improve access to information on 
a wide number of issues when buyers and sellers come together: information about other markets (prices, 
volume of transactions), information on harvests, health situation of the herds, technical information, etc. 
However this does not necessarily give farmers a better in price negotiations with the traders.
Are markets necessarily dominated by traders? There are certainly situations where individual sales on 
markets by farmers are difficult and less profitable. But there are also situations where farmers in positions of 
“individual” salespersons can access markets under more favourable conditions, by selling their production 
when they want, receiving cash payments and selling at higher prices. 
In these cases, it is important to underscore the role played by FOs and the services they provide upstream 
before the products are effectively brought to the market or sold. The FOs negotiate and define the rules of 
operation for regulation and control of markets (see sheet 12 which explains how FOs improve markets for 
the benefit of the farmers). 
To obtain a more favourable balance of power farmers must organise. This is one of the major lessons 
learnt from the cases presented so far. 
The market is essentially a place where products are sold. FOs have shown that the functioning of the 
markets can be improved for the benefit of the farmers. In Cameroon, Guinea and Burkina Faso actions 
taken by FOs to “simply” improve on the functioning of the “traditional” markets deserve close attention. 
These actions are effective. They clearly help increase the value of farmers’ and breeders’ products through 
better pricing. Moreover, they do not cost anything in terms of financial investment because they do not 
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require credit or working capital. These actions carried out by FOs are put in place most often without any 
project support. We will come back to this in sheet 12 (market organisation).
Obviously, this process does not happen spontaneously and often requires lengthy collective action involving 
farmers in the first instance. This action is thus possible only if there is solidarity among the farmers and if 
they have confidence in their organisations. Unfortunately these two conditions are often not met.
Slippery deals (Samson, 2009)
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SHEET 3
ORGANISING TRANSPORT                                                                                    
 TO ACCESS DISTANT MARKETS AND BUYERS
3.1 - Principles and examples
When buyers in a nearby market do not satisfy farmers, an alternative is to sell the products somewhere 
else. There can be multiple objectives: the FO can search for better prices at urban markets than those 
offered in local markets. In fact prices in towns are very attractive and enticing to rural farmers. The objective 
in this case is often to bypass the intermediaries (collectors or initial traders) and pocket the price difference 
due to geographic location. But the FO can also simply look for other buyers when those who are nearer 
the production areas do not satisfy the farmers (irregular or deferred payment, small quantities of products 
bought, consumers with low purchasing power who cannot pay more for better quality).
The choice “to sell elsewhere” brings with it the problem of transport. This is an activity which is not easy 
to carry out or to control in many local contexts in Africa. FOs have nevertheless engaged in the organisation 
of transport in order to carry members’ products to urban markets which are far away from the production 
zones. There are many problematic issues when the FO takes charge of organising the transportation of 
members’ products to distant markets. In many of the cases studied, the FOs did not have a clearly identified 
reliable buyer or formally signed contracts with buyers before taking the products to the distant markets. 
When the FOs arrived with their products, the potential buyers “saw them coming”. In these the FOs were 
in an unfavourable position and the buyers took advantage of the situation, knowing that the farmers had 
just two options: either to take their products back home or to reduce prices in order to sell. Here are some 
examples that illustrate these experiences.
l  In Burkina Faso, the Mogtédo cooperative at one time in the past tried to transport the rice of its members 
to sell directly on markets in the capital city. This was an attempt to find new buyers, as the 
State-run structure to which they sold before no longer satisfied them. But this attempt was 
abandoned quickly. For Mogtédo, the real problem was not transportation but the fact that 
they brought the products to the market without having a real buyer. In the absence 
of a buyer or an agreement that was already negotiated, the farmers were bound to 
receive poor prices for their products;
l  In Cameroon, many farmers try to sell their products on urban markets, hoping 
to obtain better prices. However, there is usually a traders’ “reception committee” 
which prevents them from entering the marketplace or which will agree to 
pay only a low price for the farmers’ products. It is important to note that many 
markets are dominated by organised traders (or Bayam-sellams) who control the market location and 
prices and who coerce farmers to sell their products at lower prices. Nowefor tried to find new buyers in 
the cities in order to sell excess ginger that was found on the local market. It was able to find buyers in the 
urban markets and to organise transport of the products to the cities. The difficulties arose when buyers 
proved unreliable once the product arrived at the market (box 3a);
l  In Guinea, the Federation of Fouta Djallon realised in the course of time that the organisation of direct 
sales to the cities was difficult. It also re-oriented its activities and revised sub-contracts to transporters 
and traders.
In other cases, the buyer in the urban area was well-identified and relatively reliable. But then the 
problem of the transport costs arose:
l  Nowefor in Cameroon organised the transport of members’ tomatoes to an urban market. The buyer was 
a supermarket, but the organisation and the very high transport costs posed problems (box 3b);
l  The UDP Atacora organised the transport of cashew nuts from northern Benin to the port of Cotonou (500 
km) in 2004. The FO wanted to bypass the intermediaries (collectors/primary traders) and sell directly to 
exporters. After many trials and much time and effort, the FO learnt its lessons: very high transport costs 
(more expensive for producers than for traders) and lack of mastery of unofficial administrative costs 
considerably reduced the margins derived from the operations. The result was that very little profit was 
made compared to very high risks involved (box 3c).
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(3a) Batch sales of ginger and the organisation of transport by Nowefor
Farmers of the Nowefor FO tried to sell their products outside the local market, which was already saturated. 
They hired trucks to carry their products to Yaoundé and Douala. This experience was interesting in terms of 
lessons learnt but less so from an economic standpoint. Of course the prices the farmers received from selling 
in the cities were much higher than those obtained in the local market, but the operations encountered many 
difficulties. In Yaoundé, the transaction was not satisfactory because once the product arrived at the market, 
the buyer reduced the prices which had been negotiated and agreed upon beforehand. Without a signed 
contract or substitute buyer, the farmers were forced to sell the product at an unfavourable price. In Douala, 
the buyer took the products, asking for credit, and ultimately did not pay.
These problems and last-minute surprises are unfortunately frequent. These problems make farmers 
suspicious of the team that is in charge of organising the transport and sales of the products. The 
consequence is that this destabilises collective action. Meanwhile the constraint perceived as most important 
by the Nowefor farmers was the deferred payment. The delay was about ten weeks between the time the 
products were collected from them and effective payment. The farmers were dissatisfied and tried other 
alternatives. Today the FO continues to collect members’ products and brings the buyers to the community 
to buy rather than transporting the products itself. The prices are lower but the risks are limited and most 
importantly payments are made in cash. In Nowefor’s case, the FO pays the farmers upon collection of the 
products. The FO then looks for a buyer and sells the products. Here it is the FO which bears the risk. 
Ref.: Supply, demand and equilibrium price: a case for study. Improved prices for farmers through the organization of 
the local market and the regulation of the supply of ginger by Nowefor in Bafut (Cameroon) / Lothoré, Delmas, based on 
contributions of G. Fongang (Saild) – Inter-réseaux, CTA, 2006. – 12 p. + summary 1 p.
(3b) Negotiations for the transport of tomatoes by the Nowefor FO in Cameroon
Nowefor farmers tried to transport their tomatoes from the production zones to Douala. It proved to be very 
difficult and expensive in terms of product handling. After discussion and new negotiations with the buyer, the 
latter agreed to pay for the transport. A new agreement was reached and the farmers agreed to bring their 
products to the village at the request of the buyer. Once the products are gathered together, the buyer comes 
to the village and buys the product which he then transports to Douala.
The farmers also considered changing the delivery dates to take into account the perishable nature of the 
tomatoes. The issue was also discussed with the buyer who accepted to review the dates. A new arrangement 
was reached with the buyer wherein he indicates the quantities to be supplied by the farmers on a monthly 
basis. A contract was signed between this farmer organisation and the buyer based on a minimum quantity of 
tomatoes that the farmers are to supply each month for a period of six months. The product is supplied at a 
constant price over this period of time.
Ref.: Idem supra.
(3c) Group organisation of cashew nut transportation to Cotonou by UDP Atacora-Donga
The UDP Atacora-Donga, in northern Benin carried out a trial batch sale of about 25 t of cashew nut in 
2004. The experiment involved a brokerage role for the FO, which did not buy, store or sell cashew nut. UDP 
contacted a wholesaler directly at the port of Cotonou to whom the cashew nut was to be delivered, and took 
charge of organising the transport. The farmers took over the initial collection, sorting, packaging and transport 
operations which had previously been carried out by collectors.
This type of operation required little investment, given that the FO did not have to make advances for the 
products: only the transport from the production zone (northern Benin) to the port (500 km) is financed up 
front. However, during transportation, the UDP farmers encountered many difficulties. A poor choice of 
transportersand the hiring of a defective truck led to a delay in the delivery of the product. The FO incurred 
unexpectedly high servicing costs and problems with payment of taxes on the way. Once the products had 
reached the port the buyers found that the quality was low and reduced their prices while other traders 
refused to pay cash for the products. What could the farmers do? Carry their products back over hundreds 
of kilometres? No, they sold their products at the price imposed by the traders and were paid only two weeks 
after delivery.
Once costs related to the transport operations from the production zone to the port were deducted, the farmers 
obtained an added value of 20% on the price per kilogram sold in the production zone. The gross difference in 
the profit came from gains in the quantities of cashew nuts, given that collectors in the local areas paid less for 
the product in terms of actual weight. The farmers also evaluated the risks which they had undertaken during 
the transport operations (informal taxes, mechanical problems with the truck and disputes with the driver), 
and the time which they had spent on the action. They concluded that it was wise for them to work together 
and sort their nuts at the local level, based on their own standards and offering volumes large enough to incite 
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representatives of the exporters in Cotonou to come and buy in their communities. They also realised that they 
had to verify the weights and measurement of the cashew nuts!
Ref.: Réflexion paysanne sur une commercialisation collective d’anacarde Bénin - UDP Atacora, 2004. - 20 p. + résumé 6 p.
3.2 – Advantages and limitations
In theory, price differences between production zones (collection market) and consumption areas are 
significant. Many FOs have tried to place their products directly on the consumer markets. In their experience 
two obstacles always arise.
First of all, coming to a market with a truckload of products without a known buyer or without prior negotiation 
places the farmers in an unfavourable situation; the buyers can team up to bring down prices, the products 
may deteriorate if they are not sold quickly and it is very expensive for the farmers to carry the products back 
home over very long distances.
The second obstacle is gross transport costs. There is a difference between the prices which can be 
obtained by a professional who is involved in the activity on a more regular basis (the majority of traders) and 
by a FO which uses the services of a transporter just occasionally. 
The margin of the trader like that of the FO is reduced by the transport costs: hiring or depreciation of the 
vehicle, fuel, servicing, rents or depreciation of office and warehouse space, telephone, capital costs (if a 
loan is required), losses from product deterioration during transportation. There is also a cost related to the 
risk taken (box 3d). All these transport costs combined with the risks involved diminish the potential gain of 
the organiser (trader or farmer).
However, to minimise these costs it is necessary to master material, financial and risk management over time, 
and to have a network of diversified and reliable partners. Traders have this know-how and the networks. 
This is far from being the situation for FOs.
Finally, for many FOs, transportation of products from the village to distant markets is often more expensive 
than for traders. This significantly reduces the gains obtained from the difference in prices between the local 
areas and consumer markets, and in some cases transforms the potential gaining economic losses for the 
FOs.
(3d) The cost of risk
A bag of onions bought at 7,500 Fcfa from a farmer in Burkina Faso can be sold at 17,000 Fcfa in Accra 
(Ghana) and enable the trader to see a final profit of 2,000 Fcfa per bag. 
But, the market in Accra is volatile. The trader may find himself unable to sell at a higher price and forced to 
sell at 14,000 Fcfa per bag instead. This means that he may end up with no profit or in the worse case even 
lose 1,000 Fcfa. His capital is therefore not replenished.
If this occurs every other time, the trader has to increase his margin so that for each two shipments he gets a 
benefit of at least 2,000 Fcfa per bag.
A trader can make huge gains on ten journeys but also suffer major losses on the eleventh trip: the shipment 
can be entirely lost if the truck is blocked for a week on the way (the onions rot) or simply if the products are 
stolen.
Ref: Patrick Delmas, 2009.
Lastly, even when the operation is economically positive, many FOs are nonetheless less efficient than the 
traders. This is especially true at the beginning when they take on new activities as well as other associated 
roles. They often lack adequate know-how on how to search for buyers and transporters, and how to 
negotiate and manage risk over time.
Another point which can strongly work against the farmers is related to the mode of operation of their FOs. 
Within the FO it is necessary to bring together many members of the General Assembly to take sales 
decisions or to agree on a price. Lack of dialogue can lead to misunderstanding among the members and 
eventually to suspicions of embezzlement of funds. The traders on their part make decisions immediately 
and individually. 
The costs of placing the products on the markets, higher transport costs, time and energy mobilised can 
strongly limit the benefits for the FOs in carrying out transport activities.
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Transporting agricultural produce, a profitable activity? Yes, for some
Many traders earn their living not by speculating on price differences between periods of harvest and scarcity 
(purchase–storage) but by transporting products from production zones to consumer markets. Many times 
during the farming season, they buy and resell the products quickly (within a few days or weeks, short 
periods during which prices do not vary much). The margin is not very high each time and can even be 
negative on some rounds but given that there are many transactions taking place, in the end the operations 
are generally profitable.
Several factors differentiate traders from farmers. Traders have networks of buyers in the cities. These 
networks have been built up in the course of time and even over several generations. If one of the buyers 
fails to buy the products, they have other options as to where they can find alternative buyers. Because of 
their networks and given that they move around quite a lot, it is also easy for them to have information on 
the prices that are practised in the different sales locations. This enables them to know in advance what 
margins they can count on. 
It should also be noted that very few traders have their own means of transport. The traders know the 
transporters and are able to organise and negotiate with them. When it comes to transportation and the 
payment of the numerous road taxes, they know how to make the necessary arrangements. On the contrary, 
farmers who organise the transportation of their products just occasionally can face many unpleasant 
situations during transportation (taxes) and on arrival at the market place (reluctance/refusal of the buyers, 
modification of the prices and time of sale).
Finally, the traders generally do not specialise in a single product and never travel with empty vehicles. 
They therefore make efficient use of all the trips that they undertake. 
Their transport operations are much less risky and much more profitable given the advantages that 
they have over the farmers: (i) knowledge of several buyers and transporters, (ii) quick turnover with 
price differentials known in advance and (iii) multiple activities.
A precondition for transport operations: have reliable buyers
Two essential points must be kept in mind before engaging to undertake transport activities.
In the first place, it is useful to verify whether the expected potential profit can actually improve the 
remuneration of the farmers compared to other alternatives. In effect the question can be posed as 
follows: what is the advantage in getting a higher price in the cities if the margin that is gained is used up in 
transport costs (without taking into consideration the time and risks involved)? It is therefore important for the 
FO to explore possibilities of sub-contracting some of the tasks to traders who have a network of buyers and 
to transporters who have a mastery of the different taxation agents on the road.
Secondly, if the activity is undertaken, it is important to make sure that the FO has a reliable buyer and/or 
help them evaluate the reliability of the different buyers. It is better, whenever possible, to diversify 
the potential buyers in order to reduce the risks, given that it is difficult to distribute the goods if the buyer 
makes unexpected changes in the sales terms at the last minute. It is therefore important to strengthen 
FOs’ understanding of buyers and traders so that they have several opportunities to sell. This can be used 
to generate some competition among buyers or at least have an alternative situation to sell products at 
acceptable terms.
The reliability of the buyers is an important challenge. The reliability of the FO with respect to the buyers is 
also an element that has to be taken into account: relationships of trust are built in two directions. Moreover, 
the reliability of the farmers with respect to their FOs is also an element to take into account.  
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SHEET 4
PURCHASE–STORAGE BY THE FO:                                                                  
 WHO BENEFITS WHEN THE FO BUYS ITS MEMBERS’ PRODUCTS?
Farmers have to get organised when faced with strong buyers and/or intermediaries who buy products at 
very low prices. In most cases, the organisation that is set up will directly take charge of marketing with the 
objective of “improving the farmers’ price, buying produce at prices higher than market prices, and this is 
expected to be achieved immediately after creation… ”.
This is the traditional image of the ideal cooperative, which buys the products of its members and then sells 
the products on their behalf. Through the cooperative, marketing activities are carried out by the farmers 
for the benefit of the farmers, which is different from what happens in the case of commercial relationships 
between farmers and traders. These are just principles. Actual achievements are much more modest.
Many farmers find outlets for their products as well as buyers at the level of their FOs. The conditions under 
which the products are bought can be very different: the farmer takes the products to the FO and the latter 
takes charge of transportation; payment is made in cash upon delivery or after the FO sells the products, and 
after marketing charges have been deducted as well as advances on inputs made to the farmers by the FO. 
There can also be rebate systems.
That said, during its study the Working Group did not find many examples which follow the traditional 
cooperative mode of operation where the cooperative buys the products from the farmers and later on sells 
the products. The examples that were observed portrayed more failures of this system than success stories: 
revolving funds for marketing that were lost, farmers not paid, destabilised organisations. Even if the FO buys 
the products, it is not always easy to find market outlets and remunerative prices.
4.1 - Illustrated descriptions of the purchase-storage activities undertaken by FOs
These operations are based on the inherent nature of agriculture which is characterised by production 
cycles. At harvest, there is abundant produce on the market and the prices are low. Some months later, 
during periods of scarcity (low supply) the prices go up, sometimes quite significantly. The dream of the 
farmer is that the FO buys his products at harvest time but at off-season prices. In fact, many FOs buy the 
products of their members at harvest hoping to sell them later at better prices.
When all goes well the FO stores the products and resells them with a profit. The priority in this 
case is to cover the transaction and storage costs and where possible obtain an additional 
profit which can be shared between the members and/or the FO. The profit margin comes 
from the price difference between harvest time and the time when the products are sold a 
few months later if the FO stores the products, or from the difference in prices between the 
production zone and the buyer/market if the FO transports the products to a place where 
prices are higher. Advances may also be paid to the farmers in order to secure the supply 
of products to the FO.28 Purchase of the products is done at harvest, requiring the FO to 
either borrow or have its own working capital. We will come back to the cost of this money 
that is borrowed and mobilised for a long time in the form of stocks.
Access to funds is an important and recurring constraint to this type of operation which 
necessitates working capital over a long period of time so that farmers can be paid cash on delivery. In 
most instances the self-financing of purchase of agricultural products from farmers is limited by insufficient 
working capital on the part of the FO. More often than not the FO buys members’ products by resorting to 
bank credit or through revolving funds obtained from a support organisation. 
When it buys its members’ products, the FO often has to take charge of multiple activities: finding and 
negotiating credit, organising product collection, weighing and packaging (buying of bags, filling the bags, 
bundling batches, labelling the bags, recording, transport, etc.).
The FO also has to look for places to sell as well as buyers for the products in order to sell off the 
products it has bought from members. The FO can sell to (i) other FOs which are not producing or not 
producing enough to satisfy local demand; (ii) urban consumers (local communities, institutional kitchens, 
main consumer buying centres, nearby clients and civil servants); (iii) organisations (charity organisations, 
28 Common practice used by traditional collectors and often at usurious rates.
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international organisations like the World Food Programme, State-related organisations which issue 
invitations to tender for the supply of products within the framework of their activities .
The examples illustrated here highlight the difficulties encountered by FOs given their lack of adequate 
financial resources, poor organisation and/or poor understanding of economic realities.
The project for the marketing of maize in a farmers’ union in Benin (box 4a) outlines the set-up which farmers 
often want to have in their FO in terms of marketing of their products: the FO buys maize from members at 
harvest time at a price that is slightly above the market price, stores the crop and then resells it at a profit for 
the members (rebates) and for the FO. The first type of difficulty faced by this type of operation pertains to 
financial limitations.
This case is very instructive. At the local level, this type of operation can have a major impact by causing an 
increase in the price offered by traders who want to make sure that they get the products and therefore 
follow the purchase price offered by the FO. The farmers are therefore winners not only because of the 
quantities sold to the FO, but also on the other sales they make on the market. On the other hand, the FO 
alone bears all the risks. In the event that the FO uses credit to buy the products from members and sell them 
later, it will try to wait until it can sell at a maximum price. But this is very unpredictable because the prices 
can fall at different dates from one year to another, depending on different factors.
This example shows that this type of purchase–storage operation depends a great deal on managing the 
different costs for storage and treatment, on managing storage, and on the capacity to set a “fair” price. 
Other examples illustrate the risks related to prices and the measures put in place by the FOs to limit these 
risks.
l  Price setting is illustrated by the Union of Agricultural Product Marketing Associations in the “Boucle du 
Mouhoun” region (UGCPA-BM) in Burkina Faso (box 4b). The UGCPA set up “preventive measures” so as 
to limit the risks of price overestimation and the last minute disengagement of farmers. These risks are often 
related to the conflict between individual members’ interests and collective interests of the FO;
l  The organisation Faso Jigi in Mali carried out action similar to that of UGCPA-BM but at a much higher 
level. It has access to financing and it provides advances to farmers. In order to limit the risks, Faso Jigi 
put in place a security fund to cover potential losses which can occur in case of accidents (poor cost 
analysis, losses incurred during storage and/or overestimation of prices to be paid to the farmers 
with respect to falling market prices at the time the FO actually sells the products);
l  The FO Binum in Cameroon (box 4c) carried out purchase–storage activities which left them with very 
bitter memories. It expected a buyer to purchase the products at an artificially high price but at the last 
minute the buyer did not purchase the products. The FO was then obliged to sell the maize on the local 
market at a lower price. Moreover, the quality of the maize had deteriorated during storage. In the end its 
working capital melted away like snow in the sun.
This case illustrates the other side of these good intentions. Conclusion: an artificially good price cannot 
serve as a base to build a reliable operation over time.
Faced with these types of difficulties, some FOs abandoned these traditional systems of buying and storage. 
The Mogtédo cooperative in Burkina Faso is a good example: trends in the sales of rice by farmers of the 
cooperative are very instructive. The Mogtédo case (box 4d) shows that alternatives exist to the buying and 
storage system.
Lastly, we would like to tell a story from Burkina Faso for readers to consider. This story starts from a 
classic case where farmers sold their rice to their cooperatives and these cooperatives, waiting to access 
hypothetically better market outlets, ended up with stocks which nobody wanted. The wives of rice farmers 
in the plains of Bama and Banzon finally saved the cooperatives (box 4e).
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(4a) Project for the marketing of maize within the communal Union of farmers of Zogbodomey in 
Benin: limits of financing for purchase-storage operations
For several years, the Union bought maize from its members just after harvest (when the price is at its lowest) 
at a slightly higher price than the market price (additional gains of 5 Fcfa/Kg). The FO took charge of treating 
storing and reselling the maize during the off-season when the prices would theoretically be much higher. 
The FO covered all the costs involved (purchase of the maize and pesticides, packaging, renting of the 
warehouse, and security). It had managed the storage perfectly, covered all the costs and realised some 
profits which were shared out between the different levels of the FO and the farmers. 
The farmers particularly benefited from the purchase price which was a little higher than the market price and 
especially from correct measurements for their maize. But the FO was not able to deal with more than 50t 
because of lack of funding.
Ref.: Acheter, est-ce là un rôle obligé pour l’appui d’une OP à la commercialisation ? Note Post-forum / Lothoré, Delmas 
– Inter-réseaux, 2005. – 3 p.
(4b) Mode of price setting for farmers at the UGCPA in the “Boucle du Mouhoun” region in Burkina 
Faso: attempts to limit the risks of overestimating purchase prices for farmers
Just before harvest time, between October and November, UGCPA producers come together to agree and 
to set prices for the members’ products (maize, sorghum). Price setting takes a number of elements into 
consideration: 
-  analysis of the market situation by UGCPA: information from head farmers in union collection zones, 
contacts with potential traders, analysis of the assessments of cereal farmers at various levels (State, CILSS 
and other institutional actors such as the WFP that issue invitations to tender for the supply of maize); 
-  analysis of results of family surveys carried out by UGCPA with key focus on: 
1) “preliminary surveys” carried out between April–May to evaluate: (i) existing stocks at the family level, 
(ii) forecasts of production volumes (estimation of cultivated land area, expected yields), (iii) volumes 
required for home consumption (evaluation of family members to feed and household needs) and (iv) the 
cereal surpluses which can be sold (through the Union and beyond); 
2) “validation surveys” just before the harvest with the signing of the final individual engagement 
contracts between each farmer and the union for a given volume at the price set by the nion). The 
contracts are notarised at the police stations with official stamps. These contracts provide for penalties in 
case of infringements. There is a clause that defines what is to be done in the event of a catastrophe or 
epidemic;
-  analysis of production and storage costs with the members.
The elected officials and the members come together to vote on a purchase price for the members. A secret 
ballot voting system has been put in place, with an electoral commission made up of elected officials and 
staff. Another commission is given the mandate to eliminate unrealistic votes which do not take into account 
the recommendations of the surveys mentioned above.
The rigorous system in place requires a situational analysis and preliminary organisation to discuss 
and define prices which are accepted by the members. This system calls for taking the market situation 
into consideration, polices witnesses, provision of flexibility to revise prices when necessary and contractual 
provisions for catastrophes or epidemics. These measures were taken by UGCPA to consolidate its marketing 
activities for members’ products and to avoid deficits which had already reached millions of Fcfa. These 
deficits had accumulated because the union had bought products from members at a higher price than the 
market offered and also because of non-respect of supply commitments by farmers in earlier years.
Ref.: Discussion with Soumabéré Dioma at Inter-réseaux in 2008.
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(4c) Batch sales of maize by Binum in Cameroon: waiting too long for the buyer 
Since its creation in 1998, the FO Binum has carried out many activities on behalf of its members. Among 
others it organises crop purchases, storage and batch sales since 2001. In 2003, the FO made a very good 
transaction, selling 900 t of maize at 160 Fcfa/kg to the World Food Program (WFP), at a time when the local 
market price for maize was just at 140 Fcfa/kg. The FO took charge of bundling the maize, quality control, 
treatment, weighing, recording and packaging.
This operation at first had positive effects: the members had better revenues and with the income obtained 
the FO started a fund for future operations. It also gained credibility and membership grew. But the following 
year (2004), the FO decided to buy maize from its members after harvest, when the farmers are in need of 
money, at a price which mirrored the prices obtained in the previous year with the WFP. Negotiations with the 
WFP dragged on that year, and finally no sales took place. There were other buyers in the market, and they 
proposed prices that were below those of 2003. The FO then waited in vain for the prices to go up. In between, 
the storage and the interest on loans had significantly increased the FO’s costs (the FO had borrowed money 
from a bank because its working capital had been insufficient to buy all the maize from the members). The FO 
also lost some stock as some of the maize was not adequately dried.
In the end, with the high prices the FO had paid to the farmers, the cost of the purchase–storage operation 
was higher than the sales price on the market. While the farmers were satisfied (they had obtained a price 
higher than the market price), the FO lost money and its working capital. To renew the purchase–storage 
operation the next year, the FO resorted entirely to a bank loan. To be sure that it was going to repay the loan 
and cover the operational charges, it assessed the risks involved and proposed a lower price to its members. 
The members were less motivated and the batch sales operation did not take place. Each of them tried to sell 
the maize individually. It became clear that selling to the WFP at exceptionally high prices had unfortunately 
generated a speculative tendency among the members during the following year. The members became 
disconnected from the market realities and stopped investing in and working to improve the FO’s marketing 
capacity. 
This experience poses the question of understanding price determination mechanisms in markets (apart from 
institutions/projects) as well as the setting of realistic purchase prices for farmers in the FO (so as not to be in 
a deficient situation at the time of sales). Many FOs waste their working capital in this manner and after that 
expect other funds to come from an NGO or an external project.
Ref.: Le stockage, une opération qui vaut le coup ? / Lothoré, Delmas – Grain de Sel n°36, p 7. – 2 p.
Achat-stockage de maïs – Binum, 2006 – 16 diapos.
(4d) Evolution in the marketing of rice by Mogtédo Farmers: abandoning the traditional approach of 
purchasing from the farmer members and reselling by the cooperative
Before 1996, two State-run companies managed the rice supply. One was in charge of the purchase and 
transformation of paddy rice, and the other in charge of importing and marketing of the local rice. Generally, 
members of the Mogtédo cooperative have bad memories of this period because the prices that were 
proposed by these companies were neither remunerative nor transparent.
The year 1996 marked the beginning of State disengagement and deregulation of the supply chain, coupled 
with the suppression of the State-run companies and their replacement by private companies. These 
companies bought rice from members of the cooperative (until 2004) but did not complete payments for 
the products collected. The Mogtédo cooperative tried to sell directly on urban markets by eliminating the 
intermediaries. These attempts to sell rice directly in distant markets were not successful.
In 1998, some members of the cooperative questioned its management; they did not understand why the 
cooperative was having difficulty selling their products and was unable to obtain better prices. 
A financial audit carried out by the Ministry for Agriculture however showed that the cooperative was well-
managed. The cooperative’s managers then understood the need for more visibility and transparency in the 
handling of the commercial operations for its members. A decision was then taken to abandon the marketing 
of rice by the cooperative and to set up another system at a nearby market that would give the members 
greater visibility, mastery and oversight of the operation. 
In this new system the members are directly in charge of selling their products and also benefit from batch 
sales (consultation to set prices, transparency of transactions). The first measure that was taken was to let 
the farmers sell their paddy rice directly on the local market in order to be remunerated: the members 
sell their products themselves. What could seem to be a regression in fact is not: some measures have been 
taken to counterbalance this approach which appears to be individualistic and therefore less supportive of the 
cooperative spirit, and the cooperative takes on other functions to facilitate and increase sales of members’ 
products.
Ref.: Idem supra.
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(4e) Women buy, parboil and sell all the rice of two cooperatives in Burkina Faso
The Bama cooperative (1,158 members, 1,120 ha) and the cooperative society of the Banzon Plain (670 
members, 454 ha) are located around the irrigated zones near Dioulasso Sore. In 2007 they had an unusual 
experience.
That year there was no agreement on the price of local rice among traders and persons involved in rice 
processing. The traders then imported rice from the world market. However the two cooperatives were saved 
by the local women, who bought, parboiled and sold all their husbands’ rice.
Having very few resources, they started by buying very small quantities consisting of just a few bags, until the 
warehouses of the cooperative were emptied. This parboiling operation enabled the cooperative to sell off all 
its rice production, with the end result that the rice farmers and the women obtained substantial revenues from 
the rice sales (estimated at 200,000 Fcfa per woman in a year).
Unfortunately the influx of parboiled rice in the local market led to a fall in the price of rice. Other market outlets 
were available through different networks which helped take pressure off the local rice market absorbed some 
excess produce from the market and brought in significant added value. But to invest in these more lucrative 
markets, it was necessary to improve on the quality (by eliminating black grains and dirt) and to present the 
marketed products more attractively. 
Initiatives to improve the quality of the product are underway in collaboration with the Interprofessional rice 
committee in Burkina Faso (see sheet 8). The future of rice production in Bama and Banzon must include 
consultation between farmers, their wives who are in charge of processing and financial institutions, in a 
process that aims at sharing the added value locally and to improve on the living conditions of rice farmers 
and their family members.
Ref.: Article (in French) by Yersin Y. - GDS n°40 p.27. – Inter-réseaux, 2008. - 1 p.
Film: Les étuveuses de Bama et de Banzon. Quand la commercialisation du riz passe par sa transformation au Burkina 
Faso. – CTA, Fenop, Performances Communication, 2008 – video.
4.2 – Some clear advantages and risks that are not always controllable 
For the farmer, selling to a FO can appear to be the ideal solution given that it is practical and apparently easy 
because the FO offers a price that is higher than the market price and that this is done at harvest time (when 
the prices in the market are at their lowest).
Compared to individual sales, this type of sale has obvious advantages:
l  it enables farmers to have money at harvest time, when they need money, and to get more for their 
products through better prices;
l  larger batches of products can be of interest to traders, exporters and institutional buyers. This represents 
economies of scale and time gains for buyers who no longer have to move through the whole community 
in search of products and can therefore accept to pay higher prices;
l  better access to information on prices and better negotiating positions;
l  the farmers have close relationships with the head farmers and the staff of the FO. These relations can 
help buyers to have a better understanding of the farmers than new buyers;
l  greater access to funds (banks, NGO) in order to carry out group sales.
However, this way of selling has many risks and the benefits for the farmers remain uncertain.
New activities… and new problems
This system where farmers sell their products to their FOs creates new activities as well as problems which 
must be dealt with collectively at the level of the FO:
l  collective management of stock: the FO must have a reliable place to store the stock, and must master 
storage techniques in order to limit losses and costs;
l  the experiences studied show that if the products are to be kept in good conditions, there is need for 
collective discipline among the farmers before storage. This collective discipline starts at the level of 
drying handling and sorting the products into homogenous batches;
l  resorting to bank loans can be difficult and expensive. This requires transparent management and 
administrative capacities to determine prices and to pay farmers, to avoid members becoming 
suspicious of their leaders;
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l  determination of a realistic purchase price for the farmers: The FO must propose a good but also 
reasonable price for the farmers and one that ensures the viability of the FO. Some FOs carry out ill-
considered speculative practices which lead them to expect prices which are simply unrealistic because 
they fail to assess their operating costs (collection, storage, transport) correctly, or because they do not 
fully understand price determination mechanisms. Pressure from some members can also push up the 
prices. The leaders, who are farmers themselves, may also allow themselves to be influenced. All short-
term strategies can weaken the FO;
l  anticipating agricultural price variations: changes in costs do not always cover the cost of capital 
(interest) or storage. The FO also has to carry out a self-assessment of its ability to absorb risks; it must 
remain realistic, taking market prices into account, and foresee the likelihood of renegotiating prices 
(to work with price ranges, or collectively negotiate minimum sales prices). If not, there is a risk that 
individual strategies will increase which will only weaken or destroy the initiative that has been decided on 
collectively;
l  having good knowledge of buyers and their reliability is imperative: many operations fail because of 
payment problems of payment (lower prices proposed, delays, or outright theft in the case where the buyer 
simply disappears with the products);
l analysing fluctuation in the prices of agricultural products: the FO must have access to and 
disseminate useful information to its members on prices and quantities available and/or requested by 
buyers, and the measurement units selected. It must take part in building members’ skills, so that they can 
collectively analyse the environment in which they operate, and to enable them to make realistic decisions 
that are understood and accepted by all (contract terms, mode of price determination) to avoid hazardous 
overestimation of prices and to limit risks. This requires continuous work on communicating with and 
educating members.
The hidden side of price increases and the price risks
The difference in prices between the harvest and scarcity periods is not only the result of speculation on 
decrease in the supply with respect to demand. This difference is explained by real costs. There is an 
increase in the value of the products because of (i) storage cost, (ii) the cost of borrowed capital (bank 
interest rate) and (iii) the cost of immobilised capital (opportunity cost given that the money blocked in the 
purchase–storage operation could have been invested in some other activity e.g. small livestock farming or 
placed in a bank). The longer the product stays in storage, the more its worth increases.
However, risks are always involved because it is difficult to know in advance what the price will be 
during the period of scarcity. Many factors which are not controlled by farmers come into play. In world 
markets, prices can fall and imports may flood the market and cause a fall in prices in the local market. On 
the contrary, if the prices in the local market increase too much, the government may cap prices or implement 
measures to bring them down (release of stocks, food aid, etc.). In the final analysis, the prices during 
the scarcity period are not always as expected, and neither are the aspirations of the farmers nor the costs 
incurred in the process.
It is important to note that it can appear very contradictory and hazardous to speculate on prices at a time 
when there is much talk about encouraging the free movement of products between countries of a sub-
region. Very low prices at harvest followed by very high prices during scarcity exist and storage in this case 
is very profitable. This is the case particularly when there are unforeseen events like droughts.
Traders rarely carry out storage and speculative operations of this type. Instead they try to have a 
very high turnover from their working capital. They do not earn their living by speculating on price differences 
between harvest and scarcity periods. They obtain their profits by transporting products from production to 
consumption centres. For them, this is less expensive than carrying out purchase and storage operations. 
There are no large investments, no storage costs, nor losses during storage and most importantly, their 
money circulates and keeps working. 
Members’ interests and the FO: setting limits 
The FO is not a buyer like other traders. Relations between farmers on the one hand and their leaders and 
staff on the other are different in nature. The FO does not pay for the members’ products as a trader 
would. Farmers sell to “their” FO, know the leaders, who are themselves farmers and thus can be tempted 
to fix rather optimistic purchase prices for farmers. The farmers also have close relations with the employees 
who in theory are at the service of the farmers. It can therefore be easier for farmers to have the quality 
of their products recognised, to fix a price which at least covers the production costs and have favourable 
system of payment (cash payment at harvest, advances).
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Limitations nevertheless have to be considered, so that the FO does not engage in economically risky 
activities which will weaken it too much, even if these activities are beneficial to farmers in the short run. 
Because in the medium term, this type of activity can jeopardise the very existence of the FO and the 
services which it provides to the farmers.
Anticipating and limiting risks in order to avoid losses
We have underscored the high financial expenses, high storage risks (if there are post-harvest losses), 
the lack of visibility concerning future market prices and the absence of resources to protect against falling 
prices, the risks of losing working capital as well as cash. The advantages of purchase–storage activity 
for farmers and their FOs can also be questioned.
We do not mean to denigrate the purchase–storage operations carried out by FOs which can indeed provide 
some facilities for members. The members can be paid cash on delivery of their products and therefore have 
liquidity that is needed to take care of their family needs or agricultural activities. There are experiences on 
a large scale (Faranfasiso) where effective services are provided to members.
The risks borne by the FO (and therefore the farmers) however, have to be taken into account: many 
issues have to be controlled given that the activities are neither easy nor guaranteed to succeed, and can 
destabilise the farmers’ lives. These operations are surely among the most difficult to undertake. They 
require high amounts of working capital and as much mastery of the market as that of the traders (whose 
profession is buying), with an additional difficulty related to the demands of members and their privileged 
relationships with their FOs. 
If this type of activity is undertaken, it is not enough to have working capital. Precautionary measures must 
be taken and many issues have to be worked out:
l  from the farmers’ perspective, it is necessary to properly differentiate this type of sale to a FO and one 
which is made to an unspecified and anonymous company: the FO is not a typical business;
l  training and capacity building for farmers and the FO are essential to enable them to better understand the 
market and improve organisation;
l  the question of obtaining loans from banks has to be analysed carefully: resorting to credit (for the totality 
of stock) is very expensive and intermediate solutions should be explored (for example, negotiating an 
advance payment from the buyer at the time of the order and receiving payment of the balance at delivery 
in order to reduce the volume of funds needed by the FO). Value is created when the funds are used (case 
of traders). During storage operations, capital is immobilised and given the cost of credit, one can question 
whether in the end the storage operations benefit the farmers or the bankers. The FO theoretically has no 
reason to work for the banks.
Imperfect management of the operation explains the numerous failures. 
It is always important to recall that there is no magic formula or ready-made solution; instead there are 
modes of organisation that are appropriate for the context, actors, situations and products. These modes 
have to be economically sensitive with little recourse to high volumes of investment. They should not require 
fundamental reorganisation of the FO which has to integrate many other activities and new functions. It is 
also important not to take any major risks which can destabilise the FO and the organisation of farmers.
The experiences of FOs are full of new findings, including cases where the FOs do not carry out the classical 
functions of purchasing and sales but instead intervene in the market regulation and control, compliance with 
respect of rules, transparency, regulation of supply, regulation of prices and creation of alliances with other 
actors (among whom are intermediaries). This is illustrated by the following information sheets.
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Profit tomorrow, perhaps? (Stew, GDS 36, 2006)
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SHEET 5
THE FO FACILITATES MEMBERS’ ACCESS TO CREDIT                                       
 TO MARKET THEIR PRODUCTS BETTER
Seasonal credit and marketing credit
Facilitation of access to seasonal credit for members by FOs (granting of input loans to farmers 
through the FO) is a case which is often encountered. Credit is clearly a factor which enables farmers 
to improve their production conditions. If farmers do not have the means to produce, they are likely to 
stop producing altogether, whether it is for the market or for their own consumption. 
Among the case studies, the Federation of Fouta Djallon in Guinea can be cited: credit makes it 
possible (i) to buy quality seeds (batch importation) and (ii) to obtain inputs needed to improve soil 
fertility and the quality of the products (Irish potatoes, tomatoes, onions). In return, the quality of the 
farming practices and the products obtained largely determine the capacity to repay loans: good yields 
obtained when recommended farming practices have been applied enable farmers to earn income and pay 
for the inputs and associated loans.
One can also cite the example of tiger nut farmers from Maradi in Niger where the warehouse receipt 
system (inventory credit) is a tool to obtain inputs. The Sa’a Federation put in place a warehouse receipt 
system to enable farmers to place a group order for good-quality inputs needed to produce tiger nuts in this 
zone where access to quality inputs is difficult (box 5’b in the sheet 5’). Other examples and reflections on 
the warehouse receipt system are presented in the following sheet (box 5’).
Many other experiences exist where FOs take part in the organisation and facilitation of credit to give their 
members access to loans to better market their products. Uniting in FOs improves access to marketing 
credit even if loans are small or difficult to obtain from banks, NGOs and support programs.
Here we will only cite cases which are directly related to marketing credit within the framework of the 
Working Group. 
5.1 - Principles and examples
The FO can facilitate access to credit aimed at financing most of the activities presented in the various 
information sheets in this chapter:
l  creation of working capital so that the FO can buy members’ products: purchase–storage which allows 
the FO to store products and to gradually sell them off without having to sell at very low prices (batch 
purchase–storage, with all the limits evoked in sheet 4);
l  acquisition (hire or purchase) of the means to transport, process, weigh/measure and package products. 
These means make it possible to profit from geographical price differences, “to eliminate” intermediaries, 
to obtain greater added value and to gain from accurate unit measurements (within the limits mentioned; 
see sheets 3 and 9);
l  improving production in order to access new markets or to get better prices: new varieties, farm practices 
which spread out production over time to have better prices at harvest, improved quality for specific 
consumers, etc.
The FO can also carry out collective production activities geared towards individual marketing as in 
the GIC Nnem Mbock where a group farm was set up in order to generate funds needed for individual sales 
of cassava (box 5a).
(5a) Collective farm for individual sales of cassava in the Nnem Mbock GIC
The Nnem Mbock GIC is a small organisation in Cameroon with interesting experience in terms of a collective 
approach to financing cassava marketing activities of individual members. Cassava farmers have to make 
initial monetary outlays in order to produce (establishment of the crops and possible use of hired labour during 
peak work periods), and sell (packaging of the product, transport, etc). However the women of the GIC did not 
have the money.
The GIC set up a cassava field of a few hectares. The cassava is collectively cultivated, harvested and 
transformed into “cassava batons” which are then sold by the GIC’s marketing committee. The receipts are 
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deposited in a savings and loan fund. This same fund then grant loans to members to finance the production 
and marketing of individual activities other than cassava.
Ref: Un champ collectif pour des ventes individuelles de manioc au GIC Nnem Mbock. – Odéco, 2006. – 8 p.
Marketing credit versus consumption credit?
It is important to make a comment on the link between credit and marketing. Many farmers are obliged to sell 
their products at harvest because they need money. These farmers do not produce for the market but have to 
sell part of their crop because they need money. They therefore have to sell large quantities of the products 
because the prices at harvest time are very low. At the same time they pay very high prices for these same 
products when their granaries are empty. The behaviour of these net deficit farmers (they buy more than 
they sell) is not linked to the behaviour of agricultural markets. Their behaviour is simply driven by their need 
for money and therefore cannot respond to market signals. “A hungry person cannot produce nor sell: the 
poverty trap is not a marketplace”. 
Taking the differences between farmers (net deficit or net surplus farmers) into account makes it possible to 
use different approaches to support marketing actions or simply to give necessary support via safety nets 
and social protection with consumption loans, direct assistance, etc. By taking the differences between 
members into consideration, it is possible to limit members’ tendencies to sell their products outside of the 
collectively organised operations. Moreover, it can facilitate the organisation of strategies and collective 
marketing action.
Dumping when you can’t get a loan (Samson, 2009)
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SHEET 5’
FO FACILITATION OF ACCESS TO INVENTORY CREDIT 
5’.1 - Principles and examples
Another form of credit is storage–credit, also called the warehouse receipt system, inventory credit or 
warrantage credit. This credit makes it possible for farmers to have money right after harvest (which is one 
of the aims of the traditional purchase–storage operations). This enables farmers to sell their products at 
higher prices some months after harvest. The warehouse receipt system refers loans guaranteed by stocks 
of agricultural products which are locked up in a warehouse.
The amount of money received in loans covers only part of the value of the harvest at storage time. In order 
to limit the risks, the microfinance institution (MFI) which grants the loan allocates credit below the real value 
of the stock (70 to 80%). It is a safety rule that anticipates possible declines in the sale price of stocks.
The warehouse receipt system is a form of storage where the FO does not buy the products: the individual 
farmers remain owners of the products stored in a place agreed between the FO and the MFI bank. This 
system makes it possible for the farmers to have access to credit while at the same time maintaining 
ownership of their products, and for the MFI it increases loan security.
Farmers can expect better remuneration for their products because of the deferred sales. While waiting to 
sell, farmers have access to money for different ends: to buy consumer goods, to invest in marketing, in the 
purchase of inputs or in income-generating activity (on or off the farm).
In the process, the FOs can handle some of the duties related to the warehouse receipt system: (i) provision 
of inputs and work on farming practices to improve production, (ii) information on prices, (iii) training in order 
to understand market mechanisms and enable the farmers to reduce risks during sales when stocks are 
released, etc. 
Information provided by the FO to the members is also essential to help the farmers to understand the 
warehouse receipt mechanism and the real costs of the loans which they receive. Thus farmers avoid being 
misled at the time when destocking takes place (and avoid ill-thought-out speculation on prices which may 
lead to poor valuation of stocks). They also derive the most benefits from the loan obtained, for example 
through support in the development of income-generating activities. Without this support, credit which is 
poorly used can end up being very expensive for the farmer (purchase of goods on credit, which has to be 
repaid through sales of stored crops no matter the price at the time the stocks are released).
Storage–credit remains a risky operation for the farmer, and any measures by the FO to limit this 
risk will be welcome…
Fifata in Madagascar is a FO that helps farmers store their products but is not involved in marketing activities. 
The farmers store their rice in common village granaries through a warehouse receipt system put in place 
by the FO; the farmers take back their rice once the stocks are released during periods of scarcity and 
after they have reimbursed the loan. From then on each farmer is responsible for the outcome of the rice 
sales or home consumption during the lean period (box 5’a). The original feature in this case is that farmers 
individually assume control of their stocks when they want, after they have reimbursed the loan. They may 
sell or consume the rice. The FO helps consolidate the stock but the guarantee on the stock is individual, not 
collective.. Here the MFI considers only the individual farmer’s stock and not the whole stock. The farmers 
can obtain the price differential but also assume the risk in case of low prices or losses. In many other 
warehouse receipt systems, the stocks are released by the MFI only when all the farmers have 
reimbursed their loans. 
In the case of tiger nut farmers in Niger (box 5’b), the warehouse receipt system operation is 
combined with other activities of the Federation. The stock is locked up and is released only after 
everyone has reimbursed all the loans. The sales of the stocks (during the lean period) enable the 
group to carry out grouped purchase of quality inputs for the new farming season. The warehouse 
receipt operation is carried out here within a larger framework of FO activities for its members.
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(5’ a) Getting a better price by selling rice during periods of scarcity using storage with credits in the 
common village granary: The experiences of Cecam and Fifata in Madagascar.
 “Common village granary” credit was set up by Cecam at the request of its farmer members. Its objective is to 
enable the beneficiaries to profit from the price difference between harvest and lean periods while at the same 
time having money at harvest time to meet immediate requirements. Given the many community savings and 
loan schemes that exist, Madagascar’s storage–credit capacity is estimated at 50,000 t (national production is 
estimated at 3.5 million tonnes).
The farmers store mainly paddy rice at harvest. They withdraw the rice only during the lean periods after 
repayment of the loans. This fixed period obliges the farmers to look for external sources of revenue. The 
credit covers a period of 5 to 10 months at an interest rate of 3% per month. The whole stock constitutes the 
guarantee for the credit. The bags of paddy are stored in a doubly padlocked warehouse, farmers and the MFI 
each holding a key. The farmers receive credit which is worth about 50% to 75% (according to the MFI) of the 
value of the market price of the stored bags of rice.
Each farmer signs an individual contract, while committing to a collective guarantee. Stocks are rigorously 
controlled (inspection visits, monitoring of pests and rats, etc) during the storage period. While waiting for the 
stocks to be released (which can take place only after all the loans have been reimbursed) each farmer has to 
search for external sources of income (other agricultural activity, small business etc.). At the end, each farmer 
receives his bags of paddy when the stores are opened.
There has been mounting interest for this financial product since 2004. This year was characterised by large 
increases in the prices of paddy rice and many farmers got involved in storage–credit operations. Ever since 
then, even if prices at the lean periods do not increase, farmers continue to wait hoping that the prices will 
increase. They continue to stock but in smaller quantities. 
In fact, the farmers have very little knowledge about the market mechanisms and rely often on their intuition. 
Some speculate with their stocks, and accidents and credit reimbursement problems are therefore frequent. 
These past years, the farmers have become aware of the necessity to be informed about the market, to 
manage the supply chain and to act prudently, and they are getting organised to achieve these goals. It is only 
under these conditions that storage–credit can become a tool for increasing the farmers’ revenue.
Ref.: Getting better value for rice by selling during periods of scarcity after storage with credits in the community village 
granary: the experience of CECAM and FIFATA in Madagascar / C. Beaure d’Augères, based on contribution of Fifata, 
Cecam. – Afdi, Inter-réseaux, CTA, 2007. – 12 p. + summary 1 p.
Warranty or storage credit: a mean for peasants to get more value for the products and provide security to rural finance / C. 
Beaure d’Augères. – Afdi, Inter-réseaux, CTA, 2007. – 12 p. + summary 1 p.
(5’ b) Grouped purchases of inputs using warrantage credit for the tiger nut production of the Sa’a 
Federation in Niger
Tiger nut is a particularly important cash crop in the Maradi region in Niger. Market outlets are rare and 
fertiliser supply for the production of this demanding crop is subject to many irregularities brought about by the 
State-run centralised purchasing structures. The Sa’a Federation also carries out other activities. It groups 
together input orders so as to negotiate fertiliser prices and quality. To make farmers respect their grouped 
orders for inputs, and the Federation puts in place a warehouse receipt system.
In the Sa’a Federation, the warehouse receipt system takes the form of loans granted for a number of 
months and guaranteed by a stock of products. Storage involves many stages: awareness-raising for 
farmers, training of leaders, identification of warehouses, constitution of inventories, identification of income-
generating activities, contracts, monitoring of inventories and markets, search for outlets, reimbursement, final 
assessment. The tasks are well-defined at each level of the Federation: follow-up and management of stocks, 
price monitoring, technical advice, responsibility for placing in storage, control, repayments, etc.
When the stock is sold, the revenue from the sales is used to carry out group purchases of good quality inputs 
for the production of tiger nut. Group sales also ensure that members have revenue, and increase their profits. 
The farmers are more inclined to invest in technical improvements as they have funds and fertilisers for the 
coming season.
The Federation adjusts its processes as needed according to the difficulties encountered: risk management 
with the arrival of millet imports or late storage, changing MFIs (excessive interest rates and inadequate 
financing capacity), by-laws following the release of stocks before repayments, etc. There is not enough 
storage space or financing capacity. However a network of partners is being built and the experience and 
results are very encouraging. 
Ref.: The Sa’a Federation and its experience selling agricultural products under the warranty mechanism / 
Barthe Attahirou G.- Niger: FUPSN-Sa’a, Inter-réseaux, CTA, 2007. – 12 p. + summary 1 p.
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5’.2 – Advantages and limitations
Different advantages for different actors
For the MFI the risk is reduced since the stock of products serves as the guarantee. This system makes it 
possible for the MFI to lend funds which it would otherwise not release. Accordingly the farmers have access 
to cash, as is generally necessary right after harvest, without having to sell off their products at very low 
prices. 
The warehouse receipt system is therefore a means of securing rural financing and a means for the farmers 
to get better value for their products (with the risks mentioned in sheet 4 on purchase–storage operations: 
prices drops, stock losses, etc).
The FO incurs less risk in this system of warehouse receipt system compared to the traditional purchase–
storage system. In effect the results obtained from the deferred sales are shared out by the individual 
farmers.
In the case of agricultural produce destined for sale, the FO can more easily organise sales since the 
products are already bundled.
This form of credit can also be used by a FO for its own stock. But that would require partial payment from 
the farmers who may not be prepared to do this. 
Limitations at the level of the MFI
For warehouse receipt system operations to work MFIs with a local presence are required. Contrary to 
other forms of credit, warehouse receipt systems require a lot of time in the field: regular inspection of the 
warehouses (periodic opening, closing, and inspection). This has a cost. 
Limitations with regards to the types of products and volumes involved
It is obvious that one cannot carry out warehouse receipt system operations with all types of products. Only 
non-perishable products can be stored.
When a warehouse receipt system is carried out on a large scale (large volumes stocked compared to those 
brought to the market), it has a regulating effect on prices: if everyone stores products to resell later, prices 
do not go up significantly! 29 This limits the advantages of operation which involves fixed overheads.
The warehouse receipt system is thus especially adapted for products with large and regular price 
variations.
Limitations related to storage and deferred sales
There are inherent risks involved in the storage activity: stock losses, floods, theft, fires, and pests. There 
are also risks related to deferring sales (uncertainty about price increases). Prices may not increase enough 
to cover the costs involved in the warehouse receipt system (interest on loans, rental of the warehouse, 
handling of bags and possible losses).
Moreover, if the farmers do not have good knowledge of market mechanisms – particularly as regards pricing 
and price dynamics – speculating on price increases can be very risky for them. The FOs that engage in this 
activity can help farmers understand these processes.
Recommended pre-requisites and conditions at the level of the FO
As for traditional storage operations, warehouse receipt systems require FOs that are particularly well-
organised, that have adequate storehouses (or access to them) and can constitute stocks quickly after 
harvest, verify and check the quality of the products stocked, track prices, etc. 
In any event, the warehouse receipt system works best when the farmers are supported by their 
FOs, building and strengthening their capacities through training and information, especially on market 
mechanisms, and setting up collective activities (acquisition of inputs).
29 The same as when the state intervenes in the markets when consumption prices increase too much by putting out products 
on the market to increase the supply of the products and bring down the prices.
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http://inter-reseaux.org/ressources-
thematique/warrantage-ou-credit-d-achat/
The warehouse receipt 
system or inventory credit or 
warrantage credit
The warehouse receipt system is a loan for a few months guaranteed 
by a stock of products which can be liquidated by the bank in case 
of non-repayment. The farmer can thus access credit which enables 
him to meet his obligations at harvest time, and to keep his products 
until prices are high. For the microfinance institution (MFI), the 
guarantee is secured.
The warehouse receipt system is one of the major themes discussed 
at length in the Working Group “Market access and agricultural 
product marketing: FO initiatives”. Other themes were related to the 
management of supply, market organisation and market information 
systems.
Different experiences were discussed during the forum which took 
place in Bamako in 2007. This complementary dossier was put 
together to feed into the debate. It comprises a selection of articles 
and documents:
4 reference documents and analytical notes on the principles 
and challenges of the warehouse receipt system, on inventory 
credit for small-scale producers and inventory credit transactions 
in general
4 documents presenting experiences from different countries 
particularly Madagascar, Niger and Ghana.
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SHEET 6
FO PROCESSING AND PACKAGING ACTIVITIES
Processing and post-harvest packaging make it possible for some products to be stored for longer periods, 
while waiting for the right moment to sell or for access to new urban market outlets. As the number of urban 
consumers (who are not inclined to spend long hours preparing traditional dishes) grows, the processing of 
local cereals into ready-to-use products is a very important challenge (box 6a).
(6a) Challenges surrounding local cereals
In the Sahel, local cereals like millet and sorghum are daily staples. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger produce 
these cereals in sufficient quantity to feed their population, but they most often remain in their primary state 
which does not satisfy the needs of the ever increasing numbers of urban dwellers. Often called upon to 
work outside the home to increase the household income, urban women no longer have the time to produce 
traditional dishes from local cereals (six hours to pound, wash, and sieve). These town women now require 
products which are ready to use. At the same time, eating out is also on the rise. However, traditional cereals 
available on the markets are not able to satisfy this demand. This situation is explained partly by the seasonal 
nature of production of these local cereals and partly by other factors. 
The principal competitor to millet and sorghum is rice, which, as it happens, is often imported. For a long time, 
rice consumption was limited to urban areas (where the life-style is not compatible with very long time required 
to prepare millet-based meals). However, rice is also consumed in the rural areas. Rice is often preferred to 
other cereals bought in the market, particularly during a food crisis (surveys show that households feel that 
“rice goes further, it lasts longer” than other cereals). Despite the fact that rice is often more expensive than 
millet, consumers prefer rice for a number of reasons: less waste, more accurate quantities per bag, fewer 
concerns about quality and likelihood of dirt, preparation and cooking time. All these arguments favour rice 
consumption.
In the current context characterised by increasing prices of imported food products, locally transformed 
products from local cereals can provide an appropriate answer to the needs of the consumers and address the 
current challenge which is specifically to “feed Sahelian towns and the Sahel Region in general”. It should be 
noted that local cereal products were very little affected by increases in world food prices: this situation might 
be an opportunity.
To make use of this opportunity implies moving beyond trade in unprocessed cereals. Dry cereals processing 
and marketing of semi-finished products have become important and are a challenge. The objective is twofold: 
provide an outlet for farmers and a chance to increase their incomes by working to change the image of 
traditional cereals for consumption, and secondly promote income-generating activities for persons involved in 
processing to supply consumers with diversified products which are quickly and easily cooked. 
The challenge is at different levels: producing large quantities of quality processed cereals, and supplying 
the finished products in attractive forms. The development of the market depends on two important factors: 
on the one hand implementing a set of standards and norms which make it possible to improve and ensure 
the transparency of the market, and, on the other hand, promoting processed cereals in order to win over 
consumers.
Source: Afrique Vert website (www.afriqueverte.org)
The Working Group studied very few cases of processing agricultural products at the level of FOs. However, 
there is an interesting example of women processors in Benin.
In this case, the processing of traditional local products (maize, beans, cassava) into ready-to-
use products for urban consumers is a recent response to a new demand. The study of the 
supply chain for these new products revealed the difficulties encountered by persons involved 
in processing activities: (i) supply (raw materials are scattered and costly), (ii) technical 
aspects (achieving the same homogeneous quality over time; appropriate labelling and 
packaging) and lastly, selling the products (box 6b).
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(6b) Marketing dried products in Benin
In Benin, some women took the initiative to cook and dry some of their basic commodities in order to sell 
them in the Cotonou city market. These products are traditional foods: aklui from millet, fortified gari, yam 
paste.. After processing, these food products are “ready to use”. These products are an innovation in Benin 
given that they have only recently appeared on the market and they are little known to consumers. Meanwhile, 
these products have shown promise in other countries of the sub-region (Senegal and Ghana) where they are 
consumed as often as the traditional staples.
The study carried out on the supply chain of dried products (organisation, relations between actors) reveals 
that processors encounter some difficulties:
-  difficulties at the supply stage: the raw material is widely scattered and there is a need to obtain a purchase 
price such that consumers can afford the finished products;
-  technical difficulties related to consumer demands in terms of quality: the need to master the processing/
drying techniques in order to obtain consistent product quality; the need to improve labelling and packaging 
(there is no market in the supply of suitable packaging material for the different forms of the product);
-  marketing to make the products known to customers and to achieve recognition for the products to build 
consumer loyalty;
-  sales and distribution through supermarkets, hawking, door-to-door or specific sales points.
Ref.: Commercialisation de produits séchés au Bénin: contribution au Forum Accès au marché des produits agricoles / 
Djevi H., Outtier AC. – Agro–Bénin Développement, Geres, Inter-réseaux, CTA, 2004. – 22 p.
It remains to be seen how farmers can organise to position themselves in these new markets for processed 
products. As for transportation, one can ask if farmers are the best suited to process products. A necessary 
first step appears at the production stage: the need to grow crops in sufficient quantity and quality to supply 
to processors. Next, the processors require the means with which to buy the products to be processed. Many 
activities can be undertaken to assist them in this (box 6c).
 (6c) What Afrique Vert has done to support women processors
Afrique Verte’s activities in support of processors focus on: 
-  technical (product quality) and financial training (small enterprise management);
-  supply of raw materials and packaging: bulk purchasing of unprocessed cereals, group trials and purchases 
of packaging, design and printing of labels;
-  search for appropriate funding by bringing together processors and structures financing small and micro 
enterprises;
-  search for suitable equipment, especially for drying;
-  marketing the products to consumers: taking part in national and international trade fairs, search for 
sales outlets, producing and broadcasting commercials, information programmes on radio and television. 
Participating in international fairs enables exchanges between processors of the Afrique Verte Network and 
gives the participants professional experience;
-  market research makes it possible to identify new outlets: “Fair Trade” rice supply chain in Europe or organic 
fonio; study of regulations covering processed cereal imports from Europe and the challenges involved, etc;
-  producing information sheets on preparing local cereal products for distribution to consumers. Products 
include tô, pre-cooked fonio, mablériz (made of maize, wheat flour and rice).
Source: Afrique Verte website (www.afriqueverte.org).
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SHEET 7
FO MEASURES TO IMPROVE TECHNICAL PATHWAYS:                                
 GROW MORE TO SELL MORE 
FO measures to improve technical pathways are a classic way of trying to increase production for its own 
sake, but they are far more innovative when they are designed to improve production prior to placing the 
products on the market from a marketing perspective. Managing product supply - timing, volumes, 
and expected quality - and associated production costs becomes essential. Farmers must be able to 
organise to meet collective commitments made to buyers, and ensure that they sell larger quantities of 
products or obtain better prices, which will cover any extra costs related to the adoption of the chosen 
technical pathways.
7.1 - Principles and examples
Farmers face many challenges, starting with production:
l  to produce food that meets buyers’ requirements (taste, physical quality and 
conservation). Products must meet certain standards, especially when they are 
destined for export;
l  to produce at reasonable prices (and therefore affordable production costs) for buyers 
and final consumers, while allowing the farmers an income. It is important to remain competitive 
vis-à-vis imports in order to find local outlets and access export markets;
l  to produce the necessary quantities at the time they are required to meet commitments to buyers and limit 
the risks associated with contractual non-compliance;
l  to spread production over time so that not all the crops enter the market at the same time, causing prices 
to fall.
To meet these challenges, farmers must improve and master technical pathways, organise production at the 
individual and collective level and win over consumers and buyers with products suited to their needs and 
preferences. Of course there are always other challenges: rain, locusts, pressure to sell for lack of money, 
underhand sales outside official channels by competing buyers offering better prices, etc. But the first hurdle 
is still to manage production.
Let us recall the various services FOs offer their members: (i) search and select quality input suppliers 
or those offering good value for money; (ii) negotiate wholesale prices, deadlines and delivery terms; (iii) 
monitor contracts signed with suppliers; (iv) provide inputs after solving transport and storage problems; 
(v) negotiate the method of payment between suppliers and farmers; (vi) control the quality of the supplied 
inputs, etc. None of these FO activities are directly related to marketing agricultural products but they will 
have an impact on marketing success later on. Indeed, the quality and cost of inputs influence final product 
yields, volumes, quality and prices and therefore their competitiveness in the markets.
The leaders and farmers of the Fouta Djallon Federation understand this very well. For many years, they 
have organised to import quality Irish potato seed from Europe. These seeds allow them to produce 
quality products that can compete with Dutch potatoes. The Dutch potatoes that were once imported were 
temporarily banned and today they are no longer imported even though all protectionist measures have been 
lifted. Trade barriers are no longer required as Dutch potatoes are no longer competitive compared to the 
local “Belle de Guinée” (Box 7a).
The FO can provide technical and economic advice to improve farming techniques such as fertility 
management and timely, appropriate application of pesticides and herbicides. Sometimes the FO plays an 
important role by creating ties with research and extension services to try new seed varieties, confirm new 
technical pathways and later on obtain the support and tools needed to carry out wider application of the 
techniques best suited to local conditions (Box 7b: Burkina Faso Onion; box 7c : Irish Potato in Guinea).
TE
C
H
N
IC
A
L S
U
P
P
O
R
T
7
90 91
(7a) Quality inputs obtained by the Fouta Djallon Federation
To be competitive vis-à-vis the imported Irish potato (the Federation’s aim from the outset), it was necessary 
to improve the quality of the Guinean Irish Potato and reduce production costs. Improving quality required 
importing selected seeds as the local market only supplied degenerated seed, which had been used many 
times and were not available in sufficient quantities to cover the increasing need for seed. FPFD thus started 
importing quality Inputs from Europe.
At the same time, because the farmers did not have the means to pay cash for the inputs, FPFD set up a 
seasonal credit scheme for members. Select Irish potato seed imports increased steadily from then on: from 
12t in 1991 to over 300t in 2005…
Ref. : Activités de commercialisation de la FPFD : capitalisation et perspectives / Diallo, Barry, Beauval. - Guinée : Cellule 
commercialisation de la FPFD. – CCFD, 2006. – 30 p. + 46 p. of appendices.
(7b) From quantity to quality: the much needed contribution of research to improving onion marketing 
in Burkina Faso
Onion production has increased consistently in Burkina Faso in recent years. Onions are produced for a very 
short period of time (January-April) and are sold immediately by the farmers. The farmers use techniques to 
produce the largest possible quantities, which means applying very high doses of fertiliser. Since 2007, the 
harvest has exceeded demand in local and export markets. To improve the situation, it was necessary to store 
and conserve the onions in order to spread sales out over time.
Initially, FOs researched the storage practices that were best suited to their needs. The idea was to construct 
storage warehouses. But through exchange visits and discussions with experts and other farmers, it became 
clear that to conserve the onions, they had to be grown in a different way using specific technical pathways. 
The aim was to produce a “storage onion” that could be kept for 3 to 6 months with very limited losses. The 
required storage facilities had to be easily accessible to farmers (cold houses using electricity did not appear 
to be a realistic option). A number of FOs then started drawing up new technical pathways: onions that can 
be stored for a long period receive smaller doses of fertiliser, and therefore are smaller. The resulting loss in 
weight can be offset by making the onions denser. But most importantly, it is necessary to organise farmers to 
share the production volume requirements for each onion variety and the production capacities of each farmer 
as well as establish collective rules. An onion variety that can be stored for a long time is also of considerable 
interest to traders in the regional markets (Togo, Ghana, etc.), who are ready to pay a higher price for it. 
The fact that it can be conserved for a long period makes it possible to spread sales out over time without 
experiencing stock losses. 
Ref.: Note Afdi Burkina, P. Delmas and video “Handsome onion needn’t worry about the market slump”. – CTA, Jade 
Productions, Inter-réseaux, 2008. 19 minute video + accompanying guide. - CTA, Inter-réseaux, 2008. - 10 p.
(7c) Partnering Farmers, Research and Extension Workers in Fouta Djallon
At the Fouta Federation, a two-pronged approach was taken to improve potato technical pathways: (i) 
research was used to identify the most suitable potato varieties and organic and inorganic fertiliser practices, 
and thus adopt technical pathways that stagger and spread production over time to reduce the drop in prices 
during peak production periods and (ii) a partnership was sought with the public extension services to help the 
Federation’s technical staff disseminate the techniques as widely as possible to farmers who were new to this 
technique for growing onions. 
These efforts, combined with the use of quality inputs, increased yields significantly from an average of 8-10 
t/ha in 1990 to 15-20 t/ha in 2006. Potato technical pathways and the associated costs are constantly being 
adapted to consumer demand (customers’ ability to pay) and target markets. The reduction in production costs 
enabled the FPFD to target Conakry’s “middle class” and access new markets (imported potatoes used to be 
the preserve of the rich). A similar effort involving technical pathways, fertility management, production costs 
and yields enabled Guinean potatoes to compete with imported onions, even without trade protection (see 
sheet 14).
The FPFD has been working for many years on setting up a system to dispense technical and business advice. 
The FPFD selected a limited number of farms covering various locations, agro-ecological conditions, product 
types and farmers. This system of farm monitoring should help to ensure that technical staff and researchers 
are asked the right questions and ultimately validate the results and communicate them to many more farmers.
Ref.: Idem supra.
TE
C
H
N
IC
A
L 
S
U
P
P
O
R
T
7
90 91
SHEET 8
FO MEASURES TO IMPROVE PRODUCT QUALITY: WHAT QUALITY, AT WHAT 
COST, AT WHAT PRICE AND FOR WHICH MARKET(S)?
There are many differing ideas about what constitutes quality. First of all, the concept of quality is very 
subjective because it is defined by different actors in the supply chain. And the actors may be very diverse: 
(i) processing enterprises or supermarkets that want regular, standard, homogeneous products year round 
which they can transport over long distances and store easily; (ii) end consumers, who require unblemished, 
evenly-shaped, tasty or pesticide free products year round (box 8a).
(8a) Quality or qualities? A multiple reality using coffee as an example 
Based on Benoit Daviron and S. Ponte*
“There is a widening gap between consumer and farmer prices for coffee. Gross margins for operators in 
importing countries (roasters and the retail industry) are constantly rising while farmer prices, when compared 
as a percentage of consumer prices, are shrinking. Farmer prices represent barely 10% of final consumer 
prices and this percentage is decreasing in direct proportion to the quality of the coffee.
This widening gap between the “consumer price” and the “farmer price” is linked to the increasing emphasis on 
coffee quality attributes. These attributes include their symbolic quality and “personalised service” quality.
There are 3 types of product quality:
1. Material quality, which refers to the intrinsic attributes of the product (e.g. colour, flavour, size of the 
grain). This is the “ historical quality” of agricultural products;
2. Symbolic quality, which derives from the existence of a mark of quality: a trademark, geographical 
specificity or a label (e.g. fair trade). This form of quality has developed in recent years and its existence 
depends mainly on the establishment of property rights that define the value of the mark of quality;
3. “Personalised service” quality, which refers to the type of relationship that exists between the buyers and 
the seller of a product. One example of this type of personalised service is a human relationship, e.g. the 
relationship between a coffee boy and a consumer in a bar (which is critical to the value that can be created 
from the bar). This form of quality has developed very recently”.
*Source: Our transcript of a interview of Benoit Daviron introducing the French edition of his book entitled “The Coffee 
Paradox”, Daviron B., Ponte S. - Editions Quae, 2007. - 360 p. (Available in French on-line, at the Cirad website: 
www.cirad.org).
Regardless of the particular quality, quality criteria (and the selection and segmentation of the associated 
markets) are becoming very important to buyers through a system of norms, marks of quality and also “entry 
rights” per market segment (“Ethical”, “Fair Trade”, “Organic”, etc.).
Who defines these standards? That is the first question. Another is: how do farmers interpret these standards 
and what strategies do they adopt to meet them? There are many different initiatives and complex actions 
designed particularly for export products. An example from Peru illustrates the significant strides taken by 
some FOs with regard to the quality of their coffee (Box 8b).
But the improvement of product quality often takes place through far more modest measures taken by FOs 
based on a thorough knowledge of their markets. These measures are put in place with available resources, 
particularly through the good will of farmers.
This chapter does not treat the question of quality in its entirety but only revisits some of its aspects drawn 
from FO marketing initiatives discussed by the Working Group.
8.1 - Principles and examples
The example of rice alone indicates that quality standards are not the same for all 
consumers: rice that swells, rice that cooks quickly, clean rice, taste, etc. Farmers have 
problems selling their products and receive poor prices when their products do not meet 
quality standards or average market criteria. This was the case with rice farmers in Benin. 
FO involvement to improve marketing involved taking a series of measures to produce a 
marketable product – rice that meets the quality criteria required by consumers who 
are already used to eating imported rice. It was necessary to review the choice of varieties, 
seed production, harvest and post-harvest operations… (Box 8c).
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Other farmers’ organisations know how to focus on and maintain specific product criteria, which helps 
strengthen their activities and facilitate marketing, leading to better prices for their products. This can be 
observed in the Mogtédo cooperative in Burkina Faso. The cooperative produces a “local variety” which is 
very much appreciated by traders (i.e. consumers). The cooperative organised seed multiplication to meet 
demand, using the quality of its rice to win customer loyalty (female traders) and thereby obtain higher 
prices for its rice than other production zones. 
The following cases are also revealing:
l  in Cameroon, Nowefor tomato farmers sought new markets to increase production and obtain higher 
prices. The farmers had to control pesticide residue on the tomatoes (by changing their farming techniques 
– box 8d) to meet the requirements of a large retail outlet located in Douala – which was also involved 
in exporting tomatoes to neighbouring countries. Large distributors can thus set standards or specific 
requirements for farmers to satisfy their clientele and meet specific demands. But this can also lead to 
relationships of dependence (Box 8e);
l  in Burkina Faso, farmers praise the quality of “this year’s” rice as opposed to imported rice which has 
spent many years in warehouses before arriving on the market. The culinary quality of the rice farmed 
in irrigated areas is highly valued. The rice also has to suit the new cooking methods and meet the 
requirements of mainly urban consumers. It has to be ready for use, i.e. to be cooked directly without going 
through the tiring process of sorting to remove foreign bodies. This means the rice farmers’ organisation 
and the parboilers must review their technical pathways and the processing steps to identify all the critical 
points where impurities are likely to mix with the rice: drying the paddy rice in the field, parboiling, working 
spaces, etc.;
l  again in Burkina Faso, in the villages of Zam and Mogtédo, onion production is mainly intended for the 
Togolese markets and thus in direct competition with Niger (the onion-producing country). To sell their 
products at a higher price compared to the price of their competitors from Niger, Benin or even Burkina 
Faso, farmers from Zam and Mogtédo developed quality technical pathways. Their seed is grown under 
good conditions; they have reduced the use of chemical fertiliser; they manage irrigation at the end of the 
production cycle; they sort the onions at harvest. In the end, onions from these villages are smaller in size 
than those from other irrigated areas but they are drier and their conservation quality is highly valued by 
traders who are very concerned with the shelf life of their onions30;
l  in Guinea, the Woko cooperative sought ways to increase the value of its members’ coffee through a 
“quality initiative” using agronomic research (Box 8f); 
l  the potato farmers of Fouta Djallon have long grown a potato widely recognised for its quality. They 
succeeded due to the Federation’s registration of a label (“Belle de Guinée”), which is recognised by their 
partners; 
l  finally in Mali, the GIE Jèka Ferée improved the quality of its rice by introducing rice huskers and training 
the users. 
 (8b) Improving coffee quality in Peru: progressiveness and levels of complementary action
Coffee is the main source of income for farmers in the North of Peru. Until 2002, coffee was harvested and 
treated using the wet method under poor conditions: quality was low and a large percentage of production 
did not meet export standards. The available technological package was not suited to the local situation. 
Production was not linked to processing or to marketing. Production costs, quality, marketing and promotion 
were unknown concepts; the farmers were selling undifferentiated coffee at low prices. Support from the 
Norcafé project to improve the quality of the coffee came in two stages.
The first step was to improve the average quality of the coffee. The first measure was to build up working 
capital managed by the FOs to acquire the wet method coffee treatment equipment required for the farms. To 
maintain the equipment and ensure some uniformity in basic treatment practices, teams of farmer-promoters 
were trained and put in charge of monitoring the implementation of training given to farmers and raw quality by 
physical inspecting the coffee beans. The gradual improvement in the average quality of the coffee enabled 
the FO to move towards certification to access Fair Trade and organic markets.
Then, starting in 2005, umbrella organisations (200 to 2,000 farmers) received support to assess the 
organoleptic profiles of the coffee. Sensorial analysis of the farmers’ coffee provides a better, more objective 
30 This know-how was the subject of an exchange visit by another cooperative in Burkina Faso as well as the production of a 
video (www.inter-reseaux.org)
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description of the quality, allowing it to be gradually harmonised for other actors in the coffee supply chain, 
especially traders. A trained professional is in charge of testing and describing coffee samples with respect to 
various criteria (size, acidity, bitterness and aroma). Sensorial analyses gradually determine which technical 
and agro-ecological conditions are needed to obtain high quality coffee with specific aromas.
Two types of promoters were trained within each grassroots organisation: internal inspectors (to monitor the 
certification measures and the technical pathways) and commercial representatives (in charge of collection, 
quality control, transport and payments). Through these promoters, improvements were made in the physical 
quality of the coffee and gradually different prices could be charged according to the different qualities. 
Various systems of remuneration are being introduced in the FOs for these services.
For the umbrella organisations, a quality analysis laboratory was set up with training for farmers and the 
involvement of specialists to develop other coffee analysis capabilities within the FO, correct mistakes and 
work on specific aromas. The organisations are gradually developing collection policies based on the different 
qualities of coffee. They are also harmonising their own parameters for evaluating and classifying the different 
kinds of coffee they produce. Quality is controlled at three levels: the grassroots organisation, the umbrella 
organisation and at the coffee factory laboratory. The processing of the coffee intended for export is carried 
out by a third party, but quality control is ensured collectively by the umbrella organisations.
These investments led to growth in the exports of quality coffee by the FOs (from 1,000 t in 2001, to 2,500 t 
in 2006). The organisations improved the marketing conditions for the farmers with the acquisition of different 
quality labels for fair trade, organic and sustainable markets.
These guarantees made it possible for the FOs to have a broader range of customers in various countries 
and to develop long-term trade relationships. Finally, brands were developed for specific organisations in 
partnership with buyers.
Ref: Cafés de qualité et accès au marché : l’appui aux OP péruviennes / Aquino S., Lacroix P. – GDS 36, p.29. – Inter-
réseaux, 2006. – 2 p.
(8c) Actions and challenges in rice quality in Benin
Rice is gradually becoming a food staple of the Beninese. Despite the development of rice farming, local 
supply is far from adequate to meet national demand and it also has to compete with imported rice that offers 
better value for money. Rice farmers in the Dangbo region in Benin have problems selling their rice because of 
its poor quality and competition from cheap imported rice. 
If rice quality is highly valued by individual farmers, given the small quantities they produce, it becomes 
even more important when they are dealing with larger quantities at the level of their organisations. The rice 
farmers have tried, however, to take measures to improve quality with the help of the rice farmer’s consultation 
committee. By consulting research, they were able to select suitable varieties and farmers were trained in 
harvesting, drying and husking techniques.
The farmers are working together to obtain a product that is comparable in quality to the one consumers are 
used to. This demand-driven approach may yield fruit. Another approach might consist in differentiating the 
rice according to production zones or local specificities while at the same time informing and educating buyers 
about the different types of rice (marketing!).
Ref.: Transformation et commercialisation du riz au Sud Bénin. – CCR, Inter-réseaux, 2004. – 19 p. + résumé 2 p
(8d) Grouped supply of quality tomatoes to new outlets (Nowefor)
The cultivation of tomatoes is known to be very demanding with regard to technical requirements, especially 
the use of pesticides. To find buyers for their products on the Douala market, farmers from the Bambui region 
in Cameroon, with the help of various organisations (Saild and SOS Faim Luxembourg), improved on their 
farming techniques to limit the use of chemical products and reduce chemical residues in the marketed 
tomatoes: the farmers received training on integrated pest management and the management of pesticides.
Nowefor helped the farmers modify their farming practices to meet the market requirements of a new buyer: a 
large retail outlet that did not want chemical residues in the tomatoes. The FO informed the farmers about the 
permissible chemical residue levels specified by the buyer and helped them adapt their technical pathways 
accordingly, mainly through the use of organic manure. The FO also facilitated the delivery of tomato samples 
to the buyer to measure the chemical residue levels.
After performing many tests on samples, the large retail outlet in Douala (Leader Price) finally decided to buy 
large quantities of tomatoes from Nowefor. More than 25 tons were supplied in less than one year at a price 
slightly higher than that in the local market (3,200 FCFA per 20 kg bucket compared with 3,000 FCFA in the 
local market). The tomatoes were subsequently sent to other big retailers in Equatorial Guinea and in Gabon 
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where consumers were very satisfied with the quality. The buyer then indicated the possibility of increasing 
the purchase price of tomatoes and requested other products (potatoes, etc.). The increase in volumes and 
product diversification are the direct result of the FO’s ability to improve the quality of its members’ products.
Ref.: Nowefor réussit la vente groupée de tomates en grande surface / Fongang G., Forbah D. Nuijueh. – Cameroun. 
– Saild, 2007. – 6 p.
(8e) Increased dependence of farmers on large distributors
Nowefor adapted its farming practices to produce tomatoes in accordance with the requirements of major 
distributors. 
But what happens to the FO when it starts to specialise in the supply of large quantities and the buyer changes 
the rules abruptly without consulting the farmers?
In the case of Nowefor, tomatoes that actually met pre-established standards were rejected by the buyer 
(which checks residue levels) on many occasions. The farmers then have to scurry around and spend time 
looking for other neighbouring markets to unload their products. Such situations, when there are no contracts 
and the buyer can change the rules of the game without prior consent, are very detrimental to farmers. The 
collaboration between Nowefor and the distributor Leader Price ended because of these types of problems. 
Source: Communication Mbzibain A., 2008.
(8f) Quality of the coffee produced by the Woko Agricultural cooperative in Guinea
The Woko cooperative is a farmer-led initiative: this cooperative was created in 2003 by small coffee farmers 
in the Macenta Division after they sold their coffee at a loss.
Since then, numerous measures have been undertaken by the cooperative, including establishing contractual 
relationships with other actors. To increase the members’ incomes, the cooperative focuses on the production 
of high quality coffee. The search for better pricing levels for the coffee is based on a “quality initiative” 
contracted with research institutes, which are in charge of characterising the coffee. There are also contracts 
with transporters and coffee buyers from Macenta.
Ref.: Initiative de la Coopérative agricole de commercialisation de café et d’approvisionnement Woko / Gnekoya L., 
Honomou C., Makolo K. – Guinée : CNOP-G, Coopérative Woko, Inter-réseaux, CTA, 2006. – 12 p. + résumé 1 p.
8.2 – Advantages and limitations
In the various experiences that have been analysed within the FOs, the steps taken to improve the quality of 
the products are linked to privileged contacts between farmers and buyers, usually within the framework of 
short market channels. These cases are observed when the FO is in contact with importing traders or when 
the farmers try to sell the products themselves on the markets or try to meet the demand of buyers. On the 
contrary, in the cases where the FOs sell to various intermediaries regardless of their reputation, the notion 
of quality is scarcely taken into consideration. 
Collective efforts to improve the quality of agricultural products require strong organisations and strict 
discipline regarding compliance with rules by all the farmers. Apart from the supplementary costs (technical 
pathways, equipment, etc.), the quest for quality always represents additional costs related to mobilising, 
informing and training. And one is never sure whether these improvements will be compensated by better 
remuneration. Experience shows that this varies. 
Individual and collective levels of investment
Collective marketing and organisation make it possible to undertake the quality improvement approach as a 
means to obtain better sales prices for products. It is this organisation of marketing enabled a better price to 
be “imposed”. The value added on quality is accompanied by other measures. In the case of rice in Mogtédo, 
buyers generally take steps to organise the market in advance: predetermined prices, regular supply and rice 
quality. For Nowefor, the tomatoes contain an acceptable chemical residual rate and the farmers’ organisation 
is able to supply the large quantities required as well as comply with delivery periods.
The steps taken by the FOs to improve quality are closely related to their knowledge of the market 
(or markets). This is because they engage in dialogue with the buyers and know the level of consumer 
appreciation of their products. It is interesting to note that the leaders of the FOs who take these measures 
to improve quality can talk about them in much the same way as technical sales representatives of big 
cooperatives all over the world. They can explain how their products differentiate from other products, why 
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the buyers accept higher prices, what their advantages are, etc. On the other hand, they should not afraid to 
break with market standards and differentiate their products in hopes of attracting a buyer or getting better 
prices.
Does quality pay?
It is not a sure thing; rather it depends on a number of factors that change over time. In the case where large 
volumes of products are proposed to buyers in traditional markets, an individual attempt to improve on quality 
may not lead to a better price. However, quality products can enable farmers to sell their products more 
quickly on the market. This represents an undeniable advantage. 
In 2007, in Burkina Faso, parboilers priced their rice higher in local markets in line with its quality. To achieve 
recognition of the quality, it was important to focus on short marketing channels and supply products 
directly to sales points. Since 2008, following general price increases for basic food commodities, the same 
parboilers can now sell their higher quality product at better prices.
Specific qualities and big retail outlets (distribution)
The experience of Nowefor in Cameroon with the distributor Leader Price is very instructive: at the beginning, 
the opportunity to supply large quantities of tomatoes was advantageous. But the situation was reversed very 
quickly because of unequal power relations (Box 8d).
Experiences from Latin America where the integration of the retail industry has been in place for a long time 
(work of AVSF) reveal the problems than may arise (Box 8g).
(8g) Development of large-scale distributors and the imposition of norms
The development of the self-service retail industry has resulted in imposing increasingly restrictive norms and 
health standards on suppliers than in traditional markets. If this form of industry expands in Africa as it has in 
Latin America, where it has become dominant in less than 15 years (Readon, Timmer et al., 2003), then we 
can expect small farmers to be marginalised. The latter will not be able to make the investments needed to 
meet the norms and constraints imposed by large distributors as is the case in Latin American countries”.
*Source : De la grande distribution Agroalimentaire et lutte contre la pauvreté en Afrique subsaharienne. Le rôle des micro 
et petites entreprises / Broutin C. (Gret), Bricas N. (Cirad).
Create qualities according to specified criteria controlled by farmers?
If the first approach is to have products adapted to food industry requirement, the second approach is to 
adapt the quality of the products to new markets and new consumer demands: “Fair Trade”, “organic”, etc. 
Others now propose a third approach: this involves the creation of “personal service” quality based on human 
relations developed between the sales representatives and the buyers. Can the farmers not personalise their 
services to meet the requirements of consumers as they get to know them better (Box 8h)?
(8h) Symbolic quality - a path to better revenues?
According to Benoit Daviron*, “today farmers” strategies to improve the development of their coffee are built 
above all around symbolic quality and include: 
-  the development of geographical specificity 31: this is a strategy that is used by many groups, not without 
some difficulty however. Production can be done in a location far away from where processing takes place: 
but not having all the supply chain actors in one area makes it impossible to market on the basis of the 
product’s geographic origins.
-  the creation and the promotion of sustainable standards: this is the case with Fair Trade and organic 
coffee, where the quality of the product is not defined by its intrinsic qualities (colour, aroma, etc.) but 
with respect to the conditions of production. Social conditions (child labour, farmers’ revenue, wages) and 
environmental conditions (presence of trees in the coffee plantations for migratory birds, etc.) are taken into 
consideration. These sustainable practices, which in the past were promoted by associations or NGOs, have 
since been appropriated by big roasting companies”.
There are more and more farmers in the “fair trade” or “organic” market segments: supply is increasing! 
But demand is not increasing at the same rate (the consumer markets for these products are small). With 
31 See online - Bulletin de veille Inter-réseaux n°141 Spécial "Indications géographiques" (19 March 2009)
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the arrival of large groups and large retail industry in these market segments, farmers find themselves in a 
much weaker position to maintain high prices. Also, B. Daviron encourages farmers not to neglect “personal 
service” quality, which would give them more leeway to increase their incomes.
*Source: idem supra (transcript of a interview in French of B. Daviron on-line on the Cirad website).
Products that find buyers (Stew, GDS 25, 2003)
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SHEET 9
TACKLING MEASUREMENT OF QUANTITIES AND WEIGHTS:                        
 ONE WEIGHT, DIFFERENT MEASUREMENTS?
9.1 - Principles and examples
There is often a multitude of practices and measurement units for the same product from one market to the 
next, but also sometimes in the same market (and therefore certainly from one country to another). The units 
change from one product to another: basins and bags of different sizes or completely variable measuring 
units. The same follows for the measurement techniques used. Even for the same measurement unit, the 
weights differ depending on the person who is weighing (buyer/seller) and the owner of the tool (scales, 
basin, etc): scales may be badly graded, basins deformed, twisted, with corners enlarged to increase the 
size, poorly filled or sometimes over-filled using hands to ensure the corn does not fall out, etc.
Corn bags differ in weight from one seller to another and/or from one market to another, and there are 
differences between the actual and the declared weights. Consequently, the real price per kilogram may vary. 
This is a source of considerable variation and uncertainty in prices. These variations and inaccuracies 
in the measurement units are often to the disadvantage of farmers. The sometimes-long periods spent 
arguing during the sale of agricultural products are the price paid by buyers to recover sometimes-high 
commercial margins.
FOs organise themselves to improve the quality of the measurements and control the quantities of 
products measured. Two examples illustrate the issue here:
l  members of the Mogtédo cooperative in Burkina Faso where the measurements are controlled 
by selected farmers who are trained and paid to carry out that function (box 9a);
l  Macenta union of banana growers in Guinea, where the sale of bananas per kilogram and not 
per bunch was instituted (box 9b).
(9a) Weighing rice at Mogtédo in Burkina Faso
During sales of farmers’ paddy rice to village women processors, the measurement units and the weights 
are managed only by farmers who have been trained by the cooperative to carry out this function. The 
measurement tools are defined by the cooperative. None of the women is allowed to measure the rice they 
buy. 
The farmers in charge of the tools and weighing of the paddy rice that is sold to the women are directly paid by 
the cooperative at a rate of 100 FCFA/100 kg: they are intermediaries who are paid to provide these services. 
Anybody can perform this function provided he or she has been trained by the cooperative. Competition 
among them leads them to perform their duties properly. Farmers are directly remunerated by members of the 
cooperative to carry out the measurement operations.
Since the implementation of these measures, members of the cooperative have achieved a profitable 
difference in the weights of paddy rice bags. While the traditional women buyers measured the bag of 100 kg 
paddy with 35 dishes (measuring unit), the farmers trained by the cooperative realised a difference of up to 
15% given that they obtained 40 dishes for the same 100 kg bag of paddy. 
Ref: Creation of a secured and self-managed market by rice farmers of the Mogtedo cooperatve in Burkina Faso / Inter-
réseaux, CTA, based on contribution of FENOP, 2006. – 10 p. + summary 1 p.
(9b) Banana-weighing by farmers of the UPBM in Guinée Forestière
Organised banana marketing was initiated because a factory in the town of Kankan had introduced banana- 
weighing when it carried out rounds in the area with its trucks to collect fruit. After this factory was shut down, 
weighing was abandoned in some localities and was only re-adopted after the creation of the first farmers’ 
groups and with the agreement of traders. 
Today traders provide advances to the groups in order to “reserve” part of the production (these advances 
are requested by farmers from the traders through the mediation of the offices in charge of carrying out the 
measurement operations. These advances were instituted by the union to enable farmers to finance the 
harvesting operations). When bananas are ripe, they are harvested and gathered at the measurement offices 
where they are is weighed and loaded under the supervision of farmers and the traders (unripe banana 
bunches are excluded). It is at this time that the trader pays the balance of the transaction to the farmer and 
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they part on good terms. Some of the measurement scales are mobile and are transported on motorbikes from 
one measurement office to another because all the offices are not equipped.
Ref. : UPBM Commercialization system: Negotiation of prices and programming of commercialization between farmers and 
traders- Guinea: Inader, UPBM, Inter-réseaux, CTA - 12 p. + summary 1 p.
9.2 – Advantages and limitations
These actions to control weights and measurements help reduce problems and the transaction time: they 
keep buyers and sellers from having to weigh and reweigh the products before they can agree on the weights 
or give up on the transaction all together.
Some FOs have made their choice and preferred to increase their profits from 5% to 15% by controlling 
weights rather than spending a lot of effort and time on operations whose benefits are uncertain, such as 
purchase-storage-sale operations or organising transportation of agricultural products (see. box 3 on the 
organisation of transport and sheet 4 on the purchase-storage of agricultural produce).
However, these actions to control weights and measurements are obviously not always easy to set up. 
New measurement practices may scare away buyers as well as farmers or they may simply seem too 
complicated. For example, in the north of Benin, livestock breeders worked to change many of their practices 
even though they were strongly rooted in their social system. By so doing, they succeeded in improving the 
organisation and management of the self-managed markets. A set of scales was installed in the Gogounou 
cattle market to try selling the animals per live kilogram. This measure was still not accepted years after it 
was introduced.
While it is difficult or even impracticable to seek to standardise the measuring units in a given area, it is 
possible through the use of other means to verify the quantities of agricultural products that have been 
measured. FOs can be helped to move in this direction and find appropriate solutions for each context and 
type of product.
One weight, two measurements (Samson, 2009)
M
E
A
S
U
R
E
M
E
N
TS
9
98 99
SHEET 10
IN
FO
R
M
A
TIO
N
10
IMPROVEMENT OF MARKET INFORMATION BY THE FO:                                
 WHAT INFORMATION IS USEFUL?
10.1 - Principles and examples
Traders have access to information and a good knowledge of markets and their actors because of their 
activities, network organisation (family networks consolidated over tens of years and over large geographical 
areas), and frequent trips to different markets. Farmers are more isolated and lack information. Some 
farmers use the telephone to contact their commercial partners in their target markets.32 This is only possible 
for a very small minority and is limited after all to the zones where there is a telephone network. 
From the 1980s, market information systems (MIS) were set up by states for different reasons: (i) ensure 
greater transparency in the market, (ii) correct information asymmetries between traders and farmers, 
and (iii) enable farmers to improve their sales and adjust their production volumes to demand and prices. 
However, many farmers consider the diffusion of price information using this type of MIS to be insufficient: 
the information is not current, lacks forecast analysis and can neither help them to make choices nor to plan 
agricultural production activities (box 10a).
 (10a) General limits of market information systems
Farmers consider information on prices, which is mainly disseminated by radio, as necessary but 
not sufficient:
-  the information remains difficult to use because prices can vary very quickly and information 
which is dated quickly loses its value; 
-  farmers have little choice of their sales outlets. Given their lack of money, farmers do not always 
have the choice between selling their products immediately and waiting for better prices. In some 
cases they may even be indebted to local traders;
-  the information produced by the MIS only presents the current market situation and says nothing about 
trends or forecasts, which farmers need to make choices and to plan production.
The MIS did not succeed in replacing the traditional information systems used by the traders. The latter quickly 
adopted new technologies, especially the mobile telephone. Moreover, the objectives of MIS are integrated 
into public services and have objectives in line with the basic functions of the state (transparency and market 
regulation). It is difficult to finance their operations and train personnel once the international financial partners 
withdraw. 
Ref: Renforcer les institutions de marché /  P. Delmas - Inter-réseaux, GDS 33, 2006.
Changes have taken place recently to take the needs of the actors into consideration and adapt the services 
provided in terms of information on prices and markets, e.g. the agricultural market observatory in Mali with 
decentralised structures located in regional chambers of agriculture. This observatory selects the products 
and markets it intends to monitor based on the requests made by the users in each region to better respond 
to the concerns of farmers. Private MIS have also emerged. For example, the Manobi systems in Senegal, 
which uses a combination of WAP and mobile telephones to provide information on market gardening 
products. Finally, it is important to note that there is also a trend towards regional integration with the creation 
of supranational MIS networks (like the Agritrade platform created by the Mistowa Project).
Small farmers generally do not benefit from the services provided by these systems (except in the case 
of peri-urban agriculture). Some FOs therefore decided to introduce specific information systems for their 
members. These systems may be relatively simple and on a very small scale: for example “the market 
observatory” put in place by the Mogtédo cooperative in Burkina Faso (box 10b), or the system set up by the 
Federation of Farmers of Fouta Djallon in Guinea, which informs them of prices in their target markets (box 
10c). Other systems can be much more “burdensome” and “systematic” like the one introduced by ANOPACI 
in Ivory Coast (box 10d).
32 Farmer leaders who sell their onions in the important Malanville market in Benin also use cell phones to negotiate on equal 
terms with traders operating in their market.  
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(10b) “The market observatory” at the Mogtédo cooperative in Burkina Faso
Rice farmers in Mogtédo seek the highest possible price for paddy rice. But this price must be realistic and 
acceptable to external buyers. This requires good knowledge of the market and prices.
Initially the cooperative had contacts in the market in Ouagadougou to inform them about the prices for local 
and imported rice. With time, experience, networking among rice farmers’ organisations and the spread of 
the telephone, today the leaders of the cooperatives are able to obtain regular information on the markets and 
price variations in the production as well as consumption zones. Thus they have a basis on which to negotiate 
prices for their products.
The Mogtédo cooperative then set up a local market control body made up of 10 people who, in collaboration 
with the executive board, make up the market observatory. These individuals regularly survey the evolution 
of demand and supply and prices of imported rice and monitor the activities of the farmers who are in charge 
of carrying out measurements and weights in the market. They also ensure that what is sold in the market 
comes from the geographical area covered by the cooperative.
Ref: Creation of a secured and self-managed market by rice farmers of the Mogtedo cooperatve in Burkina Faso / Inter-
réseaux, CTA, based on contribution of FENOP, 2006. – 10 p. + summary 1 p.
(10c) Price information system at the Fouta Djallon Federation (FPFD) in Guinea
The FPFD developed a system that enables it to know the prices of products upon their departure from 
the production zones. There is already information on the prices of food products on the major urban 
markets provided by some services in Guinea (Sipag-Dynafiv; Project Aca USAID).
These are mainly retail prices, which could be quite different from the wholesale prices in the major town 
markets that are of interest to farmers and traders of Fouta. 
The FPFD is also trying to set up a system to monitor information on the wholesale prices in the target city/
town markets on a weekly basis. This system would be put in place using rural radio(s). 
Ref: Activités de commercialisation de la FPFD : capitalisation du vécu et perspectives / Diallo K., Barry M., Beauval V. 
– Guinée : Cellule commercialisation de la FPFD, CCFD, 2006. – 30 p. + 46 p. appendices.
(10d) Information system on the markets of Anopaci in Ivory Coast
Following government disengagement, some state responsibilities were transferred to FOs without the 
necessary resources and means. Anopaci (umbrella FO in Ivory Coast) then defined priorities to provide 
services to its members. Marketing appeared to be the main problem faced by farmers particularly because of 
lack of market information.
A MIS was set up in 2002. It makes it possible to collect technical, economic (cost price) and commercial 
(price, volumes, supply) information about four main supply chains: pineapple-bananas, food crops, market 
gardening and livestock. Information is captured through 8 village information points (VIP) via Internet. Each 
VIP has a person in charge of data collection in five markets, who processes the data and broadcasts the 
information through rural radio stations. A quarterly report is published and is also disseminated on radio 
programs dedicated to agriculture. It is also transmitted through the Tradenet website which enables the 
exchange of information in the region. Farmers therefore have more resources to help them negotiate and 
suspicion between buyers and sellers is reduced. Revenues increase and crop intensification takes place.
It is difficult to cover the whole zone and to finance the activities of the MIS over the long term, but MIS have 
succeeded in adapting to the needs of farmers. They have become a precious, essential tool to enable farmers 
to become informed, negotiate and win the trust of buyers. The question remains whether farmers will be 
ready to pay for this service over time.
However, Anopaci hopes to be able to combine this information with technical-economic data from the 
farmers’ management committee for farms (production costs, sales price, transport costs, input prices, etc.).
Ref.: The Market Information System (MIS), conditions for the success of commercialisation operations, the ANOPACI 
experience / Kouao S., Sindikubwabo I. – Côte d’Ivoire : Anopaci, 2007. – 10 p. + summary 1 p.
10.2 – Advantages and limitations
Is it enough to be informed of a good price to obtain it?
Even if a farmer is informed of a price on a market, it does not necessarily mean that he will obtain it. The 
farmer still has to go to this market and have negotiating power in relation to the buyer, and the quality of his 
product must correspond to the price (e.g. conservation quality). 
IN
FO
R
M
A
TI
O
N
10
100 101
These factors are obviously important in determining the purchase price paid to the farmer. In fact, when 
farmers are informed of the price, they are often limited in their “choices” of the place of sale (accessibility 
of the markets, means and transport costs), and in their “choices” of the dates on which they can sell (lack 
of funds to wait for better prices and defer sales), and in their choice of “buyers” (committed sales in view of 
advances made by traders and collectors). 
Improving market access conditions and systems that facilitate farmers’ access to funds certainly 
influence their choices and the value of information on prices. The MIS will be useless if they are 
implemented without other complementary action. They can even have negative consequences: for example, 
instead of facilitating relationships between farmers and traders, the dissemination of price information 
can sometimes lead to conflicts between these actors (farmers annoyed with the traders when they think 
they are being poorly remunerated for their agricultural products). 
What information is useful to help farmers make decisions? 
Current situations and future trends
The MIS often give information on the “current” market situation. However, the actors usually want more 
analytical information on the trends and evolution of prices and markets, price fixing mechanisms, and 
quantitative characteristics. Actors are more interested in information that is analysed and forward-looking 
rather than merely statistical information on prices. Also many FOs would like the information on prices to 
be accompanied by information that helps them understand the elements that make up the market price 
or an analysis of the trends: information on prices is only indicative and the price in recent weeks does not 
necessarily give an indication of future market prices.
Prices and farmers’ decision-making 
In addition, farmers do not react to price signals as much as some would expect. Indeed, many other 
parameters come into play such as: (i) accessibility to production factors (access to land, equipment, 
fertilisers or credit), (ii) the costs of these production factors, (iii) the risks involved (health and/or economic 
risks) or (iv) the existence of a relatively transparent network of traders (no monopoly situation, accessible 
market, etc.). “Farmers think more in terms of relative incomes than price. And, there can be competition 
as well as complementarity between the crops and herds within the production systems33 ”. 
Management boards/Advice to family farms
Management boards or systems to advise family farms exist in many FOs and/or in service providers’ 
organisations. The information available in these systems could be used and exploited as decision- making 
tools. Within this framework, decision-making is based not only on agricultural or input prices but also in 
relation to crop technical pathways and practices (seed production, fertility management, adaptation of 
cultural practices according to the quality and target markets, etc.), and even to the combination of different 
crop and livestock systems with the whole production system.
Apart from enabling farmers to adjust decisions on crop technical pathways and practices as well as farming 
systems in general, these management boards or advisory systems can also facilitate access to credit (the 
link between management boards and individual credit demand or between the FO and banks34).
Importance of price information systems coupled with marketing activities
In many collective marketing activities, a simple but targeted price information and follow-up system appears 
to be important, especially when the information obtained is of interest to farmers and when it can help them 
make decisions. For example, when the FO facilitates the warehouse receipt systems or warrantage credit 
and at the same time tracks the evolution of prices and introduces a system of information and price analysis, 
this can prevent members from adopting risky behaviour (waiting for higher prices while credit and other 
charges increase, etc.). The same applies when the FO carries out purchase-storage-sales activities; such 
a system can help it to avoid paying over-estimated prices to farmers and therefore to sell its products at a 
realistic market price without using so much of its working capital.
Market Information Systems: the higher the costs, the more inappropriate the system 
Like the state-run MIS, the MIS put in place by FOs are often complex and have problems obtaining 
financing. In the end, even if the “smaller” systems set up by the farmers are not called ‘’MIS’’, they are 
33 Boum du maïs dans un pays de cacao : Sulawesi, grenier de l’Indonésie / Ruf, Yoddang, 2008. – 2 p. (inter-reseaux.org).
34 See Pôle Conseil à l’exploitation familiale (CEF) co-organised by Inter-réseaux and Afdi (www.inter-reseaux.org).
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simpler and less expensive and therefore pose fewer financing problems over time. The advantage is that 
they are actually linked to more general marketing activities. The information is adapted, usable and is 
used by farmers: farmers know what is hidden behind the prices and to what they actually correspond. The 
conception of a MIS must be built on an appropriate diagnosis, one that leads to the creation of a customised 
MIS is adapted to the specific needs of different countries, actors, products and the types of marketing 
activities that are undertaken (individual or collective).
Information flow on volumes and prices: MIS, the ultimate tool?
Beyond the MIS, information on the elements that make up these price signals
The information that the actors lack is often not related to the transaction itself or on the price signals but to 
the market environment or the factors that make up the price signals. For example, it may include information 
on the availability of credit, the level and location of harvests and stocks, rainfall data, regulations, availability 
of transport means, etc. This information can be used on a case-by-case basis to provide prospective 
indications or forecasts that are useful to farmers in making decisions.
A multitude of other possible and/or complementary action
In terms of circulation of information on volumes and the prices among different actors, other actions are 
developed by farmers and their FOs as well as by traders. This is often done with strong collaboration 
from administrative authorities and local traditional leaders: gathering the supply of the product at a single 
sales site in the market or agricultural fairs, market organisation, regulation of the supply, etc. Finally, FOs 
and support organisations can facilitate farmers’ access to information about markets and supply chains 
in general. They can do so through the development of strategies that enable farmers to have a vision and 
better understanding of the traders involved and important segments of the supply chain. This can take place 
through exchange visits and collective thinking involving all the actors. 
Market information systems
Market information systems were largely put in place in the 1980s to support liberalisation 
policies under the structural adjustment programmes.
Presented as important tools for liberalisation policies, they were aimed at solving market 
failures related to problems of information characterised as being incomplete or unevenly 
distributed among the various agents (farmers and traders in particular): by reducing the 
information asymmetries and rendering information more transparent, these systems 
were expected to improve on the decision-making of individuals, rebalance power 
relationships between actors and finally reduce transaction costs.
Management information systems have multiplied in recent years in Africa under the 
initiative of donors and/or POs. These MIS have variable lifespans and impacts.
http://inter-reseaux.org/ressources-
thematiques/dispositifs-d-information-sur-les/
IN
FO
R
M
A
TI
O
N
10
Translated for this report from the French original
102 103
SHEET 11
P
O
O
LIN
G
 S
U
P
P
LY
11
THE FO FACILITATES THE GATHERING OF SUPPLY AT A SINGLE SITE IN THE 
MARKET: FOR MORE TRANSPARENT SUPPLY AND DEMAND
11.1 - Principles and examples
There are often on one side scattered farmers with weak negotiating power and on the other organised 
buyers and/or intermediaries who are much better informed about prices and markets than farmers. To 
avoid a very strong power relationship and negotiating power between farmers and buyers – for example 
preventing farmers from finding themselves in an unfavourable position in the market and even from selling 
off their products or at worst from carrying the products back home, the FO can take part in physically 
grouping the supply at a single site in the market.
This contributes towards greater transparency regarding the volume of products available and demanded, 
and the number and type of actors involved, be they farmers or buyers. The place where the products are 
gathered and the market remain the physical location where the products come together; the market also 
represents a given unit of time that can take place at different times but always for a defined length of time. 
This unit of place and time is important for demand and supply to come together: to sell one’s products at 
a specific place, space and time in the market offers the chance for greater visibility of product supply and 
demand.
Even if the FO itself does not organise the collection, it can bring farmers together at a single place and time 
to sell their products instead of being scattered at different places in the market or at the periphery or at 
different periods outside of normal market time. 
Many experiences show how farmers and the FOs negotiated single sales sites from local, traditional and 
administrative authorities to allow them to control the flow of products and transactions at different places in 
the markets:
l  women farmers of cucumber seed in Cameroon (box 11a);
l  ginger farmers of the Nowefor FO in Cameroon (box 11b);
l  rice farmers of the Mogtédo cooperative in Burkina (box 11c).
(11a) One market day and place for cucumber seed: a space organised by Afebid 
women in Cameroon
The members of Afebid produce more than 100 t of cucumber seed per year but have serious 
problems to sell it all: sales of small quantities at the local level, distant and difficult access to 
markets, and many unsold products.
These past years, the women decided to gather their products at a unique place and precise date. Before 
the day of the market, the women carry out two types of action: on the one hand they approach potential 
buyers to have an idea about the quantities demanded and prices and on the other hand, they discuss among 
themselves to agree on the prices and assess the quantities available for the agreed price.
The installation of the local market place was done in collaboration with the local village and administrative 
authorities and also with the involvement of the youth. This experience properly illustrates the role of the 
association to support a fluid encounter between supply (farmers) and demand (buyers) of cucumber seed
Ref.: Ventes groupées de graines de concombre par Afebid / Odéco. – Inter-réseaux, CTA, 2006. – 6 p.
(11b) Negotiation of a unique ginger sales place by the FO Nowefor in the Bafut market in Cameroon
The market control committee (made up of three farmers’ union leaders and a local assistant) made a proposal 
to ginger farmers in the Bafut zone to come together at a place in the local market to sell their products 
together at a unique sales point. The idea was to gather the supply in the market to have more visibility: what 
volumes are brought to the market and by whom? Who is buying and in what quantities? At what prices? In 
fact, the ginger sellers did not have an allocated place in the market and were scattered throughout the market: 
this made farmers weak in the face of the traders (bayam sellams) and also made it impossible to put in place 
measures to regulate the supply of ginger.
To negotiate the single sales point in the market, the local market control committee undertook negotiations 
with the Fon of Bafut (an important traditional authority) and the municipal council so that they would get 
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involved in the setting up the new strategy and to obtain their support. It was difficult to reach the Fon, but 
finally the latter received the delegates of the control committee and agreed to allow the farmers to use his 
authority to control the market mechanisms.
A single, permanent place for the gathering and sales of ginger in the market was therefore obtained with the 
support of the authorities. The committee selected a strategic position at the entrance of the market that is 
easily accessible to the buyers and sellers and facilitates loading the ginger bags into taxis and trucks. 
Once the gathering of the ginger in the market was done, farmers realised that the prices were low because of 
excess supply of the product: there were 7,200 kg for local demand of 2,400 kg. By becoming aware of the 
imbalance between supply and demand, they understood the reasons behind the lower prices for farmers. A 
few bayam sellams (about 10) and mainly wholesalers had full latitude to impose low prices: with a supply of 
ginger three times greater than local demand, farmers were obliged to sell their products as low as half price.
Cohesion among the ginger farmers was reinforced at this stage as farmers recognised the situation: by 
coming together in the market, they realised that they could evaluate the level of supply on market 
day and together take a joint negotiating position on the selling price with respect to the buyers.
They also decided that it was necessary for them to set up a system to control the flow of ginger and the 
transactions. This led to the creation of a system aimed at regulating the supply of ginger in the local market: 
Nowefor developed a system of sales rounds in the local market and at the same time put in place alternative 
collective action to sell the excess ginger outside this local market (see sheet 12).
Ref. : Supply, demand and equilibrium price: a case for study. Improved prices for farmers through the organization of the 
local market and the regulation of the supply of ginger by Nowefor in Bafut (Cameroon) Lothoré, Delmas, on the basis 
of contributions from Saild and G. Fongang, E. Deniel. - Inter-réseaux Développement rural, CTA, 2006. - 12 p. + 1 p. 
summary.
(11c) A single market site for Mogtédo rice in Burkina Faso
Starting from unfortunate experiences and relying on its own internal skills and capabilities, the Mogtédo 
cooperative put in place a marketing approach based on principles that were rigorously implemented. A 
fundamental option was to focus on the local market and bring the market closer to the cooperative. The 
cooperative also invested in the development of the local market.
To ensure grouping and better control of the supply, it selected a single sales point in the market with the help 
of the administrative authorities, which had to be used by all the cooperative members: a single location in the 
market reserved only for operators involved in selling rice in front of the cooperative’s warehouse.
The consolidation aims to promote discipline and facilitate the implementation and control of the marketing 
rules that are defined together with the various partners (mainly concerning the prices and weights or 
measurement units). Farmers sell their rice only to women who reside in the Mogtédo Division, who transform 
it and then resell it in the local market. Any sales of rice outside of this circuit are considered to be against the 
rules of the cooperative and can lead to penalties, which in some cases can mean the withdrawal of the piece 
of farmland. The cooperative also set up a control body that, in collaboration with the cooperative’s executive 
board and the local authorities, monitors and ensures that sales take place in the market of the geographical 
area covered by the cooperative (See sheet 12). 
Ref: Creation of a secured and self-managed market by rice farmers of the Mogtedo cooperatve in Burkina Faso. Inter-
réseaux, CTA, based on contribution of FENOP, 2006. - 10 p. + summary 1 p.
11.2 – Advantages and limitations
In theory, bringing supply and demand closer together has many advantages. Gathering products at the same 
place in the market can improve the situation to the benefit of farmers due to relatively greater transparency 
regarding the volumes supplied and the matching demand.
But is this enough to solve the problems? The market allows farmers and buyers to meet at a physical 
location at a given time, but the organisation and the functioning of the market may vary and ultimately lead 
to less favourable situations for farmers:
l  excess supply compared to the number of traders and their purchasing capabilities can break the market: 
in Bafut in the North West of Cameroon, the market functioned well from the farmers’ viewpoint (relatively 
good prices for the ginger), until the abundance of ginger (following better yields involving more farmers) 
in the market led to the collapse of the market price (a fourfold decline within a few months);
l  intermediaries may remain dominant in the market and disrupt fluid interaction between demand and 
supply: this is the case with bayam sellams in Cameroon and the Dilani in the north of Benin who prevent 
direct access of farmers to the local market. Farmers therefore remained in situations comparable selling 
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at the farm gate and were forced to sell their products at low prices (or agree to take them back home, 
which also has its cost);
l  when the problem is to go and sell products at a relatively distant local market, farmers may find themselves 
in a very difficult situation: e.g. in Guinée Forestière where the few coffee buyers in this isolated region 
agree among themselves to set the prices;
l  at the Mogtedo market in Burkina, as in many other markets, there are countless situations where 
the measuring units for volumes and weights are biased or skewed to the disadvantage of farmers. In 
Mogtedo, the gap between the weights taken by the cooperative and those in the market varied by 10-15 
kg for the same 100 kg bag of paddy rice to the disadvantage of the buyer.
In Cameroon, the market functioned well before there was an excess of supply of ginger and there was no 
need for any specific intervention. Thereafter, difficulties emerged in the market. As in other examples that 
have been cited, the market mechanisms are not fluid and regulation or control mechanisms may 
become necessary to make the market function normally again.
The “free” functioning of the market is therefore unsatisfactory and other types of measures can be 
developed by farmers and their FOs to manage supply and regulate the functioning of the market (see sheet 
12: Organisation of markets and agricultural fairs; and sheet 13: Management of supply).
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THE FO FACILITATES THE MATCHING OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY:         
MARKET ORGANISATION AND AGRICULTURAL FAIRS
12.1 - Principles and examples
To prevent farmers from being in unfavourable positions in the market (obliged to sell off 
their products at cheap prices or to take them home), some FOs negotiate and participate in 
defining market operating rules. 
This is often done in agreement with the market authorities (local groups that manage the 
market taxes) and/or the traditional authorities or the police force, which takes part to ensure 
the respect of the rules. Consequently, farmers know what to expect before they come to the 
market. In the same way, buyers also know more or less under which framework and conditions 
market exchanges will take place before coming to the market. Several concrete cases of this nature were 
studied.
In the north of Benin, measures were taken by livestock breeders to revitalise the traditional cattle markets 
and fight against sales carried out in camps. These sales in camps were characterised by poor remuneration 
of the breeders and recurrent conflicts between them and the intermediaries. The livestock farmers took part 
in puting in place market control systems that have made market relations evolve towards win-win situations 
between breeders and intermediaries. Their involvement in the management of the market gradually 
contributed to its proper structuring and also to the development of many activities and professions around 
the market. As real tools that serve the organisation of professional livestock breeders, livestock breeding 
and local development, these self-managed markets show that a win-win strategy between farmers, 
intermediaries and buyers is possible. Improvements in market access, facilitating the matching of supply 
and demand with more transparent transactions, provision of services for livestock keeping in the markets, 
and better revenue for livestock breeders while protecting the interest of other key actors: all these activities 
can inspire other development actors. It is important to note that the organisation of the activities of livestock 
breeders around the market contributed to the creation and development of livestock breeders’ organisations 
from the local to the national level (box 12a).
In Burkina Faso, the Mogtédo cooperative helped put in place a single, mandatory sales point for rice to 
reduce the power of the buyers. Market rules defined and negotiated with the traditional authorities as well as 
price fixing mechanisms and the control of weights and measurements contributed to improve the functioning 
of the market to the benefit of farmers and traders (box 12b).
In these two Beninese and Burkinabe examples, the markets are “physical markets”, as sellers, their 
products and the buyers are present on the spot. But there are also other forms of markets where the 
products are not transported directly. Preliminary steps make it possible to organise actors well before 
market day, and farmers no longer travel to the buyers with their products but rather with samples and/or 
on the basis of agreements that have been facilitated beforehand by their FOs. The actions of FOs and 
support organisations here consist in enabling improved encounters and direct relations between suppliers 
of products (member farmers in particular, but not only them) and buyers (would they be final buyers or 
intermediaries). The markets then serve to finalise the terms of the transactions (transport methods, final 
agreements on prices according to the quality and volume, deadlines and payment terms, etc.) that are 
carried out later on. There many examples to illustrate this situation:
The example of UPBM with mini-fairs for bananas in Guinée Forestière between farmers of the FO UPBM 
and the traders’ association of Conakry in Guinea (box 12c). 
Another widely known example is the annual grain fairs organised by the NGO Afrique Verte since 1987 in 
Niger, then in Burkina Faso and Mali. The grain operators (FOs, traders, transformers and transporters) come 
together to match their supply and demand on the basis of samples. The negotiations are free of charge. 
Contracts are signed without the intervention of Afrique Verte, which nevertheless ensures monitoring and 
can propose mediation between farmers and buyers in case of conflicts (box 12d). Prior to these agricultural 
fairs, the mediation role played by the GIE Jèka Feeré (Mali) is also essential (box 12e).
In markets on the first level (physical markets) and the second level (agricultural fairs), the FOs do not own the 
goods: they simply organise and facilitate farmers’ sales by increasing the transparency of the transactions 
and facilitating the matching of product supply and demand. Farmers (members and non-members alike) 
remain the owners of the products. The FO is not responsible for physical delivery of the products.
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(12a) Self-managed cattle markets in the north of Benin
Improving the transparency of transactions, the encounters between livestock breeders and buyers, and 
the organisation of the market were the challenges overcome by Beninese livestock breeders… and very 
successfully! This farmers’ innovation was initiated by the livestock breeders in Gogounou in the north of 
Benin.
Installation of the first self-managed cattle market in Gogounou
Self-managed cattle markets were first set up in Gogounou in the 1970s by livestock breeders themselves, 
charismatic leaders and other grassroots actors. They came into existence progressively:
 A very strong start
Between 1976 and 1980, the livestock breeders united around traditional leaders to stand up against the 
opaque marketing system controlled by the Dilani in the traditional cattle market: they decided not to send any 
of their animals to the markets. There were tensions and threats and some leaders were even imprisoned to 
force the livestock breeders to start selling their cattle. But the latter kept their word and within two months the 
Gogounou market collapsed.
The process for more transparent transaction management was then initiated. The intermediaries were not 
excluded from the system – this would have been neither economically nor socially sustainable for them and 
would have quickly undermined the system. They were, on the contrary, integrated and placed at the centre of 
the new market with new functions. They were assigned to witness transactions between breeders and buyers 
and from then on they were put in charge of facilitating the sale of the animals by recording the transactions 
and collecting the tax. This tax of about 25 FCFA/head sold was managed by the village group (VG). A third 
of the tax goes to the witnesses and two thirds to the Gogounou elders (very important personalities in the old 
system).
 The organisation of a multi-actor market management committee
In 1986, the organisation of the market gradually evolved towards the introduction of a management 
committee. This committee was made up of all the actors involved: livestock breeders and agro-pastoralists, 
traders, loaders. It was in charge of the regular management of the market. The tax, which amounted to 100 
FCFA/head sold, was not managed by the VG but was instead deposited in an account opened at the local 
mutual agricultural credit scheme.
The new market, characterised by the conversion of the Dilani middlemen into remunerated witnesses, now 
featured: (i) direct matching of demand and supply; (ii) facilitated transactions authenticated by witnesses; (iii) 
better price information and transparency.
This system has been beneficial to the livestock breeders who have seen their incomes rise. The old Dilani 
now playing a new role are no longer seen as crooks since they are remunerated by the livestock breeders in a 
fixed, predetermined manner for an actual service. In the same way, the elders are still recognised through the 
percentage of the tax they continue to receive.
 The creation of the local cattle market management association (ALGMB)
In 1995, the Gogounou market was given a formal, recognised legal and organisational framework through the 
creation of the local livestock market management association.
Armed with a constitution and internal rules and regulations (and associated penalties), the association has a 
number of objectives:
-  to provide moral and material support to livestock breeders for the promotion of animal health;
-  to minimise mediation and facilitate sales between livestock breeders, buyers and consumers;
-  to ensure the regular supply of the market with animals; to facilitate and manage the market;
-  to ensure education and associative training of the members, to facilitate self-help practices, reciprocity, 
solidarity between them and to undertake legal activities to give them moral, social and material support.
 External support
Between 1990 and 1999, the livestock breeders in Gogounou obtained technical and financial support 
from state organisations and projects. This support made it possible to improve the functioning of the market 
particularly through training, exchange visits and advice on financial management, bookkeeping, animal 
health, and the management and resolution of conflicts. The market was equipped with an office, a pharmacy, 
a dispatching platform and a well, thus structuring the market space.
In all these actions, the participation and financial commitments of the livestock breeders helped to make the 
approach a partnership rather than assistance.
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Operation of the self-managed livestock market in Gogounou
The functioning of the ALGMB involves various groups of actors concerned with the sale of animals in its 
general assembly (GA): livestock breeders, agro-pastoralists, traders, butchers and saleswomen (who 
also raise small ruminants and process derivative products: curdled milk, cheese, milk-enriched pap, etc.). The 
market is managed directly by these actors and is called “a self-managed market”.
The ALGMB obtained new financial and economic management tools to manage the market: management 
and control committees, both elected, oversee the functioning of the market, the management documents 
and the issuing of tickets. The administrative and financial management of the market involves: (i) transparent 
deduction of taxes on all transactions with oversight by secretaries and witnesses and handling of the 
accounts and (ii) holding ordinary meetings (technical and financial balance sheet) and extraordinary meetings 
(conflict resolution, theft of cattle).
To facilitate the work, the management committee pays various agents:
-  witnesses, the redeployed Dilani, who authenticate the transactions and deposit the collected taxes with the 
secretaries; 
-  controllers who check the tickets before the animals are loaded; 
-  secretaries who deliver the tickets, collect taxes and transfer them to the treasurer of the management 
committee; 
-  the person in charge of the inputs store;
-  other agents also present in the market, e.g. the people who bring the animals to the markets, the loaders 
and the women who run restaurants.
Apart from the management of the weekly market of Gogounou, the ALGMB association also provides other 
services to its members using its own funds:
-  capacity building: training of the committee members in management and bookkeeping, training of young 
people on basic animal health, literacy classes for saleswomen;
-  purchase of market equipment and infrastructures;
-  supply of basic drugs in collaboration with private veterinarians;
-  development of relationships with the local institutions and support structures;
-  organisation of exchange and awareness meetings.
In addition, the ALGMB also provides information and raises awareness about this type of organisation among 
actors in other Beninese markets, and coordinates the nascent self-managed market network.
Direct results of the self-managed market in Gogounou
 Better marketing and an improvement in livestock breeding
The first direct effects of the market are an improvement in the selling prices for the animals to the benefit of 
the livestock farmers, facilitated and much faster transactions for the buyers and an increase in the volume of 
transactions. The increased frequency of transactions in the market has also made it possible to better control 
the health of the animals and fight animal theft more efficiently. As a locus of encounter and exchange, the 
market gives the livestock farmers improved access to information and their organisations are strengthened. 
 A boost for local development and wider recognition
Thanks to the Gogounou market, the livestock farmers have been able to finance local initiatives (social 
projects, primary schools in the Peulh Camps, etc). Gogounou women (Peulh and Bariba) were systematically 
integrated in the process (training, support for processing, literacy classes). Through these actions, the market 
started to gain credibility not only from the livestock farmers themselves but also from the different groups, 
local partners, livestock services and external projects.
 Extending the results beyond Gogounou: the network of self-managed markets (RLMS)
Gogounou was the first self-managed market to be set up but others were also created later on. In 1999, a 
network of self-managed markets was created as a way to share experiences, conduct information meetings 
and group training (the constitutive general assembly in 2001 where the network voted on its statutes, internal 
rules and regulations as well as other tools such as membership registers, minute books for meetings of the 
bodies, cash books, bank books).
 Structuring of the livestock breeders’ organisation
In 2000, the livestock breeders decided to organise themselves into groups. Professional groups of small 
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ruminant breeders (GPER) were created at the grassroots level, bringing together camps that vaccinate their 
animals at the same place.
These GPERs are grouped into district unions (UAGPER). The district unions also join together to form the 
communal unions (Ucoper), which are united within the Divisional union of Borgou-Alibori (Udoper: the general 
assembly was held in 2004 and brought together about 3,000 livestock breeders from the north of Benin as 
well as mayors, representatives of the administration, projects and also delegations of sister organisations 
from Mali and Niger). The association of livestock breeders at the national level (Anoper) was created in 2006.
Ref.: Selt-managed livestock markets: the Beninese example / A Lothoré, P Delmas, Farming Dynamics n°10 – SOS Faim, 
2006. – 8 p.
(12b) Markets secured and regulated by rice farmers of the Mogtédo cooperative in Burkina
Rice farmers of this cooperative had all sorts of experiences in the marketing of their paddy rice: the good 
periods when state-run societies bought all their products at good prices and the bad times when payments 
were very irregular and prices were very low. There was also a period when the cooperative was buying 
and selling members’ products with many problems in carrying out market research, failure to comply with 
commitments on the part of traders in the cities, a crisis of confidence among members and suspicion of the 
leaders by members, etc. 
The first measure was the decision to allow the members to sell their products directly and obtain cash 
payments directly. The cooperative no longer buys farmers’ products (the rice it owns comes from 
reimbursements or input purchases). It proposed that henceforth the village women should be the ones to 
buy the rice, process it and then sell it to traders in the area. The cooperative takes charge of other functions 
to facilitate marketing and improve the members’ sales. This was made possible only after the decisions had 
been collectively adopted:
- first of all, the decision that “all the rice should pass through the village women involved in the processing of 
rice” with a ban on sales of paddy rice in the market; only the sale of white rice was authorised. The women 
buy the paddy rice for cash from farmers, take charge of parboiling and husking and then sell the white rice to 
external traders who come to buy in the local market. There is therefore an increase in the value added which 
is conserved in the village. The cooperative no longer buys all the members’ rice;
-  the decision to have a single sales point in the market to facilitate the flow of information and control;
-  the decision to control measurements so that farmers would be paid for the right weight;
-  the decision that the cooperative regulate the market: it intervenes at certain periods to buy paddy rice or 
to sell some to adjust the volumes put on sale (and also to guarantee regular supplies to the traders) and to 
have a more stable supply ( and price) (see sheet 13);
- the decision to have a flat price fixed through negotiations between cooperative members and the 
processors and introduce rules to ensure that the agreed price is respected and penalties meted out in case 
of non-compliance. The cooperative oversees the fixing of the sale price of paddy and white rice as well; 
prices are correlated with the national market prices and those for imported rice, which remain an important 
reference. The cooperative negotiates and obtains better prices for the sale of members’ paddy rice. Fixing 
the price of paddy and processed rice no longer depends solely on external buyers. Now farmers negotiate 
the prices with the persons involved in its processing, while taking into account production costs on the one 
hand and rice prices in the major national markets on the other. The prices are determined through dialogue 
with the leaders of the cooperative. The women buy paddy rice and retail dehusked rice. Before negotiations 
take place, the cooperative assesses the supply of paddy rice and the prices of imported rice. The purchase 
price for rice is set based on the data and processing costs.
The role of the cooperative has therefore shifted from rice purchaser to market regulator. The collaboration 
with the local authorities allows it to ensure compliance with the rules. 
It supports economic activities within the village and a better distribution of wealth (value added on rice 
processing). It is now in a better negotiating position to set prices and negotiate the distribution of the added 
value. The rice farmers of the Mogtédo cooperative sell their paddy rice at higher prices than those on all other 
irrigated perimeters of the country: the Mogtédo market is nearly the only one which sells paddy rice beyond 
standard industrial prices. This price, which is applied at the cooperative’s single sales site is systematically 
higher than the prices offered by a few traders who still try to intercept farmers’ products in the outskirts of the 
market. 
Better prices for farmers mean that traders buy more expensive products. Nevertheless, the traders are 
satisfied with the measures because they are interested in having a regular supply of products year-round (the 
usual complaint is that the distributors are unable to have adequate supplies of rice year-round). In this regard, 
the cooperative benefits from the fact that rice is produced two times a year. The prices of parboiled rice sold 
in the local market to external traders are communicated a week in advance: the traders therefore come to the 
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market knowing exactly what to expect.
What the members of the cooperative want are: remunerative prices and a guarantee that they will be able 
to sell their production. These objectives led the cooperative to put this system in place by building on its 
local, traditional market and on the local authorities. The first role of a cooperative is to meet the needs of the 
members and to look out for the best suited, most secure systems to achieve these objectives. In most of the 
other cooperatives in Burkina Faso, the internal rules and regulations state that all the members’ produce be 
sold to the cooperative and in most cases, these clauses are seldom honoured. Why? In general due to the 
lack of financial capacity (the cooperative has insufficient or no access to funds) and/or there are simply no 
buyers for large quantities of products.
Ref.: Creation of a secured and self-managed market by rice farmers of the Mogtedo cooperatve in Burkina Faso. Inter-
réseaux, CTA, based on contribution of FENOP, 2006. – 10 p. + summary 1 p.
(12c) Programming harvests and putting in place of mini-fairs for the banana growers of Guinea 
Forestière (UPBM) and traders from Conakry 
The UPBM is an example of an FO that is organised effectively and has a well thought out marketing strategy 
in place to deal with problems related to the marketing and intensification of banana production. It is a truly 
dynamic economic enterprise which developed its own marketing rules supported by a forum for dialogue 
involving local traders who sell their banana in Conakry.
Farmers determined the days on which to sell after agreements on the prices and tonnages with the traders 
from Macenta. The FO facilitates the encounter between farmers (suppliers) and the buyers (demanders) by 
arranging contracts even well before the harvest. This led to the creation of regular mini trade fairs for the 
marketing of banana and involves price negotiations and the programming of marketing between farmers and 
traders from Conakry.
This marketing strategy in Conakry is supported by two principles:
-  the union works with traders who accept to negotiate a flat price and which can be revised periodically (2 to 
3 times a year) depending on the market, conditions and the transport costs;
-  in return, the farmer groups supply quantities equivalent to truckloads of about 20-25t on a date agreed upon 
with the traders.
To function, this system is built around various bodies:
-  a body in charge of harmonisation-negotiation of banana prices where the farmers’ union and traders of 
the association come together to set the prices;
-  a commission in charge of scheduling the harvest, where selling is scheduled every week tied to a 
harvesting programme put in place between farmers and the traders of the association;
-  a system of measurement which takes place in the presence of traders but controlled by farmers;
-  a control committee.
Ref. : UPBM Commercialization system: Negotiation of prices and programming of commercialization between farmers and 
traders- Guinea: Inader, UPBM, Inter-réseaux, CTA - 12 p. + summary 1 p.
(12d) FO participation in cereal trade fairs in Mali
Malian cereal production (millet, sorghum, corn, processed products) can meet the gross national needs but 
there is strong inter-annual and inter-regional production differences. Since 1990, fluidity in the exchanges 
between surplus and deficit zones (production zones/rural or urban consumption areas) has improved. This 
took place through the organisation of cereal trade fairs initiated by the NGO Afrique Verte. These trade fairs 
always bring together different types of actors involved in the supply chains. Some of them come from quite 
distant areas and different backgrounds: 
-  farmers who can be traders and or buyers depending on the cereals;
-  processors, promoters of cereal processing and packaging units. Women associations in general in urban 
areas and rural minorities from the south of the country;
-  traders and institutional representatives who, apart from providing technical support to the operators, ensure 
the development of cereal policies or provide funding for the marketing of cereals;
-  decision-making structures, financing structures (banks, saving & credit schemes), technical support 
services and others for the regulation and control of the supply chains, NGOs, chambers of agriculture are 
also more and more present. 
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But they take various forms depending on the number of actors and types of cereals involved:
-  trade fairs at the beginning of the marketing season between November-January also known as pre-trade 
fairs. They bring together about 60 to 80 participants. These pre-fairs make it possible to evaluate the 
availability of products in the market, the level of batch orders, to calculate the cost price of the cereals and 
to prepare the FOs in negotiation techniques as well as for the exchanges which will take place thereafter;
-  mini-fairs which bring together suppliers and buyers of a particular cereal (for example: trade fairs in 
Niono – the first in 1995 –, Koutiala, Sévaré);
-  regional trade fair which groups together about forty participants around all the cereals: these fairs make 
it possible to supply deficient zones from the surplus areas of the same region (for example in Kita and 
Diéma);
-  one annual national fair which brings together about hundred operators (generally in Ségou);
-  one annual international fair involving approximately 120 cereal operators from three countries (Mali/
Kayes, Senegal/Tambacounda and Mauritania/Sélibaby) around the valleys of the Senegal River. This fair 
(held in general in Kayes) promotes exchanges in different directions depending on the agricultural contexts.
The organisation of the fairs is beneficial at various levels:
-  the deficient FOs can obtain their supplies at lower prices than those practised in the local markets. 
Resale of cereals to members takes place at good prices while enabling the FOs to keep some profitable 
margins;
-  FOs with surpluses can sell large volumes of grain: between 2001 and 2005, more than 52,000 tons of 
grain were sold;
- the FOs are organised/structured and strengthened: in order to meet the qualitative and quantitative 
requirements of FOs operating at a loss in the Kayes Region, seven village associations in Niono came 
together in 1996 to create the Jeka Feeré (“to sell together”) organisation in Office zone of Niger (see box 
12e). A system of deducting commissions on sales for the member FOs provides the organisation with some 
level of operational autonomy. There is a increasing number of applications for membership and support to 
extend the experience of Niono to other areas of the Office zone of Niger;
-  trade relationships and dialogue are being built between farmers, the FOs and buyers and the other main 
partners: given the many fairs that have been held already, the actors end up knowing one another and are 
recognised; there is better understanding of the decisions as well as proper positioning of the actors;
-  a framework for information exchange and reflection is being put in place for marketing grain in Mali 
concerning the difficulties encountered and questions of national interest. Discussion takes place on 
experiences, analysis of the farming seasons or the supply chains, information on prices, stocks, availability, 
financing, etc. Lobbying and advocacy has begun at higher levels.
The question of funding remains: even though the meetings are recognised as useful and necessary by all the 
beneficiaries, it appears that the organisation of the fairs remains expensive (organisation, activities, technical 
support). Who has to/can pay? Which actors should be involved in the transactions? Should the annual 
exchange forum for communication and dialogue be financed by the state? 
Ref.: Les bourses aux céréales : commercialisation des céréales locales en réponse à l’insécurité de l’approvisionnement 
alimentaire /Haïdara.M. – Amassa Afrique Verte Mali.
(12e) Mediation between sellers and buyers by the GIE Jèka Feeré in Mali
The GIE Jèka Feeré (meaning “To sell together” in Bamanan) helps its member organisations to improve 
the marketing of their rice production from the Office zone of Niger by serving as a mediator between sellers 
(unions and grassroots farmers) and buyers. The GIE does not stock rice nor take out bank loans, but merely 
facilitates the transactions through many different actions: 
-  determination of a standard price which takes into account the floor price for farmers and the market;
-  assessment of the supply: evaluation of available and ready-for-sale stocks;
-  seeking markets and buyers: on the basis of dialogue that leads to setting a standard price and estimates of 
the gross available supply, the GIE is in a position to negotiate contracts in the market;
-  signing sales contracts with buyers with the assistance of specialised technicians;
-  opening bank accounts to ensure that payments are made securely to farmers;
-  follow-up and monitoring of transactions: a specialised commission ensures compliance with the contractual 
requirements of the traders (quality of the product and packaging, compliance with delivery dates, etc).
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The GIE Jèka Feeré also facilitates connections with other actors to improve the quality of rice: tests of rice 
processing equipment with an agricultural firm, access to advantageous funding for the purchase of rice 
huskers. 
Each year it sells between 1,500 and 3,000 tonnes of rice:
-  70% within the framework of the grain fairs organised by Afrique Verte for the supply of deficit areas 
(Kayes, Kidal);
-  20% for actors in the urban market (grain traders);
-  10% in institutional markets (charity organisations with programs for supplying grain banks).
Whereas the majority of farmers in the Office zone of Niger sell their rice at harvest (at low price) and funding 
for marketing and storage is limited compared with the needs, the system set up by the GIE Jeka Feeré has 
the advantage of providing a solution to the marketing problem in this zone. It is involved neither with credit 
nor storage but with the facilitation of transactions between suppliers and demanders. The GIE also works on 
improving the quality of the products and thus enables farmers to price their products higher. 
Ref.: The intermediate role of the Jeka Feere economic interest group in the commercialisation of rice in the Niger Office 
zone in Mali - A commercialisation experience without credit or storage / M.Haïdara. – Amassa Afrique Verte, Inter-
réseaux, CTA, 2007. – 11 p. + Summary 1 p.
12.2 – Advantages and limits
These activities generally take a long time to set up
The example of the agricultural fairs is particularly illustrative. In fact we generally see only the visible part of 
the process when the actors come together on market day or when the fairs are held. But for these markets 
and fairs to be successful, for contracts to be signed and for products to be sold under conditions that 
are satisfactory to the buyers and sellers, numerous conditions must be met in terms of organisation and 
collective apprenticeship: first of all by farmers but also by other actors of the supply chain and by traditional 
authorities.
Mediation of the FO: a prerequisite at various levels
For these markets and fairs to be held properly and under conditions that are favourable to both buyers and 
sellers, many organisational activities are necessary. Even if they are less obvious or immediately visible 
compared with transport and storage operations, they are nevertheless essential. The activities of FOs to 
facilitate sales are numerous and take place at different levels:
1) FO measures regarding the supply of products from farmers:
l gathering information on the quantities and qualities that farmers can bring to the market: monitoring 
cultivated surface areas, estimating the volumes harvested, family food needs (volumes for home 
consumption), estimating the volumes intended for sale in the markets either individually and/or through 
collective sales action (volumes, qualities, dates, prices), without overestimating the marketable quantities 
and giving farmers a chance to sell outside the grouped sale, somewhere else and / or on a different date 
in case of need (the example of the UGPBM in Burkina Faso has already been mentioned);
l organising discussions between farmers to agree on price levels, taking into account production costs 
and the reality of the market in order to determine a minimum price that covers the cost of production, 
transport, collection and marketing of the products. This price must also take into account the real market 
prices (the difference between the farm gate price and the world market price is not the trader’s margin. 
There are other costs and risks involved.), and consumer requirements (price, quality, presentation of 
the products, appropriate packaging, particularly because of the competition between local and imported 
products). The Fouta Djallon Federation in Guinea provides an example;
l information for farmers on the requirements of buyers and consumers: the farmer should not 
produce only according to his tastes, needs or personal constraints. Examples such as the one already 
mentioned of the FO Nowefor and its tomatoes show that being attentive to the needs of the market as well 
as the tastes of consumers and purchasers can open up new outlets;
l work on farm practices, exchange of expertise and know-how, links with research, and proper 
experiments to adapt the products to demand (example of potato farming in Fouta Djallon in Guinea).
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2) FO measures regarding product demand from buyers:
Actions are carried out by the FO to give farmers a better understanding of the demand in terms of quantities 
(new outlets, new sales sites or higher market absorption capacities) and qualities (to adapt the supply to the 
demand). The actions aim at new markets, earning buyer loyalty, sales points, etc. This takes place among 
others by:
l  collecting information on the qualities expected or desired by the buyers;
l  collecting information on the volumes and qualities requested, estimating possible prices according to 
modes of payments and delivery terms;
l  identifying trade partners and potential transporters as well as assessing their reliability (maintaining 
information on traders, official badges, etc.).
3) FO measures regarding the encounter between farmers and buyers to facilitate matching supply and 
demand in markets or at agricultural fairs:
Here the issue is to improve the functioning of the market, i.e. to make markets more transparent, to reduce 
transaction costs and balance power relations or even to create new market spaces in collaboration with 
other types of actors. This takes place mainly by:
l  improving information and knowledge of the prices, volumes and qualities available/requested in the 
markets by introducing measures to bring together, analyse and use information on the prices and 
volumes; having a vision of the supply chain and price components, operators’ costs, risks (what does 
having a better price mean?), knowing what is negotiable and what is unreasonable and where it might be 
possible to upgrade the supply chain without taking serious risks;
l  putting in place rules and committees to regulate the market;
l  promoting different ways of putting the products on the market according to the product qualities, the 
production capacities of farmers and market absorption capacities (link between sales in the local market 
and sales in more distant urban markets);
l  negotiating contracts with specialised actors (traders, transporters, processors), negotiating prices, 
payment deadlines and favourable delivery conditions for farmers. On this issue, it has been noted that 
cotton farmers agree to be paid several weeks (or months) after delivery whereas for other products, 
farmers want to be paid immediately. In Mogtédo in Burkina Faso, the price of rice is negotiated between 
the cooperative and women involved in the processing of rice who buy the paddy rice from farmers;
l  controlling the implementation of contracts and payment of farmers: finding means to ensure that 
farmers comply with their commitments in terms of announced volumes and dates to avoid discrediting the 
FO or other farmers (solidarity groups, measures to prevent hasty or early sales by farmers in difficulty, 
etc.). At the same time, at the level of the buyers, the FO puts in place measures which tie the traders to 
farmers (provisions to settle conflicts, involvement of local authorities, etc.) even if it is more difficult when 
the buyers are scattered and far away.
Undeniable results
Farmers can increase their role and influence in the marketing of their products, establish power relations with 
buyers, and negotiate and obtain reasonable prices for their products and avoid cheating by intermediaries 
and collectors (on the weights, quality, calculations, payments, etc.). They therefore enjoy greater revenue 
security and are thus able to plan and invest in the development of their farms.
For the trader, the mediation role played by the FO offers many advantages, mainly:
l  better knowledge of the product, its characteristics and its qualities (direct contacts);
l  reduced marketing costs (collection, transport, primary transformation, facilitated sales and time gains), 
and reduced marketing-related risks (prices and uncertain outlets);
l  reduced risks and uncertainties relating to purchases: products are guaranteed in terms of requested 
quantity and quality at negotiated prices or prices known in advance;
l  lower distribution costs making the trader more competitive in the market and able to sell larger 
quantities.
The mediation often leads to a contract that has many advantages: secured outlets for the farmer at a price 
negotiated and known in advance. And for the buyer: an assured source of products, at a price negotiated 
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and known in advance, products that meet the standards, etc. But this also has some risks: e.g. dependence 
if farmers sell large volumes of products to a few buyers.
The stakes involved in organising a single sales site in the local market is not negligible. The single 
sales place, associated with other market organisation measures, makes it possible to fight against poor 
information available to scattered farmers; better information on the prices and easier control of their 
compliance with agreements on prices (e.g. minimum guaranteed floor price); better information on demand 
and supply; easier management of the supply of the product; easier monitoring/supervision and 
compliance with the rules relating to the measurement units. The single sales point in the market constitutes 
an important guarantee for farmers that the rules of their organisation are being followed. It allows power 
relations between farmers and buyers to become balanced (see sheet 11).
Finally, when the FO takes part in the organisation of a market, there are improvements in the conditions 
for the members but also for all the other farmers who come to sell their products in the same local 
market.
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REGULATION OF SUPPLY IN LOCAL MARKETS
13.1 - Principles and examples
Paradoxically in agriculture, increases in the quantities produced and delivered (by expanding cultivated 
surfaces, spreading out production and/or the yields) do not automatically result in a rise of incomes for 
farmers. When there is high supply of products in the market compared to the demand from buyers (demand 
variations do not generally match supply variations in the same proportion), the prices of the products drop, 
thereby, ruining the efforts put in by farmers to produce more.
Local demand does not usually give farmers much leeway. They therefore organise to regulate and manage 
supply in the market to avoid price drops. FOs undertake actions to plan production with respect to intra-
annual price fluctuations, or even out the volumes of products available in the market, and anticipate drastic 
price falls or increases. For example:
l  technical support to spread out the production of potatoes over a much longer period of the year to avoid 
production peaks at harvest and supply deficits which can destroy existing relationships between farmers, 
buyers and consumers ( Fouta Djallon Federation).
l  organisation of rounds for the sales of ginger and tomatoes in the local markets by the FO Nowefor in 
Cameroon (box 13a and 13b)
l  management of the supply of rice by the rice cooperative in Mogtédo-Burkina Faso by putting in place 
functions to regulate and control the local market (box 13c).
 (13a) Management of ginger supply and organisation of the market by Nowefor
Nowefor, in Cameroon, paid a price for its success in the production of ginger: the members of this 
Cameroonian Federation increased their production (farming practices, provision of inputs and credit, follow 
up of production…) so much that their production saturated the local market and led to a drastic decrease in 
prices: surplus supply of ginger in the market compared to demand led to a radical drop in the price (a fivefold 
decrease in less than three years).
The members of this FO engaged in a long process of reflection and action and developed strategies to face 
this decrease in the price of ginger at the level of the local market and thus to sell more of their ginger.
In 2004, they initiated a strategy to organise the local market through better transparency in the transactions 
and through management of the supply. This strategy was build around the following: (i) weekly regulation of 
the supply at the level of the local ginger market (limitation of supply to better negotiate prices with the buyers) 
and (ii) to sell off the excess of ginger in the local market to new external markets (organisation of transport 
and sales to distant buyers)
This enabled farmers to once again achieve an attractive price in the local market. Experiences involving the 
purchase, storage and processing of ginger were also developed as well as attempts to create a network of 
farmers.
Ref.: Idem supra : Supply, demand and equilibrium price: a case for study. Improved prices for farmers through the 
organization of the local market and the regulation of the supply of ginger by Nowefor in Bafut (Cameroon) – Inter-réseaux, 
CTA, 2006. – 12 p. + summary 1 p.
(13b) Management of the supply of tomatoes by Nowefor in a local market in Cameroon
Technical and financial support made it possible for farmers of Nowefor to significantly increase the production 
of tomatoes within the market gardening sector in Bambui. Production increased from 7 buckets of 15 litres 
of tomatoes per week per farmer to approximately 20-40 buckets. The local market in Bambui, like the 
main market in the nearby town of Bamenda, were saturated with tomatoes and the prices fell from 3,500 
FCFA/bucket to 1,800 and even 1,000 FCFA/bucket. Farmers no longer had a satisfactory income from their 
production.
The members of this sector then have been working on how to make their production more profitable. Some 
ideas emerged among others: reduce the supply of tomatoes in the local market on the one hand, and on the 
other, gather the products and look for external markets to sell off the excess production.
To reduce supplies of tomatoes in the local market, farmers adopted a sequential mode of production. 
Members of the sectors organised into six sub groups and a production calendar was established, which 
118 119
provided for a gap of two weeks between the planting of tomatoes by the sub groups. As a result, farmers 
harvested at different periods and no longer carried all of their produce to the local market at the same time.
In order to search for external markets, two members were sent to prospect markets in Yaoundé and Douala 
and Limbe where buyers were identified in each of the towns. These buyers had different demands in terms of 
the quality of the tomatoes. Specific farm practices were then developed by the FO to meet these requirements 
(see sheet 8 on quality).
Ref.: Idem supra.
(13c) Managing the supply of rice - Mogtédo cooperative in Burkina Faso
The cooperative set up an innovative system for managing the supply of rice in the local market, in order to 
have regular supply of quality product. The cooperative acts on two key elements: the price of paddy rice and 
white rice and the volumes that are brought to the market. It also intervenes in terms of quality: informing, 
training women parboilers, work on the equipment.
The regulation of rice supply is crucial to avoid an influx of excess paddy rice in the market, which tends to 
bring down prices and also to guarantee regular volumes of products for the buyers who are on the market 
when rice is scarce.
The cooperative intervenes at different periods to maintain regular volumes of supply on the Mogtédo market. 
It does not buy paddy rice from the members (only in cases where some members are in difficulty or to 
avoid flooding the market at harvest), but regulates supply in the market through the rice it obtains from the 
reimbursement in kind of input loans to members: the cooperative stocks and releases this rice in line with the 
needs of the market. It releases its stocks into the market once the market starts lacking rice with the objective 
of maintaining the purchase volumes in each market and as a means retaining buyer loyalty (these stocks 
come from payment in kind of contributions for the management of the land or for reimbursement of inputs and 
intervention purchases).
The cooperative therefore tries to regulate prices (higher, more stable and known in advance by the buyers) 
as well as the volumes (there is rice to be sold on each market day). This last point is primordial for the buyers 
who are in search of regular turnover. Farmers are the ones managing the market through the actions of the 
cooperative. Here the action is not to collect the market taxes, but to manage the supply of the product and to 
guarantee demand by offering conditions that are appreciated by the buyers. 
For farmers, the market is secured because it is no longer subjected to price variations, which can be imposed 
by the buyers. Farmers are involved in the process of ensuring that the agreements are respected and the 
cooperative supports the control of the transactions to prevent losses on the weights during purchases.
The new mode of operation was explained, negotiated and accepted by the local authorities who are not trying 
to stop it but are even encouraging it:
- Control of processed rice brought to the market at a single sales point and at negotiated prices;
- Control of measurements and weights
- Rules to ensure the respect of the prices with penalties in case of non-compliance.
The cooperative therefore introduced a right to regulate the local market for more equity on the basis of 
negotiations with other professional actors. 
Ref.: Creation of a secured and self-managed market by rice farmers of the Mogtedo cooperatve in Burkina Faso. Inter-
réseaux, CTA, based on contribution of FENOP, 2006. – 10 p. + summary 1 p.
13.2 – Advantages and limitations
On the basis of the observation that farmers can manipulate the supply more easily than sometimes distant 
and often poorly identified demand for products, FOs often adopt priority strategies built on the supply: 
l  reduction of per unit supply production costs: grouped purchase of quality and cheaper inputs, 
improvements on the farming practices to produce better and increase productivity per area or per labour 
input, etc;
l  improvement in supply (volume) management: grouped supplies (economies of scale and gathering 
which make it possible to reach better prices), deferred sales over time in order to get better prices 
(either through storage or by spreading out the production in order to produce over long periods of time), 
reduction of imports, etc;
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l  sales of products in the local markets and the search for external, distant markets to sell off the excess 
elsewhere (search for means to shift placement of products in the markets: purchase from members who 
need money, storage infrastructure, anticipation through knowledge and control of the volumes brought to 
the market);
l  improvement in quality management: farming practices which make it possible to have marketable 
products, products that can be conserved, well transformed and attract traders or final consumers (setting 
up a system for sorting, quality control);
l  supply of products with higher added value either because they are of better quality or through 
processing/packaging.
Source: Synthesis of the forum “Market Access and Agricultural Product Marketing”, Bamako, 2007/D.Diagne, Fongs 
Action Paysanne – Inter-réseaux, CTA, Amassa Afrique Verte.
It is certain that the management of the supply cannot end only with limiting the supply in the market as a 
means to artificially raise prices. In fact, consumers are limited by their purchasing power and governments 
do not want to have crises in urban areas and therefore follow these actions closely. 
The market - where supply meets demand
MARKET
PRICE
END DEMAND
Consumers, households
SUPPLY
Farmers, breeders
Traders
Farmers’
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Consumers, just not at any price (STALEMATE Magoni, GDS 31, 2005)
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(COALITION AGAINST THE HIGH COST OF LIVING)
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CAN TEMPORARILY BLOCKING AN IMPORTED PRODUCT HELP FARMERS’ 
ORGANISATIONS TO DEVELOP THEIR PRODUCTION?
14.1 - Principles and examples
Blocking imported potatoes at the border and the subsequent success of the Federation of Farmers of Fouta 
Djallon’s (FPFD) “Belle de Guinée” in Guinea is surely the most widely known example. This experience 
has been widely publicised but often with very simplistic insights or with quick shortcuts that may give the 
impression that blocking imported products is the miracle solution. First of all, there was no blockage at the 
border, but rather different blockage methods, at particular periods and on volumes that were negotiated. And 
during these periods of import suspension, there were parallel actions that were carried out by the FPFD that 
led to achieving the positive results which are known: contracting with research, traders and transporters; 
organisation of collection points; putting in place working capital for partner traders; monitoring prices and 
volumes in markets of the production zones.
The battle was therefore won not only at the border, but also on the field through production and the 
organisation of marketing at the national level. In fact, the Federation has better control over the production 
and marketing of potatoes than of onions (box 14a). Thereafter, potatoes were no longer blocked at the 
border and the ‘Belle de Guinée’ started to yield benefits. It is important to indicate that the same Fouta 
Djallon Federation did not have similar success at regulating the entry of onions across the borders (box 
14b).35
Other famous examples can be related: 
l  the case of suspension of poultry imports at the border in Cameroon and Senegal, 
in particular involving the mobilisation of a consumers association (Acdic) and 
the Poultry Interprofession Ipavic (box 4c);
l  the case of blockage of onions at the borders in Senegal.
The subject of regulations at the border (as well as that of agricultural and trade policies) is very 
vast and is not treated within the framework of this work 36.
(14a) Blocking potatoes at the border, a sufficient measure to save farmers in Guinea?
When the Federation of Farmers of Fouta Djallon requested that potato imports be suspended, Guinean 
production was already competitive (sold at lower price) and was of better quality. But the potatoes only lasted 
four months in the market (February to May). With the regular imports reaching the local markets, the markets 
were flooded and therefore led to huge losses for local farmers. The importers could withstand these losses 
given their larger margins obtained during the rest of the year. This was not the case for the local farmers. The 
suspension of the imports made it possible for them to have a secured outlet for their production.
Obviously, the suspension of the imports could not be maintained for a long period of time. Actions taken 
by the Federation and farmers led to the development of potatoes during two new periods: from July to 
September (rainy season production) and October to December (on specific fields). The potatoes of the 
Federation could therefore be on the market all year round.
It is at that moment that the imports were stopped because their margins were no longer advantageous. 
Blockage of the potatoes was no longer of interest. But the suspension of the imports made it possible for 
farmers and their organisation to develop strongly, obtain stable revenues and invest in production and 
increase productivity. It would not have been efficient if it did not cover the needs of the market with local 
production for the whole year. This was the problem faced by the same Federation regarding attempts to 
suspend imports of onions. With only one production cycle of four months in the year, the Guinean onion has 
never succeeded in replacing imported onions despite measures taken to tax imports when local onions are 
produced and placed on the market. 
Ref: note of Patrick Delmas, 2009.
35 The suspensions in 2007 and 2008 are more blockages to export products in a context of internal crises in Guinea (price 
increases and food scarcity which led to the prohibition of exports of some Guinean products).
36 More information and analysis from the Working Group of Inter-réseaux on Interprofessional organizations which treats 
questions on the modes of organization of actors ion the markets and on supply chains.
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(14b) Different activities to improve marketing within the FPFD in Guinea
SUPPLY 
CHAIN
TYPES OF MARKETING ACTIVITY INITIATED BY THE FPFD PERIOD SITUATION
IN 2006
Potato
Negotiation with the government for periodic suspension of 
imports. Blocking of imports is coupled with contracts
From February to 
June,
from 1993 to 1997
None
Written Contracts with importers in Conakry
(framework agreement)
1992, 1993 and 
part of 1994 None
Less formal contracts with local traders from 1995
Yes but
importation
not suspended
Onion
Punctual suspension of imports Period of local sales in 1993 None
Negotiation of overtaxation (coupled with contracts)
From April to 
August
in 1994, 95, 96
Contracts written with importers of Conakry
(framework agreement) 1994 None
Less formal contracts with traders in Labé From 1995to 1997
Yes but
without tax
Onion
Tomato
Direct marketing carried out by the FPFD in Conakry:
Onion on a large scale in 1996; tomatoes on a small scale in 1999 1996 and 1999 None
Potato
Onion
Step points of collection with tradesmen: 
- putting in place collection points accessible to trucks for some 
  groups and unions;
- construction of a storage place, warehouses;
- negotiation of  farming season price*/floor price with
  Traders - partners of the FPFD who make contracts with 
  transporters and warehousemen;
- reimbursement of credits on the day of collection and determination 
  of the minimum quality to be delivered (“quotas for onion, potato” **)
Initiated
in 1994
then formalized
and developed
on a large
scale
in 1996
Yes in
some
unions
Onion
FPFD setting up working capital for partner traders involved in 
the onion supply chain with the assistance of other partners for the 
purchase of onion by the unions or partner traders
From 1998 Not in2005
Potato
Marketing management: contact traders and negotiation of price, 
storage and regulation of market when prices drop, collective 
marketing
Yes AT the UGTM
Potato
Onion
Monitoring prices and volumes leaving markets in the production 
zones Yes 
Potato Putting in place small retailers in Conakry supplied by the FPFD in order to increase the sales of potatoes 1999-2000 None
Potato Support for exportation: study of regional outlets, export trials, obtaining a trademark, presence at West African agricultural fairs
Since
1998 Yes
* Onions: more than just the “seasonal price”, it is the floor price: farmers and traders agree on a price that 
enables them to survive even in the middle of a farming season (two months of strong sales of onions). 
This price should not go below a certain threshold, which would lead to a disturbance in the market or place 
farmers in a difficult position to repay their loans. For potatoes, the same approach was used but with prices 
that were stable for very short periods of time. 
** At the beginning the quotas were related to the “collection point ” approach which included deductions on 
the quantities that had to be supplied by farmers: part of the deductions or commissions contributed to build 
the FPFD’s revolving fund while the other part went to the groups and unions. Given that the collection point 
approach did not work in most of the unions, the deductions took place where the inputs were sold.
Ref: Activités de commercialisation de la FPFD : capitalisation du vécu et perspectives / K. Diallo, M. Barry, V. Beauval 
(Cellule commercialisation de la Fédération des producteurs du Fouta Djallon). – CCFD, 2006. – 30 p. + appendices
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(14c) The Cameroonian poultry supply chain in difficulty despite the reduction of frozen chicken 
imports
After many struggles to limit imports of European frozen chicken, which was competing with the local poultry, 
the Cameroonian poultry supply chain ended up taking off. Unfortunately, the production of maize, which is the 
principal component of chicken feed, did not follow the same tracks. The chicken farmers were faced with a 
very low supply of corn (to feed their birds) compared with demand.
Because of this shortage, many farmers were forced to decrease their daily feed ration by up to 40%, even 
to the extent of starving the chicks because of lack of feed. The poultry farmers cannot buy imported maize, 
which is even more expensive for them. The absence of available maize for animal feed is not because of a 
lack of production (which has increased significantly compared with the preceding years) but because of an 
increase in the demand for maize:
-  for human consumption: because of the increase in the prices of the foodstuffs in 2008 (like tubers, banana 
plantain, rice and other products), many low income households resorted to corn, which is cultivated in most 
areas of the country and at relatively good prices;
-  increased demand from livestock farmers: the demand for corn leaped in a few months to about 40% 
because of the recovery of the poultry sector which had been hit in 2006 by the avian flu.
(The discovery of the H5N1 virus on a dead duck had caused a panic among consumers who massively 
refrained from consuming poultry products and this led to a drastic decline in production. Thanks to the efforts 
of the livestock farmers, poultry production returned once more to a normal pace in May 2008).
According to forecasts of the Ministry of the Economy, maize deficits are expected to increase by 2012. In fact, 
about 90% of Cameroonian production is ensured by some three million small-scale farmers who are faced 
with increasing prices for fertilisers and pesticides.
Source: Syfia, Cameroon, Reinnier Kazé, February 2009.
14.2 - Advantages and limitations
Concerted and multi-actor collective strategies: processes which take a long time to establish
It is obviously more complicated to enable farmers to live well from their products than merely to close the 
borders. The example of onions in the Fouta Djallon Federation clearly illustrates this point: other factors 
were not in place to ensure the enhancement of the product and to benefit from the temporary border 
protection measures. The difficulties observed on this supply chain remain unsolved. 
Many other actions are necessary, and requests for protection at the borders are more likely to be heard and 
become negotiable when production and marketing are approached in a coherent, coordinated manner with 
other actors of the supply chain and end consumers. These actions involve FOs at various organisational 
levels, from the grassroots level to the umbrella structures and national federations, which have more 
visibility and weight. They have the power at their own levels and/or thanks to alliances created with other 
supply chain actors (Interprofessional organisations) and even consumers to influence agricultural policies 
and regulate the opening of the borders.
The failure of internal markets: another barrier not to be neglected!
Clamouring to close the borders to certain products can diminish if world market prices increase (imports 
become more expensive and therefore less competitive in local markets). There are many voices that insist 
on the need for political arbitrage between protectionist policies that are favourable to the emergence of 
local production and liberalisation, which is favourable to urban consumers. It appears important to take 
into account favourable price policies for local production (custom as well as fiscal policies), but also 
institutional support policies, which take other factors into consideration besides price (the organisation of 
actors, research to provide suitable materials for production, support for quality, infrastructure, etc). Internal 
barriers to marketing are in fact, more pressing and worrisome than external barriers and international 
trade. 
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Unrestricted borders (Stew, GDS 24, 2003)
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http://inter-reseaux.org/groupes-de-travail/organisations/
FO ACTIONS THROUGH CONSULTATION FORUMS OR INTERPROFESSIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS IN SUPPLY CHAINS
With regard to the Working Group “Market Access and Agricultural Products Marketing”, another specific 
thematic Working group called “Interprofessional organisations” was led by Joel Teyssier of Inter-
réseaux and other members (see illustration below).
We will only look at some of the elements that emerged from the discussions in the network on this 
subject. For more information, see the box - Working group “Interprofessional Organisations” on the 
website of Inter-réseaux:
15.1 - Varied realities of Interprofessional organisations modes
Interprofessional organisations, frameworks of dialogue, Interprofessional committees, and supply chain 
meetings, are forms of organisations known as “Interprofessional” that have emerged and flourished in 
recent years in West Africa. They are generating strong interest on the part of economic factors involved in 
various supply chains, political leaders and some donors and support organisations. 
These forms of organisation can be grouped under the generic term “Interprofessional Organisations (IOs) 
which is used when at least two “professional families” of a supply chain come together to dialogue, consult, 
Interprofessional 
Organisations 
By Interprofessional Organisations (IOs), we mean 
forms of organisation that consist of groups of actors 
from different professions in a value chain (farmers, 
processors, traders, transporters; etc.) who wish to engage in 
dialogue, consult, coordinate and work together to solve common problems related 
to a particular product or group of products. IOs can therefore take different forms: 
meetings, dialogue, negotiation forums, and may or may not be recognised by the 
state. They may or may not be permanent and can be coordinated in any way 
that enables them to participate in the process of organising/structuring the value 
chains.
The IOs are very topical in many countries but what is the actual situation of IOs 
in these countries? Especially in Africa, what roles should they focus on playing, 
what operating mechanisms exist, what are the underlying power relations, and 
what results can we expect and for whose benefit? The Working Group on IOs 
launched in 2007 will address these questions. 
The objective of the Working Group on IOs is to:
• make known the different experiences of IOs and to share them with a wider 
public
• deepen analysis and reflexion on IOs by involving IO actors or those 
supporting them to provide research of use to practioners in the field.
         
            
Translated for this report from the French original
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establish agreements and/or carry out collective actions related to a particular product or to groups of 
agricultural products. These organisations can take on many different forms depending on the actors who 
make them up, their missions, the products involved, the territory covered, the role and place of the state in 
the supply chain, etc. Often, the main objective of IOs is to “organise” the market, to “structure” the supply 
chain and to represent the interests of the professionals.
In some countries, setting up IOs is even presented as the solution to a whole range of problems from 
the regulation of the markets to the organisation of the supply chains and even the improvement of their 
competitiveness and the defence of the “interests” of the professionals. A general historical overview on 
existing IOs shows that they are many and diverse: there is no standard model but many diverse forms of 
IOs.
 (15a) General historic overview of IOs in West Africa
The first West African Interprofessional Organisations were put in place in the 90’s within export supply chains. 
In the context of liberalisation of supply chains and disengagement of the state, the creation of IOs was seen 
by governments and donors as a means to maintain a number of the advantages of integrated supply chains 
(cotton, groundnuts, etc.) and avoid their collapse. It is with this background that the first Interprofession 
organisations were created in West Africa: the national Interprofessional council for the groundnut sector 
(CNIA) during the liberalisation of the groundnut sector in Senegal (1992); the national cocoa and coffee 
Interprofessional council (CICC) during the liberalisation of the coffee and cocoa sectors in Cameroon (1992).
Some years later, IOs were also created following the same format in the cotton sectors of many countries 
following the privatisation of cotton societies: the Interprofessional Cotton Association (AIC) of Benin in 1996, 
the InterCoton of Ivory Coast in 2000, the Interprofessional Cotton Association of Burkina Faso (AICB) in 
2006, the Senegalese Interprofessional Cotton Association (ASIC) created in 2007, and the ongoing creation 
of the Cotton Interprofession in Mali.
At the same time, and in other sectors, the actors found themselves obliged to dialogue and to organise in 
order to work together and this led them to create IOs. This is especially the case of supply chains/sectors for 
processed products, where dialogue and coordination between farmers and processors is necessary or even 
obligatory for their activities. In fact, while some problems can be solved by a single type of actor (for example: 
for FOs to have access to cheaper inputs, organisations of processors to promote a certain processed 
product, traders associations to manage distribution, etc.), others require dialogue and coordination among 
different families involved in the supply chains (between farmers, processors and distributors to improve the 
quality of the products, to defend a local supply chain, to establish agreements on prices or on modes of 
supplies).
The occurrence of a crisis in a supply chain strongly favours the emergence of Interprofessional dynamics. In 
the poultry sectors in Senegal and Cameroon, for example, when faced with uncontrolled, massive imports 
of cheap frozen chicken, Interprofessional organisations (in Cameroon in partnership with a consumers’ 
association) played an important role in lobbying government services and also the regional authorities of the 
UEMOA: through these actions it was possible to slow down imports of frozen chicken.
Finally and more recently, some states have shown strong interest in IOs to the point of including them in 
the general development orientations and regulation of supply chains. The recent laws for the orientation of 
agriculture promulgated in Senegal (in 2004) and in Mali (2006) allow room to entrust IOs with an important 
role in the regulation of markets (supply management, market management and piloting supply chains). 
At the supranational level, the UEMOA is also pressing for the creation of IOs. Also, current international 
development aid and international organisations are increasingly supportive of initiatives of dialogue between 
different professions in the supply chains at local, national and even supranational levels.
Ref.: Agricultural Interprofessional Organisations (IPO) in West Africa, Joel Teyssier. – SOS Faim – Farming Dynamics, 
2008. - 8 p.
It is possible to distinguish two main types of IOs in food crop supply chains:
l  IOs in the “major supply chains” (like the cereal and livestock supply chains). They involve a large 
number of actors: farmers scattered all over the territory, who are not necessarily market-oriented and 
who do not necessarily want to specialise; many other actors’ downstream (processors, traders, etc.). 
Dialogue does not appear to be a necessity and their role remains unclear. Many of these IOs today have 
problems getting off the ground and operating (box 15b).
l  IOs in the “small” or short supply chains. They are built on precise collective actions, around a strong 
nucleus of actors in a limited geographical area. The number of actors is rather small, often with the 
presence of “specialised” farmers and a central operator (transformer) that is the major, clearly identified 
bottleneck for the products. The economic challenges and missions of the organisation are generally well 
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defined. This is the case of Interprofessional organisations put in place around the Federation of farmers 
of Fouta Djallon in Guinea (box 15c) and interprofessional organisations within the Industrial Tomato 
supply chains in Senegal (box 15d).
 (15b) Interprofessional organisations in West African cereal supply chains 
Grain supply chains are considered by governments to be strategic, especially for national food security. In 
the 1990’s, the grain supply chains had more or less strong state involvement prior to liberalisation: the rice 
supply chains were entirely managed by government, while other dry grain sectors received more occasional 
involvement. 
Since the end of the 1990’s, IOs were put in place with the backing of the state in rice and other dry grain 
supply chains in some countries: the Interprofessional rice committee (Ciriz) of Senegal in 1998, the 
Interprofessional rice committee of Burkina Faso (CIRB) in 2001, the Interprofessional grain committee of 
Burkina Faso (CICB) in 2004 and the Ghana Rice Interprofessional Body (Grib) in 2004.
These IOs are often made up of all professional families from upstream to downstream in the supply chains: 
input suppliers, agricultural farmers, processors, transporters, distributors, and sometimes public institutions 
(e.g. Ciriz). They generally have a large mandate to regulate markets and organise supply chains. These 
objectives at times appear vague, do not facilitate introducing concrete measures and their activities today 
remain quite limited. In the absence of an obligatory point of passage for agricultural products (processing 
factory or export centre), the IOs have not succeeded in setting up systems to deduct commissions to ensure 
autonomous financing of their activities and have therefore remained largely dependent on external funding for 
their operations.
Ref.: Document bilan d’étape du Groupe de travail sur les Organisations interprofessionnelles / Joël Teyssier. – Inter-
réseaux Développement rural, 2008. – 45 p.
(15c) Interprofessional Agreements between farmers of the Federation of Fouta Djallon and other 
agricultural supply chain professionals
Since its creation, the Farmers’ Federation of Fouta Djallon (FPFD) has led the fight, exemplary in many 
respects, to strengthen its production supply chains.
In the case of the potato sector, the successes can be explained mainly by comparative advantages that the 
Fouta Djallon had with its crop, the quality of the technical pathways put in place by the FPFD and its partners, 
the strict cropping practices in most of the production valleys, but also and most importantly, the dynamism of 
the leaders and their capacity to negotiate with other actors in the supply chain.
A strong nucleus is made up of the Union of Farmers’ Groups of Timbi Madina (UGTM), which sells more 
than half of Guinean production during the dry season. With the assistance of the FPFD, the union negotiates 
the marketing of its members’ potatoes during the dry season with a group of traders operating in Timbi 
Madina who have strong ties in Conakry. This group of traders is linked to a group of transporters.
This approach corresponds to a true Interprofessional agreement although not a formal one; each actor 
tries to negotiate rather than try to establish power relations with the other actors. Trade relations between the 
Union of farmers and its partners upstream in the potato sector are well codified (well-established, clear rules) 
and at the same time respect the local cultural and trade traditions. This can be misleading for an uninformed, 
external observer (there are not necessarily any formal contracts: yet the agreements are respected)…
Ref: Activités de commercialisation de la FPFD : capitalisation du vécu et perspectives / K. Diallo, M. Barry, V. Beauval 
– Guinée : Cellule commercialisation de la Fédération des producteurs du Fouta Djallon, CCFD 2006 – 30 p. + appendices
(15d) Interprofessional Partnership between farmers and a processor of industrial tomatoes in 
Senegal
In the Valley of the Senegal River, a partnership was built around tomatoes between agricultural farmer groups 
and a processing enterprise. Industrial production of tomatoes was introduced in Senegal in 1969. From this 
period onwards, a Franco-Senegalese Enterprise (Society for food conserves of Senegal-Socas) proposed 
purchase contracts to farmers for their tomatoes and provided them with technical assistance needed for the 
production of this new crop. Production for the farming seasons of 1969-1970 was 200t of fresh tomatoes. 
Today, more than 50,000t are bought on contract from farmers and processed into paste (conserves) by 
Socas. There are more than 12,000 farmers involved. Socas has become the leading industrial farmer of 
tomato extract conserve from fresh tomatoes in the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa.
The success of this supply chain is explained by a strong partnership that was built, step by step, between 
farmers and Socas and led to the creation of the national consultation committee for the industrial tomato 
supply chain (CNCFTI) in 1994.
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The Interprofessional organisation (CNCFTI) is made up of farmers, a company (Socas), transporters, 
suppliers and public institutions (agricultural services, agricultural banks, research), traders and consumers. 
It is a forum for dialogue and decision-making, where the modalities of the farming seasons are mainly 
discussed (financing, planning, techniques, purchase prices, etc.). The founding members of the CNCFTI are 
farmers and Socas among whom dialogue and consultation are the order of the day, but they also have the 
means to put pressure on one another (e.g. example a farmers’ strike in 1998 because of lower prices offered 
by Socas for their products and because of the quality control by the processor). They self-finance most of 
the functions of the CNCFTI (equal contributions from farmers and Socas amounting to 0.5 FCFA/kg sold or 
bought). SAED is in charge of the secretariat of the CNCFTI (committee office, meeting preparation, meeting 
minutes, etc). 
Tomatoes farmers of the region are organised into Economic Interest Groups (GIE). These groups are 
organised into unions in the villages. Fixed purchase contracts at guaranteed prices (farming contracts) are 
negotiated yearly between farmers’ groups and Socas: (i) farmers commit to the production of the tomatoes 
and to selling them to Socas; (ii) farmers commit to growing the varieties of tomatoes selected by the CNCFTI; 
(iii) the company agrees to take all the truckloads of tomatoes brought to the factory within 24 hours; if the 
tomatoes are damaged, Socas reserves the right to discount the price. At the beginning of the farming season, 
farmers’ groups take out a loan from the local agricultural bank. The bank only grants the loan if they have 
already signed the contracts with Socas. The repayments of the loan are deducted directly during the sale of 
the tomatoes to Socas, which pays farmers directly into their bank accounts. This therefore guarantees the 
security of the loans granted thanks to the Interprofessional contracts signed between farmers and Socas. 
Socas has put in place an experimental station to try new varieties of more productive tomatoes. Management 
training is provided to leaders of the GIEs. The success of the industrial tomato supply chain in the Valley 
of the Senegal River as such rests on the strong partnership embodied in the Interprofessional agreements 
between Socas and the farmers’ groups. It is onto this strong nucleus that other services for farmers have 
been grafted (access to agricultural financing, experimental research, training of farmer leaders, etc.).
Ref. Dans la Vallée du Fleuve Sénégal, différentes histoires interprofessionnelles autour de la tomate industrielle et du riz / 
A. Fall, S. Sarr – GDS 44 – Inter-réseaux, 2008. – 2 p.
15.2 - Some key points
An IO, why start one and with whom?
The question of the definition of the mandate of the IO is of primary importance. To want to set up an IO to 
“regulate a supply chain” is often not precise enough as a basis for concrete action. Experience shows that 
the most successful IOs are those that are created in response to a crisis in the supply chain. The crisis often 
serves as an impetus to kick-start the measures and makes it easy to define the priority(ies) and focus on 
the most important measures needed to solve the crisis. Setting up an IO is therefore not an automatic or an 
mandatory solution: it must be a response to the need (s) expressed by actors of the supply chain.
Often, IOs are seen as a grouping of all professional families upstream and downstream in the supply chain: 
the direct actors (those who derive a living mainly from the product) and the indirect ones (like transporters, 
service providers, etc.). But then, not all the professional families of a supply chain necessarily find 
themselves in the IO. Some families may not see the need or feel concerned by the problems that are being 
tackled. Others may just have different interests (which is not very good for the effectiveness of the IO).
However, one may question which actors and families should be included in an IO? It seems that the 
composition of an IO has to be thought of in terms of the objectives pursued. If, for example, the principal 
mission of an IO is to establish agreements on prices between farmers and those involved in processing their 
products, then a “short” IO made up of two professional families (farmers and huskers, as in the case of the 
AICB) is appropriate. 
If the objective of the IO is to improve on the quality or the hygiene of a product along a production, processing 
and distribution chain, then the actors should work on a “long” IO made up of all the professional families from 
upstream to downstream in the supply chain.
What roles and place for the state?
When one considers the role of the government in the IO, it is possible to distinguish two major types of 
organisations: those in which the state is present (through elected local leaders or technical public services) 
and those made up solely by private actors. And of course even if the state is not officially part of the IO, it can 
weigh in on a lot of the decisions taken (this is the case for cotton and groundnut supply chain). Even if the IOs 
are private, the aim of regulating markets should be seen as a co-construction of rules, an expression of the 
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joint management of the markets and co-piloting by the public services and professional organisations.37
For the actors, the question is therefore not to know whether to include the state or not in the IOs, but rather 
to know how to reach a situation of joint management between the state and the professionals. For this to 
happen, many types of structures have been put in place.
In Senegal, meetings of the “Onion Committee”, organised by the Market Regulation Agency (subordinated 
to the Ministry of Commerce), allow farmers’ organisations and importing traders to consult in order to limit 
price declines due to competition between local and imported onions. Each year, these consultations and 
dialogue between the professionals and the state lead to freezing some imports throughout the local onion 
production season. 
In the Senegalese poultry supply chain, the two private interprofessional organisations – the Federation 
of the actors of the poultry sector (Fafa) and the National Union of actors of the poultry sector (Unafa) 
– played an important role in lobbying the state services and regional authorities of ECOWAS, in response 
to the increase in poultry meat imports. These demands were the subject of discussions in inter-ministerial 
meetings, which finally led to introducing fiscal and customs measures (poultry inputs exempt of VAT since 
2002, a hygiene-based embargo on poultry meat imports since 2005).
How are the decisions made?
Like any other organisation, IOs have to make decisions (for example: define prices). One of the specificities 
of IOs is that they bring together different families of actors (e.g. farmers, people involved in processing 
products, distributors) and thus their interests may differ or diverge. This means that each family of actors 
(farmers in particular) has first of all to agree among themselves in order to speak in one voice before they 
can negotiate with other families of actors. For this to happen, the actors are first of all organised within their 
families, preferably prior to setting up the IO.
How representative each family’s delegates are is another important question that emerges. In the case 
of an IO where decisions can carry nation-wide obligations or in which decisions can be made mandatory 
for the whole country, it is important for the member actors to be representative in order to increase the 
chances that the decisions will be accepted, and above all implemented and complied with by everyone. 
In other interprofessional bodies, the agreements reached only apply to the participating actors and thus 
representativeness is not an issue.
In their very nature, IOs often bring together actors of the supply chain whose interests are generally not 
aligned. The decisions of the IOs often require long negotiations and usually lead to compromises in the 
various positions. Representation in the IOs frequently takes place via colleges: each professional family 
has a college and each college has votes during elections (the numbers in each college may vary from one 
family to another). For the decisions taken to be enforceable, they have to be recognised and accepted by all 
the professional families. That is why in general, decision-making in IOs requires unanimity of the colleges 
rather than a simple majority.
What are the means and modes of financing?
In terms of modes of financing, two main categories of IOs can be distinguished:
l  those in which the strong degree of concentration of a professional family in the supply chain constitutes 
a “necessary” passage point for the products and where it possible to foresee deductions of contributions 
for the operation of the IOs (the case of supply chains where products are processed or exported by a 
small number of operators);
l  those in which there is no “necessary” passage point for the products and in which other modes of 
financing have to be foreseen (i.e. unprocessed grain supply chains or supply chains in which there are 
many actors at different stages). For the latter, the question of funding is not solved. Most of the IOs are 
put in place as a result of external (project) funding and end up without sufficient financial resources at the 
end of the projects.
No set answers
Interprofessional frameworks are specific modes of organisation, which require many preconditions. They 
are thought of collectively by the actors in terms of their usefulness, effectiveness and complementarity 
37 Régulation des marchés agricoles au Sénégal : entre arbitrage et gestion concertée / G. Duteurtre et I. Wade. – GDS n°41-
42. p 35. - Inter-réseaux, 2008. – 2 p.
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compared with other types of organisation (cooperative, FOs, etc). There is no single model framework 
or single approach to the creation of interprofessional organisations. The solutions raised in terms of 
interprofessional organisations differ depending on the contexts and supply chains.
Constructing collective processes takes time, involves trial and error, compromises and adjustments 
around strong nuclei (“builders” of the IO). There are no set responses. An IO will have the best chances 
of succeeding if it is built around a “strong nucleus” of the main actors in a supply chain, organised into 
organisations, motivated and grouped around common challenges; the different families of actors can listen 
to each other, agree, and find the necessary tools to be able to “play in concert”.
Families in agreement “playing in concert” (Samson, 2009)
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Lessons 
from the participatory analysis process
on local initiatives
CHAPTER 3
132 133
Beyond the comparative analysis carried out by type of action in Chapter 2, 
other across-the-board lessons can be drawn from the case studies. There 
are two types: (1) lessons on collective marketing actions; 2) lessons on 
the process/approach and tools used to analyse and share these concrete 
experiences.
1) Lessons from the collective marketing actions: the initiatives that have been 
studied show that FOs provide much-needed services. They enable farmers 
to access markets on better terms (re-establish a balance in power relations, 
reduce risks and transaction costs, etc.), and/or derive better value for their 
products. This is especially the case when the farmers have an understanding 
of their socio-economic environment (supply-demand relation, price 
determination in different types of markets, the role of the value chain actors 
and of rural development actors, etc.). It is also true when farmers reinforce 
relationships among themselves over time, but also with other local actors by 
making use of their know-how and respective networks.
In this regard, it was observed that, even when they have the resources, FOs 
are not necessarily more successful than processors, transporters, traders, or 
even individual farmers at carrying out certain marketing related activities.
Recurrent factors of success and failure observed in the initiatives of FOs are 
also illustrated: some are related to marketing activities while others relate to 
collective actions and to the functioning of FOs in general. These lessons are 
not new; highlighting them here only serves as a reminder, knowing that the 
idea here is not to present “best practices” that should simply be replicated in 
other places.
2) Lessons on the process and tools: different tools were used in the process 
to analyse, capitalise on and discuss concrete cases: carrying out field visits, 
feedback forms, videos and audio tapes on the experiences and exchange 
workshops. The usefulness of these tools was above all due to their being 
employed at different moments as complementary aids during a process that 
had already been completed. This process not only focussed on the tools 
(number of tools produced or participants in the workshops), but on a genuine 
process of communication of the experiences.
These tools can be further improved and need to be each time adapted. 
However, because their production and use took root in a long process in line 
with the dynamics of local actors, it was possible to share the cases diligently, 
debate them collectively and in so doing, ensure their use by actors to continue 
the construction of collective reflections for action. In this sense, they are 
useful support tools. 
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1 – ACROSS-THE-BOARD LESSONS FROM THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF 
FO ACTIONS
Beyond the lessons (or the questions, to be more precise) highlighted by the different types of actions 
presented in Chapter 2, recurring failure and success factors were observed in most of the collective 
actions of FOs that were studied. The lack of membership, commitment, or even discipline by some 
farmers is frequently mentioned: broken commitments, opportunism and individualistic behaviour 
(sales of products to ambulant collectors who are less demanding about quality, cash payments when 
prices increase, etc.) without considering the consequences for the FO and its commitments to traders 
(quantities, quality, dates, etc.).
If the farmers benefit from the services of the FOs to which they feel more or less attached and 
committed, the cases studied show that “dissident” behaviour can be minimised. Three types of success 
factors can be distinguished: those related to the types of actions chosen by the FO (and/or the support 
organisation); those related to the manner in which the actions are implemented; and those related to 
the structuring of the FOs.
1.1 – Success factors related to the actions chosen and the objectives of the FO
Implementing actions that meet analysed needs in a reliable manner
A first trivial point, but which in fact is not always checked, is the suitability of the action chosen for 
the needs of the members of the FO: collective actions of FOs are “sustainable” and respected by the 
farmers when they meet their needs and benefit them. Indeed, there is often a gap between the needs of 
the members and the marketing actions that are put in place. Are grouped sales, transport, purchase-
storage or market information systems always the most relevant measures when the immediate credit 
needs of most of the members have to be met?
FOs that implement actions too hastily (often under the influence of external funding) are often doomed 
to fail. Inadequate consultation with members results: (i) in demands and unrealistic expectations 
from the farmers vis-à-vis their FO, (ii) in the system being set up too hastily and (iii) in difficulties 
carrying out activities collectively in the future (for example: an FO that obtains temporary external 
working capital purchases its members’ products at prices higher than market prices without taking into 
consideration the costs of storage).
In the cases that have been studied, the actions that “succeed” are those resulting from the analysis 
made by the FO – often after the fact, unfortunately – of the failures encountered in previous actions. 
These failures force the FOs to review or scale down their ambitions or in any case to plan more realistic 
collective actions: the “problem” of marketing is therefore “broken down”; and is no longer taken in 
its entirety, and therefore much more targeted solutions are explored to solve specific problems. Each 
of these solutions may appear “small” but in fact their diversity and complementarity contribute to the 
success of the FO.
The role of the leaders and staff of the FOs is crucial. Their understanding of the basic mechanisms of 
market operations and how prices are determined (for farmers and buyers) is a prerequisite. Information 
on prices, supply, and the demand of buyers and consumers is necessary but not enough. They also need 
to have the ability to analyse this data.
Anticipating negative effects or predictable constraints
Farmers are not the only actors at the local level or in the value chains. Whatever collective action 
they initiate can undermine existing power relationships and well established socio-economic powers. 
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Resistance may come from traders who try to destabilise the collective actions – in particular by co-
opting farmers with financial advances. It may also come from farmers who do not identify with the 
collective action.
In the cases studied, when the activity put in place by the FO competes with those carried out by other 
actors of the value chain and the risks of resistance are not fully taken into consideration, failures are 
often to be expected. Farmers are the ones who bear the consequences: loss of products, time, money, 
motivation and destabilisation of the collective dynamic…
Farmers dream of there ideal FO (Stew, 33, 2005 GDS)
Implementing actions where the FO contributes greater added value than other actors 
Farmers frequently feel robbed by other actors in the value chain, traders most of all. This is often the 
result of under erroneous assessments of the activities and risks that other actors in the value chain are 
taking or over-estimating their expected benefits. Additionally, farmers are tempted to get involved in 
the activities “in place” of these actors.38 
The examples studied show however, that FOs cannot always offer better services to their members 
than other actors that are present in the value chains. This leaves the door open for dissident strategies 
from members. On the contrary, examples show outstanding results when the roles and complementary 
competencies of each type of actor are leveraged, with traders, processors and transporters who are not 
boycotted “in principle”, but considered as useful economic actors.39
It is therefore not always in the interest of the farmers – far from it – to have their FOs assume new 
functions “in place” of traders, processors and/or existing transporters. Farmers have to ascertain the 
advantages and risks of involving their FO in the implementation of an action: can it do better than other 
existing actors in offering the same type of service? Is it more relevant for the FO and its members to 
38 Studies show that: (i) volatility in the prices of cereals is much higher in local markets than on the international market, 
and (ii) if there is great instability in the endogenous markets, price variations at the production stage are closely reflected in 
consumption prices in many cases (good price transmission). This means that traders fulfil their commercial function without 
excessive margins to the detriment of farmers or consumers, and therefore, that they are not such tremendous «speculators » 
(Daviron, Cirad, 2008).
39 Examples of Mogtédo in Burkina Faso, Nowefor in Cameroon, or the self-managed cattle market in the North of Benin.
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engage in new transport, processing and distribution activities, or better still to improve on the existing 
activities (production of quality products, more reliable and consolidated contracts with other actors, 
etc.)?
Implementing actions where the FO contributes greater added value than individual members
In the close-knit environments where FOs operate, there are often no other actors who can offer farmers 
the services they need. Should the FO then nevertheless provide these services?
Examples show that it is sometimes better and more effective to allow the individual farmers to carry 
out some tasks than to want to organise everything at the level of the FO. For example in Mogtédo, 
members of the cooperative decided to allow individual farmers to sell the volumes and quantities of 
rice they wished in the local market. Nevertheless, the FO contributed by “organising” this local market 
in a manner that enabled the individual farmers to sell more of their rice.
When collective actions are very risky, it is sometimes preferable to allow the farmers to take actions 
by themselves and not to struggle to “carry out the actions collectively” at all cost. This is often true in 
particular when the socio-economic environment is very unfavourable or very volatile (pressure from 
other actors, intervention by the state or donors).40 It is also true in food crop supply chains where large 
volumes of products are sold not because the farmers want to sell but because of their immediate need 
for money.
Choosing diversified, complementary actions rather than focusing on “a single miracle 
action”
We have seen in the cases studied that collective actions of an organisational nature are often very 
effective for farmers. These actions generally require very limited material investments. On the 
other hand, they are very complex and take a long time to put in place because they affect not only 
the individual and collective management capacities within the FOs but also those of other actors. 
For example, actions promoted by the FO to improve the transparency and functioning of the market 
may undermine existing power relations (with respect to the traders, traditional chiefs, finances of the 
municipal council, etc.). Dialogue, negotiations and lesson-learning over time are necessary.
Organisational / economic measures
In many cases, if the FO is not well organised and fails to work with other actors of the value chain, 
the economic actions that are financed will crumble at the end of the project due to internal problems 
in the FO (insufficiently rigorous or transparent management, unrealistic behaviour with respect to the 
market, etc.) or to the renewed power of actors excluded from the marketing system (traders).
Many FOs studied did not succeed because they only focused their actions on a single type of function or 
activity, whether economic (provision of inputs, grouped sales) or organisational (information, advice, 
training, market organisation). FOs that carried out a variety of actions to solve the difficulties and 
face the risks in the market responded better to the needs of their members over time. The marketing 
actions put in place were seen more as tools to respond to the needs of the members rather than as ends 
in themselves or as readymade solutions that could be imposed.
Time-consuming organisational activities given the composition of FOs
Organisational activities (the type of activity related to improving the circulation of information or work on 
supply management in the local market) are difficult to put in place within FOs for a number of reasons: 
-  farmers are not all the same. The same farmer may have different strategies depending on the various 
40 In the local supply chains in particular, given that they are more easily destabilised than imported product supply chains 
where the traders are more organised and few in number. Examples: fixing and control of seed prices by governments and 
control of the prices of basic food commodities, subsidies for consumption, food distribution by the WFP in local markets…
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agro-ecological and socio-economic conditions they encounter and the production systems they 
develop as well as climate forecasts or their family situation;
-  farmers do not only have economic needs: they also have social expectations vis-à-vis their FO. This 
places the FOs in a situation of mediation, which is often not easy between members (in principle, 
beneficiaries of the services put in place by the FO) and “external” partners (traders, banks, donors…), 
who are certainly focused on the economic aspects.
-  given the diversity of the members in terms of their expectations as well as geographically, dialogue and 
communication within the FO over time is necessary to define actions that will be accepted and to which 
all members can adhere. Arbitration is necessary because all the members cannot be equally satisfied 
(for example in defining specifications on the types of products and qualities expected or in negotiating a 
price or a date to bring products to the market, etc.). 
Economic activities: challenges for sure
Many support organisations finance economic activities (related to transport, storage, processing or 
grouped marketing) which present a number of advantages:
-  they are more visible and faster to put in place : the purchase of a vehicle or setting up working capital 
makes it possible to quickly disburse large sums of money; 
-  they mobilise farmers and have a unifying effect at the FO level: for example it is easier to mobilise 
farmers (and donors) around a storage facility than to work overtime on the management of supply or on 
the organisation of multi-actor agricultural fairs;
-  they are focused on a single type of actor: Effort is concentrated at the level of the FOs without other 
actors.
1.2 – Success factors related to the manner in which activities are carried out by the FO
The marketing actions put in place are shared by the members
The collective dimension of the vision and project of the FO is crucial. There is no “innate” collective 
spirit on the part of farmer members of the FO. Cooperation is built around shared objectives but 
also around collective actions that have been tried over time. The members are not the same (farmers 
differ in terms of their production systems, constraints and expectations) and they must learn to work 
together. 
To make all their expectations converge, it is important to ensure internal dialogue, circulation of 
information, resources to generate awareness, understanding and sharing of the collective marketing 
actions by the entire group (principles, rules and justifications).
The case studies show that these apprenticeships take time: many years and even decades. The situations 
appear to be “easier” when production is relatively localised in a given area (an irrigated area, a valley, 
etc.) and where the farmers have succeeded in working together on various occasions (preparation of 
the farm plots, water management, etc.). These actions around production are good stepping-stones to 
get to know each other and work together around the marketing of products. 
Words of a farmer
“When you tell a farmer “I will market your production”, chances are he will not be happy after you do 
it. As a result of several unfortunate experiences, we have decided to adopt a marketing approach that 
involves everyone and is clear to everyone. We have highlighted the benefit for members rather than for 
the cooperative. This made it possible for them to mobilise and really stick with the process of market 
reorganisation”.
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The actions put in place involve rules and binding control systems
Is it enough to want to be together and accept the principle of mutual interests and the risks involved in 
a collective action for it to work? 
Collective actions for marketing products are easier to put in place when, in addition to a common vision 
of the aims of the actions considered, there are also clear rules that are shared and frameworks that make 
it easy for them to be implemented (e.g. a single sales site in the market). These frameworks help to 
limit temptations and dissident behaviour by the farmers (when an isolated trader makes a counter-offer 
for example) and thus facilitates the consolidation of the collective actions. This can be done generally 
through the use of penalties for failing to comply with the quality standards or commitments on the 
quantities to be supplied. 
Members may adhere to the collective action voluntarily, but it appears more reliable when the members 
have a “binding” commitment to participate (which may be financial or a condition for access to credit). 
In many of the case studies, collective action was strengthened by the involvement of other regional 
actors (local groups, traditional chiefs, and police) or value chains (traders associations, interprofessional 
organisations, etc.). Nevertheless, a collective action defined in a very rigid manner also increases the 
risk of failure and dissidence… thus the need for a certain amount of flexibility.
Actions put in place that provide for some flexibility and possibilities for renegotiation 
For the collective actions and the rules to “hold”, they have to be realistic with regard to the diversity 
and differentiation of the farmers themselves. The latter are not only farmers: they have families, they 
engage in many activities that are not always agricultural (private trading, salaried work, etc.) that may 
compete with or destabilise the collective action, and they also have different capabilities for coping 
with risk.41
Moreover, if disciplinary measures are necessary, the case studies also reveal that the collective actions 
are more viable when the possibility of appeal and a certain amount of flexibility are provided for. 
This flexibility is indispensable particularly in very fluctuating contexts when the prices agreed upon 
beforehand can no longer hold when the contract has to be implemented, whether for the farmers or for 
the traders. In this sense as well, the diversified strategies of the farmers (diverse marketing options, 
different buyers, etc.) contribute to their success.
That said, for some collective actions, introducing “rules and systems that are binding and flexible at the 
same time” would appear to be impossible when the organisation/structuring of the farmers is too weak 
or the socio-economic environment is volatile. This has quite sensibly induced some FOs to retreat from 
carrying out certain collective actions, considering it was better for the farmers to act by themselves 
rather than to try in vain to lead collective actions that could not work (grouped sales for example).
The actions implemented involve value chain stakeholders and local actors in the region
Among the success factors, are the relationships that the FO can develop with other actors of the 
territory, markets, value chains, public services and local development in general. These links can 
contribute to better distribution of the risks and/or power monopolies:
•  the work done between the FO and other actors of the value chains and markets provides a better 
understanding of markets and how they work. This can also contribute to concerted definition of 
standards and trade rules;
•  the local authorities and traditional leaders can take part in defining and controlling the decisions 
made by the farmers for the benefit of a wider public by extending the benefits derived from FO 
organisation throughout the local economy: larger volumes traded in the market, better prices, 
41 Leaders selling their own products and those of other farmers.
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greater purchasing power for farmers, financing social activities; 
•  partnerships and alliances with actors involved in training, research, extension work, decentralised 
state services or civil servants of ministries also strengthen FOs. Farmers who do not have the means 
to do everything, are often in need of these alliances. Where they exist, they are frequently very 
effective.
1.3 - Certain success factors related to the structuring of the FO
The FO has the means to implement its actions and make good use of its resources 
By analysing the history of longstanding FOs and their multiple trials and struggles, one sees that by 
seeking to undertake many activities without a proper assessment of the competition and the risks 
involved, many FOs have lost out. FOs are not necessarily ready to carry out any new type of activity 
(transport, processing). To take charge of new activities can only be realistic for the farmers if the FO is 
quite robust and able to manage and make decisions that are collectively honoured.
Because of lack of competencies, FOs do not often deliver on expectations and many of them have 
been destabilised to a greater or lesser degree at some time in their existence by actions that were 
managed poorly. Sometimes with the encouragement of support organisations, FOs set very unrealistic 
objectives without any knowledge of the difficulties involved. For example, the strategy of the farmers 
to develop activities in place of intermediaries is not always realistic given their real capacities to take 
on new functions, finance them and manage them collectively (while faced with attempts by the same 
intermediaries to destabilise those activities). 
The members of the FO benefit from services but also assume responsibilities
Farmers may view their FO as an opportunity among others (good purchase prices) and try to benefit 
from its services without feeling they have any corresponding obligations. These individuals are 
therefore “users” rather than “active” members of the FO, and they do not feel committed to complying 
with a given quality, quantity or delivery dates, or to participating in the social life of the FO. This can 
certainly only weaken the collective action and even beyond it, the FO itself.
While the FO provides services to its members, the members also have obligations: among others, to 
participate in the life of the FO, to build a common vision to defend beyond their individual activities, 
and to respect the commitments that have been decided collectively. Through lack of understanding 
or interest in collective action, the relationship between the farmer and the organisation may be seen 
by members as demanding and the FO perceived merely as a necessary intermediary (especially when 
there are no other service opportunities in the market). 
This brings to light the question of the balance between individual and collective interests, with the 
good of the whole being greater than the sum of individual interests. Communication between members 
at the base and the leaders is essential. The role of the technical teams is also essential in the quality of 
the information and training given to the members to help them and their leaders make decisions in a 
more realistic, serene way.
Leaders play their roles
The leaders who are farmers themselves may commit to unrealistic demands. The FO is plays the role of 
an intermediary between farmer members and rural society (farmers have families and live in connection 
with other activities and rural actors), on the one hand, and other economic actors in the value chains, 
rural and local development actors (policy makers, support organisations, etc.) on the other.
However, to legitimate their power positions, the leaders may want (have) to offer better terms than 
the market can provide and have problems ensuring votes on decisions that “disappoint” members with 
unrealistic expectations. Their role is not always easy.
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The staff of the FO are trained and carry out activities for the members’ benefit
The role of the staff of the FO is not simple: their positions depend on the elected representatives and it 
is not easy to bring the members and leaders to accept disappointing realities or defend positions that a 
priori may be less advantageous for the members in the short term, though more realistic in the medium 
to long term.
The technical teams at the level of unifying FOs are in a privileged situation in terms of access to 
information and contacts with trade, technical and financial partners. It is sometimes difficult for 
the FO to keep their skilled technicians once the latter have acquired a network of relationships and 
capabilities. How many people in charge of marketing in FOs have left for private organisations or to 
trade on their own account?
Although this situation is unavoidable (FOs’ limited resources do not permit them to pay high salaries), 
FOs can obtain the resources to better manage their human resources and the relationships between the 
elected leaders and staff. To put in place quality services for the FO and its members, other than the 
competent staff, it is also necessary to introduce tools for planning, steering-assessment and continuous 
feedback on the activities of the salaried teams in the FOs to ensure that they work diligently for the 
interest of the members, not only to control what the staff are doing but also to keep track of the 
achievements and the knowledge capital that has been acquired.
FOs: are they just like any other organisation? FOs have special functions
“The FO is not something alien. Members shouldn’t scratch it: it belongs to them, it is part of them. The 
FO is an organisation that also exists to empower the rural world, something companies won’t do. It 
provides other services that the private sector does not”
In fact, the FO is not an ordinary organisation that invests like a company depending on market 
opportunities and returns on the capital invested. It is an organisation at the service of its members, a 
social group, which may have economic as well as social needs. 
This brings up the issue of the balance within the FO between the economic (which can push the FO 
to work only with the most successful farmers for example) and social functions. It is necessary to 
highlight the expected results as well as the objectives to which the members are committed: this makes 
it possible to refer to them and to recall and/or issue reminders about the rules that must be respected.
1.4 - And after this, what should be done with these cross-cutting lessons from the 
case studies?
These lessons are not new: many were known even before starting this study42. To highlight them here 
is merely to recall them, knowing that the idea is not to present “best practices” that can simply be 
replicated elsewhere.
42 There are innumerable reports on the subject. Amongst others in the French literature:
On the role of FOs: Les organisations paysannes et rurales pour un développement durable en faveur des pauvres : – Thème 
n°1. Renforcement du pouvoir des agriculteurs et résultats de l’action collective. Note introductive Atelier de Paris / Mercoiret 
(Cirad), Minla Mfou’ou (Canadel). – World Bank, IFAD, MAE, MAP. – Octobre 2006, 14 p. (pour la préparation de Rapport de la 
Banque Mondiale 2008 « Agriculture pour le Développement ». Les organisations paysannes et rurales pour un développement 
durable en faveur des pauvres. – World Bank, 2008.
On FOs and marketing: Many works by Afdi, AVSF, Cirad, Gret, Iram, etc.
On methods of support to FOs: Les programmes d’appui institutionnel aux organisations paysannes en Afrique sub-saharienne : 
analyse et capitalisation de l’expérience de la Coopération française / Mercoiret, Pesche, Berthomé – MAE, DGCID, DCT, EPS, 
Cirad-Terra, Ciepac, Octobre 2004. – 53 p.
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Best practices to transfer do not exist!
“Best practices” do not exist. This depends on the context and which viewpoint is adopted. The 
viewpoint of the FO that is carrying out the action? That of the farmer who benefits from it? That of 
the donor or support organisation that supports the value chain or specific actions? Or that of the expert 
who analyses the initiative?
There are only practices that work in specific contexts to solve specific problems for specific FOs. Often 
it is a combination of “small things”, neither extraordinary nor innovative, that strengths the services 
offered by the FO.
More than just recommendations of “what needs to be done”: questions that need to be ask
This observation raises the question of the point of these general lessons. Rather than suggesting “all 
you have to do is…” or “there must be…”, these results shows the reason why the FOs and the support 
organisations need to acquire steering and evaluation tools that enable them to verify and ensure that 
the actions put in place are relevant. The box below gives examples of key questions that can guide the 
action towards better service for the benefit of the members.
Not best marketing practices to copy, but possible questions to ask when putting marketing     
actions in place
(1) The actions put in place by the FO:
§  respond to the reliably analysed needs?
§  take account of the negative effects or predictable constraints?
§  contribute more added value than those already offered by other actors?
§  are diverse and complementary without focusing on a “miracle action”?
§  have been discussed and agreed by members of the FO?
§  have clear rules and control systems?
§  leave some room for flexibility and possibility for renegotiation?
§  are carried out with other stakeholders in the value chain and local development actors?
(2) The Farmers’ Organisation:
§  has the means to implement its actions and makes good use of its resources?
§  is clear on its mandate?
§  has active members and leaders who assume their key roles?
§  has competent leaders and employees for the provision of quality service?
§  has systems to make the best use of its collective wealth of experience?
Approach directly inspired by the “quality criteria” reference developed by the URD group for humanitarian actions. In 
particular see “rose des vents” of Compas Qualité (www.urd.org).
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2 – APPROACHES AND TOOLS FOR SHARING THE CONCRETE CASES 
Beyond the results obtained from the analysis of the marketing initiatives (comparative-analysis in 
Chapter 2 and the across-the-board lessons above), what results do the local actors draw from the 
study-analyses, exchange tools and forums that require considerable involvement on their part? These 
participatory approaches are complex and take time to put in place, are time-consuming and clearly 
expensive (whereas human and financial resources are limited). These questions therefore deserve to 
be clarified. Lessons learnt from the tools and the communication media produced and used during the 
process of the Working Group are presented below.
2.1 - Workshops: spaces for exchange and communication?
Participants in workshops, if they are informed in advance, often arrive with among other information, 
a program that they have more or less the chance to read.43 In reality, even if they have read it, regardless 
of the topic or the audience (FOs, ministries, researchers, NGOs, etc.), the programme is often fixed 
well in advance and usually follows the same format (see box). What takes place in such workshops? 
What has to be said? What happens or remains afterwards? Who do they serve at the end of the day?
Traditional conduct of a very traditional workshop
1) opening: official speeches, presentation of objectives, logistics and guidelines.
2) successive plenary presentations (10-15 minutes by PowerPoint), for half a day; then the question 
of the rooms to which participants have to be assigned, answers to some of the questions (in half an 
hour at the most, since the opening session and the presentations have already taken more time than 
planned).
3) work in subgroups (or field visits), often with question grids to fill in and then back in plenary sessions 
where the rapporteurs try to summarise the work in 10 minutes.
4) conclusions and grand final declarations.
5) evaluation, often with generally polished, respectful satisfactory comments (with perhaps different 
viewpoints expressed during the coffee breaks, at least).
The result is often as follows: “presentations were too long, there is too little time for discussion, except 
during breaks but they were too short”.44 In general, very little is remembered from these workshops. 
Is it because they do not respond to the needs of the participants? Or is it because the format of the 
workshop does not give adequate room for discussion? Faced with these observations and questions, we 
tried to build a dynamic where workshops are only components – the visible parts - of a long process 
with a “before and an after”. 
To better exchange “during” workshops and ensure an “after workshop” result, we tried especially 
to improve the phase “upstream or before” the workshops by setting them within the context of local 
dynamics. A long process of support, exchange visits and the creation of tools was carried out with 
farmers. The first part of the work consisted in identifying the actors and local marketing initiatives. 
Thereafter, different forms of exchange (and in different languages) involving local groups were 
multiplied. The local groups analyse and discuss the concrete cases and prepare to present them. They 
then come to the workshops to share and to discuss them (in French).
43 In general the farmers are designated in the last minute and their availability often takes precedence than whether the 
theme of the workshop is adequate for them.
44 It is a pity given the numerous workshops which are organised. More so, this can contribute to disperse the energy of the 
farmers, encourage them to run after the workshop per diem and even destabilise the FOs by the dispersion of the leaders 
and their salaried staff. 
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During these workshops, the choice was made to allow for more room for discussion between participants 
and to make it the core of the meetings, with few formal speeches (which aid communication) and 
more time for group discussions. Thus, the shared time was put to better use and laid the groundwork 
for dynamics beyond the workshops. Field visits, videos and feedback forms produced before the 
workshops made it possible to share experiences during and after the workshops. Lessons are learnt 
from the different tools.
2.2 – Collective analysis trips to study concrete cases: essential and far-reaching work
The visits and analysis carried out in the field by local actors prior to the workshops are long 
processes presenting varying organisational problems depending on the availability of farmers, local 
accommodations and the means of communication and transport deployed.
This time is important and necessary for the work to be focused on the concerns of the local actors as 
well as on the dynamics of the FOs, so that the feedback analysis carried out by these groups should be 
a process of collective apprenticeship. Time is needed “before the visit” to identify groups engaged in 
marketing experiences and/or interested in the Working Group’s process. Thereafter, time is needed so 
that the local groups can:
•  do the work according to their calendars: set up the groups, organise, carry out field visits and 
produce the first analytical notes;
•  understand the key items of the experiences studied, fill in missing information with return trips to 
the field when necessary, exchange with the support structures involved;
•  produce the exchange tools on their experiences, which are needed afterwards to carry out comparative-
analysis and help gain a sense of perspective with regard to the specificities of each case.
Difficulties therefore exist. They can even discourage organisation and follow-up on the process 
involving local actors before the forums. It is much easier to limit the work to evaluation studies and 
analysis of “best practices”, which are done by experts faster and apparently less expensively.45  
But we have to be clear about the results we wish to achieve. If the objective is to have an evaluation 
study quickly so as to be informed about what is happening in the field, one might be satisfied with 
the second option (to use experts). On the contrary, we should be sceptical of the “external synthesis 
provided during a workshop” formula, if we expect the actors be able to change their practices. Because 
the process of collective apprenticeship is also an integral part of the results to be obtained and this 
necessitates specific means in terms of time and human resources.
Within the framework of the Working Group, efforts by farmers and support teams (with the associated 
financing) did not go in vain. The lengthy phase of visits and capitalisation were occasions for multiple 
exchanges between actors (sometimes in the local languages) and was a very important step in the 
process of collective apprenticeships.46
For the farmers who capitalised on their own experiences and /or other experiences visited, and who 
took part in designing the exchange tools, the process led to self-reflection (mirror effect) and to 
improving their ability to represent themselves and present their story and their situation. This is the 
first result. Though it is difficult to measure according to the classical criteria for project evaluation, it 
has to be taken into consideration.
45 In reality, one can question the usefulness cost of a workshop whose effects are very limited…
46 In Benin, Cameroon, Guinea and Mali between 2004 and 2006.
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2.3 - Videos: powerful tools to enhance exchange and support debate
Videos produced to share the practical experiences of actors have shown enormous potential. They 
contain, in some 10 to 20 minutes, more information than a long report. The power of the image makes 
it possible to reconcile in a single time and place rich experiences that are sometimes located in very 
geographically distance places: this allows more people to access it. Since it is often difficult to move 
many farmers to watch an experience, the video makes it possible to take home the experience, its actors 
and their voices.
Video has characteristics that make it an undeniable asset to bring life and reality to the experiences of 
others: we see and hear. “It is clear, the videos of the marketing experiences (like producing pictures 
and PowerPoint presentations), bring added value and make wider and better participation possible 
not only at the level of grassroots farmers but also the leaders of the FOs. The farmers participate 
more fully since that it is more “visual” and concrete and in seconds it brings a change to the many 
workshops in which they take part each year”, according to a facilitator of the forum in Bamako.
In our experiences, when the phase “before” the production of the video involved local actors (farmers 
and support NGOs) to a considerable degree, the video was later on circulated and used “alone”. This 
joint construction of videos, following a process of voluntary participation, takes more time than when 
the video is commissioned to a communication professional who “puts the finishing touches” on the 
video without any outside input.47 Moreover, there is need for skills and a specific attitude: it is not 
easy to find a professional who will take the time to understand the issues with the farmers and jointly 
construct the scenarios with them the way they want (see box 1). All the same, the videos are not miracle 
tools: the results depend on the manner in which they are used (see box 2).
 (1) What type of video production initiatives are we talking about? (S. Ouattara)
As the director of a private press agency working for more than 20 years in the production of press articles, 
photos, video, radio and television programs, and for the past five years in the training of young journalists, 
I like “doing journalism differently”. When we use the video tool with farmers, we are certainly working on 
journalistic genres, but the participatory approach we use is different from what a professional reporter would 
use, who works alone.
We proceed first of all by identifying the innovation in the field. It is the necessary step to understand 
upstream “what is our subject matter?”. This involves working with individuals and support organisations 
that are familiar with the experience: FO, NGO, projects or state development organisation. One has to go to 
the field, meet people, and understand their issues. After that comes the phase of deepening the reflection 
and determining the explanatory elements. This can be achieved by organising meetings between the FO, 
consultant, filmmaker and the support NGO. There can also be the examination of the case studies done by 
the consultant. When this is done, we can then proceed to the actual production phase i.e. the filming and the 
postproduction, which leads to the production of the video. 
This appears obvious, but still! How many videos have been commissioned and finalised without 
understanding the situation of the local actors? We can then ask whether the result is a “video for 
development” or “simply a video”. I never forget who I am; I try not to lose sight of values such as a balanced 
view, honesty (objectivity, on the other hand, I reject). In a world where communication finds itself everywhere, 
to keeping one’s focus is a constant battle.
Ref: Initiatives et réflexions d’acteurs autour de la vidéo pour le développement / Diagne et Sall (FONGS), Colin et Petit, 
Ouattara (Jade productions), Lothoré. – GDS 44, Inter-réseaux, 2008. – 2 p.
47 Inter-réseaux had many exchanges with leaders of FOs, support organisations (Amassa, Saild) and video professionals 
(Jade productions, Cespa) to jointly construct the scenarios. Feedback, experience sharing and construction of collective 
reflections: videos, tools inscribed in the processes; Guide to the video “Vidéo pour le développement ou vidéo tout court ?” / 
Colin, Petit, Diagne, Mbzibain, Ouattara, Sanogo, Lothoré – IR, 2008. – 24 p.
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 (2) Strengths and limitations of video to support development (l. Colin, V, Petit)
A current challenge is to put local populations back at the centre of thinking about their development and 
encourage approaches aimed at promoting “active partners” rather than “passive beneficiaries”. 
But for true dialogue and collaboration to be established, there is need for further leeway for each 
and every one to be comparable. If this ultimately leads to particular forms of political and institutional 
organisations, then it entails specific work on communication, which has justified the emergence of 
communication for development. This decision relies on the use of approaches, modern and traditional 
communication methods and tools, to facilitate discussions and the exchange of views between the 
people involved in a development effort. Among other media used, the video as a tool is again in the 
spotlight.
Video approaches
Depending on the case, video is used to achieve different objectives: lobbying actions, training, experience 
sharing and facilitating debate. Participatory video production options also make it possible to support 
co-expertise approaches, which aim to perform diagnoses, do follow-up studies and evaluations or plan 
development projects with the local populations. 
These video interventions are developed by NGOs (AVSF, Maneno Mengi, Deccan Development Society), 
donors (filmed evaluation of the Prey NUP project in Cambodia by the AFD), researchers (project 
Wademed in Morocco) or even farmers’ organisations. 
Although the renewed interest in the video is due in part to recent technological advances in this area, what 
are the real strengths and limits of video to support local development dynamics?
Benefits offered by the video tool
Videos have a number of advantages, first of all its accessibility: the oral nature of the messages make 
it possible to reach nearly everyone – particularly illiterate persons - and the images in themselves have 
a strong descriptive character; discussions take place around “factual reality”, generally (and often very 
quickly) seen by the spectator as objective proof.
Another major strength is how easily it can be reproduced and, by the same token, its potential for massive 
distribution. It also serves as a record of events, often leading the actors of a video to attach a strong value 
to their roles and invest time in their preparation – as if the fact that they are frozen on the tapes meant 
that their statements were irreversible. More broadly, the dissemination potential of video makes it a strong 
message-carrier, capable of facilitating vertical communication (see the Fogo Process of D. Snowden 
where the video put at the service of the local populations was used as a tool to represent and disseminate 
their development strategies) or horizontal communication for example during exchanges of experiences 
between farmers’ organisations.
The video also makes it possible to offer local actors, new spaces for expression that can be qualified as 
“direct” and “secure”. “Direct” in the sense that, once the interview has been filmed, and by avoiding 
the anonymity of the information, it reinforces and strengthens the credibility it is given by the spectators: 
the latter feel they have received first-hand information. “Secure” because the video can guarantee 
the expression of certain groups, especially the most marginalised, and therefore where the interviews 
create opportunities for expression: their dissemination during debates helps open up the dialogue to new 
participants.
Used in a participatory manner, video plays the role of a mirror, and therefore favours work that is based 
on reflections, appropriate for retrospective assessments for each and everyone with regard to his/
her arguments and behaviour within the local system. Finally the use of video is relatively original and 
interesting compared to the fascination television brings to the four corners of the world. This was clearly 
highlighted during a participatory diagnosis that was carried out using video in the Office Zone of Niger with 
the participation of Malian farmers: 
“The projection of the video helped to encourage people to express themselves during the meeting. We 
also learned many things from it {  } without the video we would never have had this type of information. 
Many of us attend meetings but do not understand what is actually taking place. This time, when we 
watched the video, everybody then knew what had to be discussed”.
They come to us and we hold meetings. Or they invite us, and then we speak and they write. But if what 
you say is not what they think, they will not write it. Never. Many people take part in these meetings, but 
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what you say is translated into French. With the video you are seen and heard, nobody can transform what 
you have said”.
The limitations of video
It is clear that the production of videos cannot directly solve the problems of poor nutrition, access to water 
or low incomes. We sometimes observe the frustration of the populations when a camera is introduced; 
when they would have preferred a well (see the analysis of Braden and Huong on the use of video in 
Vietnam). The interventions must be able to identify projects that can be effectively supported by video, or 
honestly acknowledge cases where the media does not have its place. 
In the development context, video as a product is hardly an end in itself. It is how the video is used and its 
incorporation into a more global approach to feedback and dialogue that makes it possible to evaluate its 
different strengths. It is important to carefully distinguish the real impact of a video intervention (medium-
term measure) from the momentary excitement it can generate. “The life of the video” after its production 
has to be the focus of attention. If not, are the spectators sufficiently prepared to see the biases inherent 
in the production of the video and to distinguish factual reality in this sense from what is shown in the 
video? Faced with an uninformed audience, the force of conviction conveyed by audiovisual messages 
can transform them into propaganda instruments. The video can therefore become a new source of power 
(depending on the influence that each person has on its content) and thus play a role contrary to its original 
purpose. It is therefore important to ensure that the spectators are capable of watching the video critically. 
On this subject, many precautionary measures can be taken including writing an accompanying/support 
guide that highlights the contexts in which the video was produced, possible leads for debate, possible 
comparisons with other situations, etc. (see video support guides Inter-réseaux).
The role of those making the video
These limits show the influence of the people involved in producing the video – who may or may not belong 
to the system of local actors. They should not only be audiovisual technicians but aware of development 
issues and have the necessary understanding of the subject. Our experience has shown the importance for 
the audience of having the video participants express themselves on the subject presented or discussed 
by the video, along with the honesty and humility of presenting their comments as one point of view among 
others. Objectivity is illusory, and it can even appear useful to voluntarily present issues from a generally 
specific angle and in a positive manner in order to help advance the debate. If this means a form of 
manipulation, then it should be conscious, exposed and controlled. The “communicator for development” 
considers the video process and its impact in terms of development the absolute priority, well ahead of the 
audiovisual product. No matter how enthusiastic the local actors or how much the time is devoted to its 
production, the video must remain what it is: a tool.
A final point concerns the Participatory Video process (VP). This can provide excellent results, mainly 
in terms of accessing how the actors see themselves, building self-esteem, empowerment, and starting 
dialogue… All the same, it cannot escape the general criticisms made against participatory approaches: 
socio-political and institutional conditions remain crucial for their implementation; the making of the video 
may be perceived as a lacking transparency by the participants; the know-how of the filmmaker is essential 
and they often lack a system of checks to guide the fieldwork. These approaches also raise the very crucial 
question of copyrights.
Video is not a miracle tool, but certainly a tool to be taken advantage of
The video is therefore not a miracle tool that could revolutionise development practices. However, if we 
recognise that poor communication penalises bottom-up approaches and is an important barrier to the 
emergence of an “alternative development” approach, then the use of video has a role to play in various 
situations. By providing possibilities for expression, video makes it possible to bring the viewpoints of the 
population to the public arena and even to create a counter-force – and perhaps this explains some of the 
resistance to the use of these approaches. It is a tool for socio-cultural opening up and a tool for exchange. 
It can facilitate establishing dialogue between different groups and in so doing, remove barriers – even 
if only temporarily – whether social, geographical or even temporal (time constraints). It can also help 
establish a form of continuous democracy. Nevertheless, depending on the case, other communication 
tools may be more appropriate. It is up to the communicators to identify them, taking into account local 
habits of dialogue and conflict resolution. Today it appears important to have tools that can help stimulate 
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joint reflection among development actors at every level of intervention. In this respect, feedback in the 
form of a video on development support activities, whether successful or not, seems quite appropriate.
Ref: La Vidéo Participative : outil d’accompagnement du développement local ? Étude de trois processus de concertation 
en Bolivie, en Équateur et au Mali / L. Colin, V. Petit – Thèse, AgroParisTech-Abies-Cirad Green, 2008.
Du potentiel réel aux limites de son utilisation pour l’accompagnement du développement : la vidéo, un outil qui fait débat / 
L. Colin, V. Petit – Contribution à Inter-réseaux Développement rural, 2008 – 4 p.
2.4 - And after the forums and workshops?
What happens afterwards depends on what happened beforehand...
Exchange visits and preliminary analyses and tools developed prior to the forums (feedback forms, audio 
tapes and video) made it possible for the actors, despite the short length of the forums, to clearly present 
their experiences not only with contextualised, descriptive aspects but also analytical information. 
Responding to the questions of participants was an important element during the process of forum 
deliberations by the farmers presenting their experiences (mirror effect). The presentations also 
facilitated exchanges and stimulated participant reflection. The concrete cases studied beforehand 
were effectively shared and discussed: at the end of the forum, most of the participants had a genuine 
understanding of the experiences and could carry out comparative analyses of the cases presented. 
After the forums, participants gave some “traditional” feedback - formal and short - to their “leaders” 
who had mandated them to take part in the forum. But many other meetings also took place, led by the 
participants using the aids obtained from the results of the Working group: these aids, and especially 
the relative mastery of their contents by the participants from the outset of the forum, made it possible 
to continue the discussion and support reflection within their FOs and support organisations beyond the 
forum and those who took part directly in it.48 The videos were used as support (the work of the session 
leaders facilitated by the feedback forms and the video support guides); other aids (CDs, audio tapes) 
were produced by the FOs based on existing ones for dissemination and were also used in other forms 
(radio) and in different languages.
Products and processes (Lothoré, 2009) 
1) Approach   
 focused on the  
 immediately   
 visible product
2) Approach   
 integrating 
 the processes
Workshop
(Large resources
spent in 2-4 days)
Processes
Occasional very visible 
workshops
mais ponctuel
not very real world,
with no prior or post-event processes
Workshop, 
shaped by local dynamics
as part of a long process
Workshop
Long processes 
prior and post the event
to exchange and co-produce
knowledge
48 CDs containing all the aids were given to each participant at the beginning of the forum.
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The media can even be downloaded from the Internet and they have been used in university courses.
The participants - those who participated in the preparatory phases of the workshop or in the workshops 
themselves - do not indicate the types of changes in practices that can be produced or that they can 
generate. However, there is evidence suggesting that new activities were observed in the field following 
ideas inspired from the FO initiatives studied and meetings in the field: agreements between farmers 
and traders, new mechanisms for price setting, changes in collective marketing strategies.
These changes in practices in the field are certainly not credited only to the work of the Working Group; 
other factors come into play. But by opening up the field of opportunities and references for the activities 
carried out by the farmers, the Working Group greatly contributed to these changes.
The example of the Cameroonian FO Nowefor is illustrates this (see box). Its recapitulates how the 
farmers and leaders of the FO viewed their participation in the Working Group and what they were able 
to gain from it. The FO participated in the feedback on its experience, first of all in a report and then 
in a summary sheet; these aids served to jointly construct the scenario to produce a video; the video 
was shown during the Regional Forum organised by the Working Group in Bamako; and thereafter, the 
members of the FO used the video to work within the FO and/or with potential partners.
Sharing marketing initiatives between FOs: experiences and lessons from the FO Nowefor
Upstream - meetings in large groups (national workshop in Cameroon, international forum in Bamako)
A team of leaders and staff of the FO Nowefor took part in the production of a video about their own 
experience in the management of supply at Bafut local market in Cameroon: working on the scenario, 
choosing the people to interview and seeking the views of Saild (Cameroonian NGO which has supported 
this FO for a long time). Saild made a contract with professional journalists to produce the video. Ever 
since, the technical team and the farmers of the FO Nowefor have shown the video of their experience on 
many occasions.
During the experience exchange forum in Bamako (2007)
Being able to present their own experience bolstered their capacity to communicate and discuss their 
experience. This made it possible for other participants in the forum to understand and effectively debate 
about the experience and consider it in relation to the other experiences presented: the self-managed 
cattle market in Benin and the market for rice farmers in Mogtédo.
After the forum
Nowefor farmers used the video within their FO network for internal communication and to make their 
experience known to a wider public. Indeed, their experience of supply management in Bafut was 
successful, but the issue regarding the system in place was the need to find more distant markets to sell 
local surpluses; this forced them to work on producing larger volumes… and thus with more farmers. The 
video in this case helped the farmers to make their experience known to other farmers in neighbouring 
zones and was used during support sessions as a means of inducing these farmers to work on the supply 
management issue as well.
The Nowefor team used the video to show their experience to other partners and aid organisations during 
forums to which they were invited. This helped make them better known and to strengthen them.
Each time, Nowefor has made many copies of the video using its own funds to disseminate it more widely 
(more than 300 people had seen and discussed the issues raised by the video a few months after the 
forum). The video was also shown on television in two provinces. In the example of Nowefor, the fact that 
local actors were used in the conception of the video allowed for “its appropriation”: they “saw themselves 
in it” and they used it to achieve their ends, and this helped to give the video a life after its production and 
presentation at the Bamako Forum.
Assessment of the process and the video tool
According to the then Coordinator of Nowefor, the process of feedback and discussion made it possible to:
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- discuss concrete practices with others who also presented their experiences;
- strengthen the capacity of the FO to communicate internally and externally (local authorities, traders, 
donors), to involve more actors in its initiatives, and to gain recognition from various quarters;
- have a direct impact on the activities of the FO, on the organisation of the market and on the prices of 
products.
Nevertheless, the video is not a miracle tool. There are limits and constraints to its use:
- the need for projection equipment and electricity;
- the need for a means to produce copies dubbed in local languages;
- the need for other simple written aids such as annotated posters in local languages that can be used in 
remote regions that do not have their own computers or video projectors.
Video is therefore, only one communication tool among others and has to be used with other 
complementary aids and discussion tools suited to local conditions and languages.
Ref.: Expérience de commercialisation du gingembre par Nowefor, organisation paysanne du nord-ouest (Bafut, 
Cameroun) – CTA, Inter-réseaux, Nowefor, Saild, 2007. – 12 min (vidéo) + Guide d’accompagnement (13 p.).
Farmer’s organizations sharing Farmer’s organizations experiences: Nowefor experience sharing, and learning from a 
process / Mbzibain (Nowefor), Lothoré (Inter-réseaux Développpement rural), Octobre 2008. – 10 p.
Valorisation of the video documentary on the ginger commercialization experience of Nowefor / Mbzibain, 2007. – 4 p.
2.5 – A variety of results according to the approach and tools used
Visible results
At the beginning of the approach, we defined formats for the sheets, videos and audio tapes in such a 
way as to make their use easier during the facilitation of wider collective reflection. We made changes 
during the process (mode of production involving the local actors, production of support guides to 
accompany the videos and facilitate reflections using this tool). In the end we were able to obtain:
•  co-production of information and analysis of agricultural product marketing in different forms: 
descriptive sheets, audio tapes, videos of the experiences, support guides for the videos; comparative-
analysis sheets for the marketing activities (chapter 2); across-the-board lessons in marketing and 
tools (chapter 3);
•  co-production of support tools to continue the debate over time, independently of the sporadic process 
of the Working Group: the aids pertaining to the experiences and analyses are still available. These 
aids do more than merely provide information on the existence of this and that experience (a one- or 
two-page article or a radio announcement can be effective for that). Complementing each other, the 
aids provide information “that speaks”, which can be shared relatively easily, and which can help 
facilitators/technicians or leaders to prepare other collective reflections during various events.
Necessary diversity of exchange aid formats
For writing, it is important to have different formats, for different approaches and periods of reading, and 
for different audiences: (i) very short format for a simple “sticker” (a few lines); (ii) short format to provide 
information about some characteristics of the activity of the FO (a page); (iii) format with more information, 
to go beyond factual information and to understand more analytical elements. Files of about ten pages, if 
they can be read by the technicians, staff or leaders (who are used to reading), are not appropriate formats 
for “grassroots” members. Also necessary are illustrated and/or animated aids, each of which can be used 
in its “own manner”.
Less visible results, related to the process
The approach and tools used in the analysis and feedback work had many important results:
•  they established a genuine exchange of experiences and communication between actors during many 
meetings (local workshops, national and international forums);
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•  they reinforced the capabilities of the actors to present and communicate their respective experiences. 
This is an essential point, to be able to work more effectively with the members internally, to improve 
the understanding of each member, but also to be able to work at the external level, in collaboration 
with other value chain, rural and local development actors;
•  to reinforce the capabilities of the stakeholders to share and discuss these studies more widely in 
order to find suitable solutions in view of their own contexts and specific needs and the specific 
characteristics of their products, their socio-economic environment and the structure of their FOs, of 
course. The participants go back with ideas and tools to continue debates collectively. This can lead 
(and has led) to new actions at their own level;
•  reinforce the advisory capabilities of the support organisations with respect to FOs. 
At the end of the process, we can say that these tools were aids that facilitated collective reflection. They 
should be used in a complementary manner by local actors according to their needs and their state of 
reflections on marketing.
2.6 - Recommendations for action
Is one tool better than another?
There is certainly no best communication-exchange aid. How they are used in a completed initiative 
(without confusing tools and ends) and the context of their use within the local dynamics is what counts. 
The idea is not to do feedback for its own sake.  
Feeding back on experiences?
The idea is not to do feedback just for the sake of it, but to meet and share, because what counts is the 
relationship with the other, and not partly true-partly false communication that is so common. 
The first role of feedback is that, instead of being limited to a point in time, the experience of an individual, 
an institution or a group of people becomes a source of building know-how for them, and therefore a 
structuring experience for those who have had them. 
The second effect is that by asking them or by obliging them to structure what they have drawn from their 
experience and to transform the know-how and the fruit of their experience, they become structured by 
themselves; they are therefore not only more effective in their actions but they build up know-how which 
can be transmitted to others.
Good feedback is one in which even the production of feedback contributes to setting the structure, the 
organisation, in motion. For this to happen, the association (the actors) must be involved in the task, [ ... 
] so that feedback on an experience will be the product of the actors of the experience, even if its final 
production is done by somebody from outside (support organisation). 
Source: Analyser et valoriser un capital d’expérience. Repères pour une méthode de capitalisation. Dossier coordonné 
par A. Ollitrault-Bernard, S. Robert et P. de Zutter, 2001
“How to do it” and “who does it” matters more than the occasional result of the feedback or 
communication aid produced (paper, web page video, workshop, etc.): “Within the framework of 
communication that targets development, the technical team must also be committed. The relationship 
between the technician and the person whose experience is being used to teach a lesson is what makes 
the difference. It is this complicity that can be the foundation for an aid that has a soul” (J. Kompaoré, 
Performances, Burkina Faso)
How do feedback and exchanges about initiatives work? How are the tools mobilised and used – or not? 
These issues are essential because communication is neither spontaneous nor immediate, even among 
people apparently speaking “the same language”: the approach is not visible, even though it contributes 
to the interest of the tasks carried out. 
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Put the actors directly concerned at the centre of the initiatives and tools
The general lessons are not important: some were already known even before the start of this work. The 
search for these types of lessons should not be a justification for launching studies (but then it is often 
what remains to be done). The issue is to start with the actors, farmers and concrete cases, to recognise 
their existence and enable the local actors not to put into practice the supposed or proposed solutions but 
to strengthen and reinforce their own possibilities for action. 
“Know-how does not mean knowing how to do, but what to do”.
Skills are often understood as the application of theoretical knowledge or practices or even as a set of 
abilities and personality traits. They are understood in terms of the situation. This is an analytical approach 
to skills, which is only defined by the sum of knowledge, know-how, and interpersonal skills. Describing 
skills here means listing them.
Skills, on the other hand, have to be considered as a process, enabling a farmer to make the connection 
between the combination of resources (knowledge, know-how, etc.), an action, a contribution to a result 
(service, expected product): the person (the farmer) has a wide margin of autonomy to organise, make 
decisions, adapt, react, innovate. This does not mean carrying out a particular activity conceived and 
prescribed from outside at a particular time. We count on the ingenuity, innovation and entrepreneurial 
spirit of the farmer – and therefore this must be recognised beforehand. This is what will guarantee the 
survival of the farm. It also seems just as pointless to try and judge past actions by the present, as it is to 
look to the past to find recipes for the present. On the contrary, recognising mistakes to avoid repeating 
them and help advance ideas and modes of intervention for the benefit of the wider rural population 
appears to be more than desirable.
Ref: Extract from Boterf Guy, Skills Engineering, Les Éditions d’Organisation,1998
Necessary evaluation of the impact of the studies, of feedback and of workshops
No matter what final declarations the workshop make or how many workshops are organised, WebPages 
and papers are published and videos are made: if they are not useful or used, they have no raison d’être. 
It is their impact that matters. But then, measuring the impact of the activities aimed at improving 
analytical capabilities and collective decision-making is difficult for a number of reasons (see box).
Difficulties in measuring the impact of capacity-building
Impacts can only be measured well after the completion of an action (it is impossible to assess the impact 
of a workshop at the time it ends). This is even truer of capacity-building for collective action. It is not 
enough to give relevant information to a member of a FO during a workshop or in a file (slip) for the FO to 
understand it. Beyond the individual understanding of the information, there is also the process of putting it 
to practice or into action. And when we work at the level of agriculture (annual production cycles which limit 
the number of times the action can be repeated and therefore mastered), and at the level of the FO (with 
differentiated farmers), this implies much time for information sharing and communication.
The impact is differed over time and conditioned by many other factors. Yet the impact of training or a 
workshop is hardly ever assessed many years after it took place.  
Should we not evaluate the capitalisation studies and the workshops? This will generally be expensive 
given the number of studies and workshops that were financed. Furthermore, if the impacts of studies/
workshops cannot all be measured, acquiring tools to evaluate them from time to time may perhaps 
lead to greater impact.
It is possible to think about evaluations that are not based solely on visible results (the number and 
quality of workshops or capitalisation as such), but also on organisational aspects and the processes 
that led to these workshops and capitalisation. These “process” aspects (how to capitalise, organise 
workshops, etc.) are essential but are seldom taken into account in the conception, implementation and 
evaluation of case studies. One element appears essential in these processes: the actors who directly 
concerned must be placed at the centre of the approaches and tools used. This is not the same thing as 
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the simple, mandatory declarations announcing that the approach and processes were “participatory”, 
which sounds as though it was pre-printed on headed paper. 
A number of possible questions can help clarify these aspects:
1) For workshops in particular:
§  are the priorities of people invited to the workshops respected (are dates scheduled according to the 
agenda of the organisers or participants)?
§  are the resources used and structured with the local dynamics in mind?
§  does the workshop take into account the capabilities, the information and knowledge of the participants?
§  is the structure of the workshop flexible? Does it take the audience into account?
§  are the participants prepared enough to be able to understand and discuss the information?
§…
2) For the feedback sessions in general: 
§  what objectives are targeted by the feedback sessions?
§  how are the actors involved in the feedback sessions?
§  are the types of feedback and the aids varied?
§  how will the feedback sessions be used after their production?
§ what means and methods are in place to ensure that they “live on” after their production?
§ …
Knowing that the expectations of organisers, participants, facilitators, and donors may be different, or 
even contradictory, the issue is to build a set of tools that are sufficiently diverse to cater for each and 
everyone. In this respect, one should give the imagination free reign: the formulas and formats of the 
workshops, aids or forms of communication have to be thought up anew each time, without forgetting 
the ties between the different tools.49
 
49 Example: the roving video-supported workshops. The concept of the roving workshops was borne within the Agricultures 
Paysannes et Mondialisation network. The idea is to bring together a group of key-persons and make them reflect together 
on a specific theme, around a series of field visits. Video support during these sessions makes it possible to structure 
collective reflections and to construct documents which facilitate continued reflections after the trip (see images on http:
//www.agter.asso.fr).
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SITUATION A
Questions
What are the value chains’ 
problems? What to finance?
SITUATION B
Answers and ideas
Collection of “Best Practices”
Recommendations. Models
(1)
Prepare  
analysis grids
(2) Expertise, 
advice (3)
Escalate 
data
Give comments
(4)
Feedback
Workshops
Local actors
(2)
Co-production
of knowledge
(1)
Facilitation of exchanges 
and linkages 
between actors
Local actors
SITUATION B
Actors who know 
each other
and are on the move
Expertise 
Advice
SITUATION A
Local actors
with problems
Experts who advance ideas and debates (Diagne, Lothoré, 2009)
Every step of the way, actors are on the move (Diagne, Lothoré, 2009)
Legend: Circles and text in green: local value chain actors
 Squares and text in red: actors (from the North or from the South) that support the value chain actors
 Arrows: linkages, exchanges between actors
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What should be retained from the whole process of analysing FO 
initiatives? What should be done with this whole store of experience for 
these local initiatives to be shared more widely?
The point here is not to draw general lessons. This will not bear fruit, 
and would even contradict the entire approach presented in this 
document, which aims to help farmers and their organisations find 
solutions suited to their diverse situations.
However, we are merely proposing some conclusions we have drawn 
from these experiences, whether they concern FO marketing initiatives 
or means and initiatives to reinforce their activities in this domain.
They can be summarised in a few points that may serve as reference 
for NGOs, or donors engaged in supporting FO collective actions in 
general and, more particularly, in their collective marketing actions:
- Successful experiences can rarely be transposed to other contexts or 
other areas. 
- The interesting aspect of most cases lies in the approaches, 
reflections and principles that induced the actors to make their 
choices and to construct/build their experience. 
- It is therefore preferable to multiply the number of initiatives that 
promote collective thinking involving the stakeholders, than to 
replicate and disseminate the results of the summary analysis derived 
from the case studies. 
- Particular attention should be given to failures and aborted 
experiences, which are as rich and full of lessons as the success 
stories. 
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1 - MARKETING BELIEFS
Improve marketing: key leverage
Marketing improvements can contribute to a significant improvement in farmers’ income. This should 
be considered the priority action. For example, a simple improvement in the system of measurements 
can improve a farmer’s income by an average of 10%. The returns from these types of activities which 
improve marketing conditions are often higher than those related to an increase in productivity or yields 
(more difficult to obtain).
Yes, Farmers’ Organisations are useful!
FOs provide essential services to farmers regardless of whether or not they are members of the FO that 
introduces the measure (for example, a farmer who is not involved in a FO will of course benefit from 
the organisation of the measurement system or the organisation of a more transparent market). 
These services facilitate market access and the marketing of agricultural products through a range of 
more or less complex activities. Recalling the activities covered in Chapter 2, we can list: providing 
technical information; improving the quality of products; grouping supply; market information 
(information on prices and volumes); introducing market operating rules and control systems; putting 
in place rules to limit measurement and price variability; local supply management; import barriers; 
collective bargaining; looking for market outlets and creating ties – contractual or not – between 
farmers and other actors in the value chain; building partnerships with other regional actors.
These services provided by the FOs re-establish a balance in power relationships between farmers and 
other actors in the value chains and help improve market functioning in general (circulation of products, 
supply to cities, etc.).
Diverse solutions: there are no “right” actions per itself
The activities of FOs tend to focus on the supply of products – the most characteristic is one in which the 
FO buys the products of its members and then tries to resell them. Others pay more attention to demand 
by targeting markets and actors and consequently adapting their farming practices and techniques 
(quality, volumes). Others improve on matching demand and supply.
In relation to the diversity of situations, these actions, which may or may not be undertaken 
simultaneously, can be carried out at different levels of actors’ organisations (FOs at the grassroots 
level, unions, umbrella organisations, traders’ organisations, multi-actors in interprofessional forums 
for dialogue) to access different types of markets (local, national and international). 
The areas in which these actions are valid are often defined by the particular context and specific socio-
political conditions. Implementing standardised actions is impossible: there is no readymade solution or 
one solution that is better than another. We cannot foresee the events and the situations that farmers will 
face. This always depends on the intrinsic characteristics of the agricultural products, on the situation of 
the FO and also on other actors in the value chains (in terms of organisation and structure) and potential 
partnerships. 
It is therefore often impossible to reproduce “what works for one FO” within another FO and it is 
necessary to recognise the specific features of each situation. This is an important problem for the 
implementation of projects or activities on a large scale. One must therefore acknowledge that a priori 
solutions do not exist and acquire the means to examine and analyse the “actual situations”, i.e. as they 
are viewed and experienced by the actors of these FOs.
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Received ideas are not always the best: Beware of prejudices!
We saw that the formula, which states: “the cooperative must buy now and sell later” is not always 
the ideal solution. “Shorten the market channels, take over the functions in place of other actors or 
intermediaries in a value chain to gain added value “, is also not always possible or beneficial to farmers 
and their FOs. “Traders are thieves” ignores the real services they can contribute (sometimes better 
than FOs). 
Their “opportunistic” behaviour makes them less reliable in the farmers’ opinion, but this may also be 
due merely to a changing, less certain environment; just as farmers may have individual opportunistic 
strategies, “despite everything”, due to a very limiting environment.
FOs are successful when they innovative and do not want to “do everything”.
In the cases studied, the FOs “score points” and their services and credibility vis-à-vis their members 
and their partners are strengthened, when, beyond a common vision shared by the members regarding 
collective measures, they succeed in (i) targeting services that respond effectively to the realistic needs 
of members; (ii) having the means and the comparative advantages over other actors (when they exist of 
course) to execute them; (iii) implementing clear rules with systems that are both binding and flexible 
so that they are respected.
Sometimes FOs engage in activities in which they have neither the means nor advantages compared 
with others who can do better than they can. Processing, marketing and transportation are professions 
that require techniques, know-how, finances and modes of organisation, which are neither spontaneous 
nor obvious. Moreover, FOs cannot easily substitute for these professionals.
It is not always appropriate for an FO to want to replace these actors and take charge of all these types 
of activities. On the contrary, the FO encourages and promotes positive dynamics for farmers when 
it facilitates relationships between them (the farmers) and the traders, transporters, processors, or 
research and extension actors by obtaining funds to lead these actions.
Changes of scale where they are not expected
We have seen that individual cases rarely repeat themselves nor do they abide excessive simplification. 
It is easy to resort to general lessons (one-size-fits-all), which are neither new nor very operational. 
This work shows that perhaps, by trying too hard to gain perspective and analyse the concrete cases in 
order to draw general lessons, even the relevance of the case studies can be lost. 
The case studies therefore are neither aimed at passing on general lessons or replicating them, which 
is less desirable. They can, on the contrary, serve as aids to fuel and facilitate discussions within the 
FOs and support NGOs to build customised solutions. Within each experience, some elements can be 
reconsidered to nourish these discussions. For example, well-documented case studies make it possible 
to change the scale in terms of advice-support. By introducing some of the elements from the target 
actors (farmer leaders of FOs and rural development facilitators), these studies give the former the 
capacity to build projects adapted to their local conditions and the latter a supporting role.
In the same way, a field visit reaches out to about 20 people (which is already a great deal in terms of 
logistics and the system in place to be able to share effectively); but when combined with the production 
of a video, it renders the case more accessible to a larger number of people. The change of scale does not 
lie in reproducing the concrete cases but in the capacity to multiply occasions to share and discuss these 
complex cases. The aids, which always have to be adapted, can be used to facilitate debates at different 
levels (local, national or regional). This means precautions must be taken with regard to the approaches 
and the tools that are mobilised.  
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Chains of related skills (Samson)
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2- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUPPORTING FARMERS
There is no readymade solution that can be transferred: based on the provision of inputs to marketing, 
farmers and their FOs have to make decisions, negotiate, arbitrate, make choices, react to hazards, 
innovate daily and take up responsibilities, invent, invest, organise and get organised. Farmers who are 
able to analyse their constraints, identify their possibilities, express their needs, exchange knowledge 
and strengthen their negotiation capabilities have better access to knowledge and relevant agricultural 
technologies. 
Furthermore, rather than merely recommending actions to carry out or experiences to copy, decisions 
must instead focus on principles and approaches to strengthen local dynamics. Following the work 
carried out, we can make a number of recommendations in this area to help local actors put together 
and build relevant solutions (especially, but not only, around marketing), by mobilising resources (theirs 
and/or those in the surroundings or externally) to carry out actions that target realistic objectives.
Put the actors back at the center of processes for much-needed collective apprenticeships
To be effective, farmers and their organisations have to appropriate the methods: analysing concrete 
situations of FOs and searching for a range of solutions by exchanging and discussing these concrete 
cases as well as experimentation. Therefore, it seems important to start with what is being done, from 
the concrete, the actual, and from its potential and constraints, not on behalf of the actors but with them. 
One cannot be satisfied only with providing external analysis and technical advice; it is important to go 
further and above all facilitate social dialogue. To enable local actors to organise, they have to be part of 
the process. At a time when communication is exploding, it is amazing to witness just how difficult it is 
for people to establish real contact with one another. Very little effort is made to get beyond individual 
concerns and modes of thinking. 
It is important to promote methods that reinforce social bonds, interactions between individuals and 
networks to allow an area to organise. The era of pyramid-like systems has evolved. Actors must 
be able to act on their projects locally and overcome the inevitable obstacles (elected officials, local 
authorities). The shift from the “benefactor” approach to one of “partnership” necessarily challenges 
certain existing power relationships. 
Open up a field of possibilities
A marketing experience implemented by a FO is made up of a series of decisions that have been taken 
by the leaders. For example, in the experience supplied by the Mogtédo cooperative in Burkina Faso, the 
cooperative members succeeded in “imposing” a unique point of sale in the market, the option to sell 
rice but not paddy rice (primary processing), control over weighing, etc.50 The methods and systems put 
in place look like a building constructed with “key pieces”. 
In each experience, the “chosen pieces” may be different. In one case an FO will prioritise the payment 
of advances for marketing; in other cases it will chose a system of “trade fairs”, a place and time for 
demand and supply to meet, or even the obligation to sell per kilogram instead of using traditional 
measurements. And, in each of the experiences presented for analysis or in feedback, we can see these 
differences: how the choices farmers and FOs made were driven by the conditions, contexts, degree of 
FO organisation and discipline as well as a wide range of factors and elements that only the actors can 
control.
50 After forceful discussions and multi- actor dialogue of course.
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The real advantage of this feedback lies in the possibility of giving the actors involved a better 
understanding of “each of these pieces”, in order to review the range of tools and options, control their 
consequences and therefore chose the solutions that are best-suited for themselves (and collectively). 
The Mogtédo cooperative was undoubtedly the most visited and utilised experience with the two videos 
and accompanying documents that were produced to make this experience better known. This never led 
to a “replication” of the Mogtédo case, however, although some FOs selected certain “pieces”, which 
they saw and analysed. 
In dealing with traders who travel and who are informed and involved in exchanges, farmers have 
long remained isolated with very limited access to information. The initiatives to analyse and receive 
feedback on marketing experiences make it possible to distribute the cards more fairly. They give 
farmers the possibility of thinking about the sale of their products differently.
It is better not to engage FOs in “one” type of quick, predetermined action, which is believed to 
correspond to what we consider good for an FO (e.g. buying members’ produce). The participatory 
feedback sessions should make it possible to open up a field of opportunities and discussions to construct 
locally adapted solutions. Once again, these feedback sessions have to “speak out”.
“Feedback for its own sake” or “feedback for development”?
It appears to be necessary to multiply the feedback sessions by directly involving the local actors. 
Farmers must in first be able to analyse and put their own experiences and those of their neighbours 
into perspective and question them. Support organisations, NGOs and researchers are also necessary 
to support and/or strengthen these dynamics with their external and/or new viewpoints: they can 
participate in facilitating and keeping abreast of collective thinking by supporting the organisation of 
exchange visits and the production of feedback aids as well as by facilitating retrospective assessments 
of experiences. 
The objective of the feedback sessions is not to do feedback “for its own sake”, nor to transfer a stock of 
“external” results that reveal which action is desirable. The goal is to create opportunities for collective 
reflection on the basis of concrete cases – what is done at home and what is done in other places – and 
comparisons to see what can be improved at home.51 The issue is about collective construction of 
know-how and shared knowledge so that later on people can engage (or become engaged) in collective 
actions. 
This participatory process may appear to be more expensive to carry out than external studies or 
“traditional” workshops, which are conducted in a short period of time. But in absolute terms this is 
not the case, since the results are not measured by a long display of reports on the shelves but by local 
dynamics that have been strengthened. The change of scale as such is not found in the multiplication of 
“external” case studies or workshops but rather in their effectiveness as long as they are part of a long-
term process involving local actors.52
Communication is not spontaneous: it requires specific resources
The knowledge of farmers – who are also marketing actors – can be useful to other farmers (and others 
as well). But for this know-how and knowledge to be shared or become shareable, there is no need for 
studies, debates, forums or workshops carried out in a preconceived manner using pre-established, 
standardised approaches. Indeed, communication is more than just spontaneous and immediate. It 
requires some detailed work, adequate tools, know-how (how to make and use the tools), human/
financial resources and time. 
51 Construire les compétences individuelles et collectives / G. Leboterf.
52 Even if a workshop or an occasional video is apparently not expensive in relative terms, it becomes so in absolute terms if 
“it does not have anything to say”, if it does not facilitate exchanges, or if they are not used.
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Strengthening the economic and organisational activities of FOs
The economic functions of the FO (organisation of storage, transport, processing, etc.) are the first 
things that come to mind because they seem easy to implement. But they are professions in themselves, 
which are much more difficult to carry out collectively (contrary to activities which private companies 
can undertake activities without having to consult members, which is the case for FOs).
Thus, it is important at each stage to verify the interests and comparative advantages of the farmers and 
their FOs before engaging in these activities and whether or not the members believe in and support the 
initiative. Marketing products through an FO is first and foremost a collective action, which requires 
compliance and collective engagement. During visits to the Mogtédo cooperative, the first remark of FO 
leaders who come to learn and see the experience is always: “They are disciplined here”.
Furthermore, since the environment keeps changing and new farmers continually bring their products 
to the market, a new problem emerges: financing the organisational process and permanent training 
to build capacities (for more rigorous and transparent management at the administrative level and in 
applying the rules). This has a definite cost. What can be done to cover these permanent costs? A 
balance is often sought between the economic activities – as long as they yield surpluses – (provisioning 
in inputs, grouped sales) and non-economic activities (information, advice, training, etc.). External aid 
remains necessary to strengthen the latter.
The simplest actions are often the most effective and sometimes improving what already exists 
(production advice, information on prices, weighing, information from traders on volumes available, 
specialisation in a few roles) can be more effective than taking charge of new, complex, risky functions. 
Strengthening productive capacities through technical advice and control of technical pathways to limit 
problems in terms of product volumes and quality in advance is an indispensable pre-requisite: many 
collective marketing actions carried out prior to dealing with production fail due to a poor management 
of the volumes, dates and quantities produced. 
Diverse types of support, not focused solely on FOs so as not to stifle them
While FOs are a key leverage point, they are not the only actors in the value chains or the territory. It 
may seem easier to stake everything on the FOs, but FOs hardly have the means to charge of everything 
issue and manage everything over time. The investments/support focused on the FOs makes it possible 
to support them for a while (by pushing them to substitute other actors), but in the long run this does not 
solve the core or fundamental problem.
It is therefore important to help other actors progress at the same time. What is the point of strengthening 
the FOs if the other actors are neglected and cannot live from their services? The strength of the 
measures also depends on their being accepted by various types of actors who have likewise been 
strengthened. By dividing up support more evenly and not neglecting other surrounding actors, it is 
possible to redistribute roles, leverage available skills and limit exaggerated positions of power (and 
weakness) based on too few FOs or often too few individuals leading them.
Financing is a problem not only for FOs but also for farms: short term “dissident” individual strategies 
resulting from life’s hazards, emergencies and farmers’ urgent monetary needs do not always favour 
collective marketing action and often seriously undermine these types of actions. Furthermore, 
strengthening diversified systems of credit and support to those with low revenues (short term credit to 
overcome specific difficulties, safety nets, etc.) can help reinforce FO marketing actions.
Set aside time for collective learning: a gradual, incremental process
Another observation is that changes do not occur immediately: they may take a few months or many 
years. The ideas and options presented in the communication aids remain available: the seeds have been 
planted. And it is even possible to see which ones are eventually used.
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Collective apprenticeships and learning are indispensable within FOs (between members), but also 
among multiple actors, with the right to make mistakes: farmers learn collectively by doing. Experience 
is necessary, but this does not mean they should be pushed into very risky actions that carry consequences 
they will be unable to assume, along with the danger of destroying all the dynamics without learning 
anything constructive. The cases studied have shown the need for gradual progress in activities, testing 
marketing approaches on a small scale before engaging in larger operations (with the constraints of the 
critical mass: for example, grouping minimum volumes of products to cover costs).
The construction and development of local collective action over time is incompatible with political 
and media management of a crisis: the interventions improvised by governments according to “pre-
structural adjustment programs” (planners, investors, experts, traders) that do not take into account 
commitments made at the sub-regional level (ECOWAS, for example); the intervention of donors with 
“aid” that seriously jeopardises the networks of local actors, which have taken so long to build.
There are limits to getting the big picture! (Samson, 2009)
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3 - FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS
Continue the network exchanges to enrich everyone’s work
Today in terms of supporting FOs, priority is given to “capacity-building”. The methods for building 
capacities have changed, however: projects and programs no longer have their own teams with 
specialised trainers; the large organisations specialised in training farmers and their FOs have problems 
staying afloat; now is the time for activities that result from the demands of local actors and approaches 
geared to helping farmers “to do things by themselves”.
Concretely this often happens in a situation where an FO has to apply for assistance to “build its 
capacities” from projects and programs. If the application is granted, the FO has to find the appropriate 
service provider. Generally, the FO engages a nearby service provider who is “more or less” qualified. 
The service provider is certainly remunerated for the training but rarely for its preparation. The 
preparation, which is necessary, becomes a “weak link” that weakens the entire edifice.
This approach has become the most popular mode of intervention. 
One possible, desirable fallback position for analysis and feedback on marketing experiences is to make 
experiences, examples and analyses available to the service providers to serve as aids and tools for 
training.
For this to be possible, the work has to be accessible and known, hence the importance of working in a 
network and multiplying the information. In our opinion, this is one of the most significant impacts of 
all the work that has been produced.
Developing new tools for steering and evaluating initiatives?
Continuing to invest in the dynamics of capacity-building, networking and collective learning processes 
appears to be indispensable. Nevertheless, these dynamics may seem complex, expensive, less visible 
and hard to measure, and therefore discourage donors as well as support organisations or service 
providers who are engaged in these types of activities.
Just because we lack tools to measure impacts does not mean we have to limit ourselves to evaluating 
immediately visible results, which does not actually make sense in the case of collective capacity- 
building, where impacts are deferred over time and influenced by many other factors. Therefore, we 
should continue developing methods to measure the usefulness of these tools and improve on steering 
and evaluating these types of frameworks in which “facilitation and process” aspects must take 
precedence over everything else.
It would be interesting to see, among other things, “quality initiatives” that have been developed in 
many other sectors (health, humanitarian action, etc). These approaches appear especially relevant in 
helping to put beneficiaries back at the centre of the action, especially when there is some connection 
between: (i) the organisation that pays for the services, (ii) the actor that develops the services and 
(iii) the beneficiaries of the services. At the level of NGOs, FOs or of networks of actors, member 
beneficiaries might well see the quality of services improve.
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APPENDIX
Participants in the Working Group on
“Market Access and Agricultural Product Marketing”
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PARTICIPANTS IN THE WORKING GROUP ON “MARKET ACCESS AND 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT MARKETING” 
This appendix presents only a portion of the people and organisations that participated in the thematic Working 
Group on “Market Access and Agricultural Product Marketing”. In fact, several dozen organisations and hundreds 
of individuals participated in the process and not all of them are mentioned here. More complete lists of participants 
are available on our website at www.inter-reseaux.org
BENIN
SOTONDJI Cyrille Sênakpon: Currently with Alternatives, Afdi country representative for Benin. Engineer and agro-
economist, MSc. Specialist in the dynamics of professional agricultural organisations (PAO) and local development. 
Previously country representative covering the agricultural sector with the NGO Alternatives in the Paimaf project, I 
now coordinate the representation of Afdi in Benin. I am particularly interested in and dedicated to farmer movements 
and the services provided by PAOs to their members, specifically the grouped sale of agricultural products.  I work in 
close collaboration with five PAOs that are using this strategy in the sale of rice, banana, cashew, soya and livestock.   
(sotondjic@yahoo.fr ; Afdi_cotonou@yahoo.fr) 
GEAY François: PPAB (Project to Professionalise Agriculture in Benin) /PAIMAF.
LACROIX Pierril: Currently with PPAB/PAIMAF, now in charge of programming with AVSF. (p.lacroix@avsf.org)
DJEGGA Demmon: breeder, Secretary General of Udoper. (Udoper_benin@yahoo.fr)
FIODENDJI Assise Komlan: President of the UCP, Vice President of CCR relations. (udpmc@intnet.bj)
GBENOU Pascal: CCR. (gbenoup@yahoo.fr)
KICHE Anastase: Alternatives. 
BURKINA FASO
ISSOUF Sanou: Programme coordinator with FENOP. I have worked with FENOP since the beginning of the Federation 
in 1996. Over the course of ten years working with FOs, I am convinced that at their basic level, FOs are not adequately 
informed about the challenges and stakes on the ground in the rural milieu. Information and communication are therefore 
a priority in the current context to direct all development-related activities. The FENOP is currently developing tools for 
communication and media access, mainly with the support of the CTA and other partners (fenop@cenatrin.bf).
OUEDRAOGO Moumouni, President of the Mogtédo cooperative (via Fenop: fenop@cenatrin.bf).
OUATTARA Souleymane: Jade productions, founding member of Inter-réseaux. Journalist by training, interested in 
questions of development and champion of certain causes (land security, equality in knowledge sharing 
between the North and South), I sometimes feel like a tightrope walker, balancing between different 
roles. As director of a private press agency and engaged for more than 20 years in the production of 
articles, photographs, radio and television programmes, I have a different conception of what journalism 
should be. When I lead a workshop on radio broadcasting with farmers, we certainly work in a journalistic 
fashion, but we proceed differently than traditional journalists might. The participatory approach that we 
employ is at odds with that of a traditional reporter, who by definition is engaged in a solitary exercise, 
apart from the role of his colleagues in reading over his work. However I never forget who I am, trying 
to not to lose sight of values like careful judgment and honesty (although I denounce objectivity). In a world where 
communication is found everywhere, staying on course requires constant vigilance. (souattara@fasonet.bf) 
CAMEROON
EDJO ELLA Sylvie: I participated in the organised workshop at Kribi, where I presented on the creation of a self-managed 
border market in Menguikom, near two other markets in the Southern Province (Gabon and Equatorial Guinea). Since the 
forum, I have served as president of the regional platform of farmers in the Ntem valley area of Southern Cameroon. I was 
made a member of the agropastoralist FO project selection committee for the southern region. (sylvie_edjo@yahoo.fr)
FONGANG Guillaume: I am an Agro-economist engineer by training and author of a doctoral thesis on the sociology of 
agricultural development ( AgroParisTech). I worked for ten years in support of farmers’ organisations in 
Cameroon: an exciting and absorbing adventure, full of challenges. I was the director of SAILD APPUI, 
in charge of support to FOs (SAILD, Support Service to Grassroot Initiative of Development is a Swiss 
registered NGO based in Cameroon). I am currently an instructor-researcher in the department of 
popular agriculture and rural sociology at the University of Dschang (Cameroon). One of the courses 
that I offer is called “Farmers’ Organisations”. I also continue to wear several different hats in the rural 
development world.  (fongangfouepe@yahoo.fr) 
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MBOG Sylvie Christel: Director of the NGO ODECO in Cameroon, expert in management of cooperatives and rural 
development, graduate of several institutions including the University of Sherbrooke (Canada). I have 
worked in rural development since 1988, and specifically in Cameroon since 1990 with Odéco. My 
experience has led me to believe that local rural development happens through the involvement of those 
concerned, from proposal to implementation, as well as planning and oversight. Local populations and 
farmers have to make the change from targets of assistance to actors, based on their own vision of 
development and not on short term projects and funding. Farmers need to respond to the needs of the 
market, which they must also better understand, and they need to organise themselves to create new 
markets (introduction of new products or substitution of products). Entrepreneurial thinking is required 
to become competitive and credible. In order for that to occur, actors need technical, technological, organisational and 
managerial skills, and they must be prepared to take risks.  (odeco1000@yahoo.fr) 
MOUDIE Dieudonné: In charge of programmes at ODECO. Agronomist-technician by training, with ten years of 
experience in the field. I have been working for the past six years on rural development in Cameroon. For 
a long time I have assisted local populations with efforts to structure and organise FOs, as well as the 
popularisation of new species of roots and tubers (manioc) and plantain bananas. Currently, I am focusing 
my efforts on developing strategies for marketing farmers’ products, because in order to contribute to the 
development of my country, it is imperative that farmers’ living conditions improve. And, improving their 
lives requires income. (moudiedieudonne@yahoo.fr) 
MBZIBAIN Aurélian: I am a social economist, agro-engineer by training. I was the coordinator of the North West Farmers’ 
Organisation (Nowefor) in Cameroon from 2003 to 2007. I am currently studying for a master’s degree 
in rural development at Humboldt University in Berlin. I am particularly interested in the impact of 
international trade policies on food security in developing countries, and on market access for poor popul
ations.(bedevconsult2@yahoo.com) 
MBANGARI Kenette Fru: Coordinator of NOWEFOR. I am an Agro-Socio-Economist, Agronomy Engineer and instructor. 
I am currently the coordinator of Nowefor in Cameroon, a post that I have occupied since January 2008. What I am 
particularly interested in, are the ways that international trade policies can potentially be advantageous to local market 
access for the rural poor and small-hold farmers. (frbangari@yahoo.com)
NDONNA MIMBIANG Martin José: ACEFA programme, Pari project. Anthropologist and agronomy engineer. Since 
2008 I have been responsible for management and organisation of professional agropastoral organisations (PAO) in the 
programme to improve the competitiveness of family farmers, funded by the AFD under the C2D initiative.  This has been a 
very rewarding job for an enthusiast of inter-actor relationships in the rural milieu, and I am specifically interested in farmer 
platforms set up with financial support from France, the BIT, FAO, Minader and Minepia. The leadership of this programme 
was entrusted to Project Pari. Right now, the challenge is to help these cases of farmer representation play their roles more 
fully (excluding those that are fictitious) on the one hand, and on the other hand enabling members of PAOs to improve the 
management of their organisations to benefit from the  availability of the support system and the funding that the Acefa 
programme is going to provide to organised farmers. (ndonna25@hotmail.com)
ACHANCHO Valentine: Pari, Project Pari, Minister of Agriculture in Cameroon. (achancho_va@yahoo.fr)
NOGHEU François: President of the Galim zone for the Binum FO in Cameroon. (binum_ass@yahoo.fr)
PEDHOM Christine: Grassroots FO support, Minader-PARI /SDOPAC.
TANGYE Joseph : Ginger farmer from the FO. (bedevconsult2@yahoo.com)
FORBAH David: Tomato farmer. (noweforbamenda@yahoo.com)
SANGMOUDA Jean Michel: Minader-Promopa.
NGBWA Fabienne: Afebid FO, female farmer. (Sandra_defab@yahoo.fr ; afebid@yahoo.fr)
DR CONGO
KULI MUSHI NSINGA Xavier: Coordinator of the ASALI Network in South Kivu. I am an agronomy engineer. I was not 
at the Bamako forum, but I participated in subsequent reflection about this theme. I have worked for a number of different 
institutions (cotton industry, international organisations, community development associations) in the DR Congo. I am 
particularly interested in the experiences of development and agricultural product marketing by economic organisations and 
their impact on food security and sovereignty. My FO was represented by its president, who became honorary after his 6-
year mandate ended. Networked exchanges on themes such as the processing and  marketing of agricultural product can 
improve the economic opportunities of small farmers when the agricultural policy of the country is aligned with the interests 
of farmers. (asalikivu@yahoo.fr)
PALUKU Mivimba: President of the Federation of Agricultural FOs for Northern Kivu. (mivimbapaluku@yahoo.fr)
LWABAGUMA-MUSAKA Joseph: President of the board of trustees of “Fish farmers in synergy” in Southern Kivu.  
(preaski@yahoo.fr ; lwabagumaj@yahoo.fr)
BAHIZIRE DEMBA Jean Pierre: Works in the Asali Southern Kivu Network as President of the board of beekeepers. 
(asalikivu@yahoo.fr ; bahizire20@yahoo.fr)
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FRANCE, EUROPE
BEAURES D’AUGERES Cécile: Afdi. (Cecile.beaure@afdi-POA.org)
BAH Caroline: Afrique Verte International. (caroline.bah@libertysurf.fr)
DELMAS Patrick: Previous Executive Secretary of Inter-réseaux (between 2004 and 2007), then with Afdi in West Africa 
and Technical Assistant to Cowi / Iram, Network of Chambers of Agriculture, Niamey / Niger.
LOTHORE Anne: Inter-réseaux. Agro-economist by training, I have had the luck since 1992 to work for numerous 
organisations (research centres, international organisations, university training or continuing education centres, 
associations) in many different countries in Asia and Africa, as well as in Brazil. Following this experience, or more than 
6 years with Inter-réseaux as technical coordinator, I am convinced more than ever of the necessity for exchanging 
knowledge in a network and the involvement of local actors in analyses and presentations: to improve practices and living 
conditions.  (alothore@yahoo.fr)
GUINEE CONAKRY
DIALLO MAMADOU Kourahoye: FPFD, Federation of Farmers of Fouta Djallon, farmer and head of marketing. Rural 
engineer by training, I have worked in agriculture in Guinea for 30 years.  At the beginning, I worked 
for 10 years as a high official in the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulics, where I participated in the 
elaboration of projects and programmes.  Then I served for 10 years as the head of an agribusiness 
company as an importer-exporter of tropical flowers, fruits and vegetables in Europe, in both 
conventional and biological agriculture. Since 1999, I have been a farmer in an agricultural group and in 
charge of marketing with the Federation. In this professional organisation, we are working to make the 
Guinea potato more competitive. I am interested in particular in the development of supply chains, the 
improvement of competitiveness of our agricultural products, and the development of our sub-regional 
markets. I sincerely believe that in their current form, our nation states cannot develop our agriculture in a competitive way, 
faced with a changing world.  (fpfd2002@yahoo.fr) 
CAMARA Fata Mady: Ex-President of the UPBM, current President of the Federation of Banana Growers in Guinée 
Forestière since January, 2009. Following the Bamako forum, we set to work with partners in the banana 
commodity chain, and in particular INADER. The result was the creation of a Federation of Banana 
Growers in Guinée Forestière in January, 2009. (fatmadycam@yahoo.fr) 
GNEKOYA Lucien: Technical consultant with CNOP Guinea. (lucienunciel@yahoo.fr)
Sherif: National Confederation of Farmer Organisations in Guinea. (cnopguinee@yahoo.fr)
Teams from Dynafiv and from Maropa.
BAH Thierno Mamadou: Director of Inader, the National Institute for Assistance to Rural Development. 
(inadergn@yahoo.fr ; thiernobahgn@yahoo.fr)
IVORY COAST
SINDIKUBWABO Innocent: Engineer and statistician, technical head of the National Association of PAO in the Ivory 
Coast, Anopaci, where I have worked for 10 years. I have participated in the implementation of several 
initiatives seeking to share agricultural information in order to assist technical and commercial decision-
making. The question of agricultural product marketing remains fundamental to farmers in nearly all 
African countries. They do not receive sufficient remuneration. It is not surprising in some cases to see 
farmers paid only 30% of the price that final consumers pay for the same product. I am convinced that 
giving farmers access to information that is trustworthy, timely and continuous will allow them to improve 
incomes and working conditions. The tools and the techniques to accomplish this already exist, but what 
is missing in my opinion are willingness and determination. (Inosi2000@yahoo.fr) 
KOUAO Attoh Sylvain: Farmer. (skouao@gmail.com)
MADAGASCAR
RAVONINJATOVO Simon Marcellin: President of UNICECAM FIFATA. (urcecambongolava@wanadoo.mg)
ANDRIAMAMONJY Fidy Ndriana Harijaona: Network organiser. (reseausoa@netclub.mg)
RAZAFINDRASAMBO David Raphaël: Beekeeper, member of SOA. (reseausoa@netclub.mg)
EVONDRAZA : President of MPD, House of Farmers of Tuléar. (mdp-tul@wanadoo.mg)
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MALI
HAÏDARA Mohamed: National Coordinator of Amassa Afrique Verte in Mali. Engineer in agronomy by training, I first 
worked on farms operation in the Office du Niger region in Mali, the financing of cereals marketing by 
national financing agencies, and the impact of liberalisation of the price of grain on the operation of 
markets in Mali and the sub-region of the Sahel.  In 1994, I opened the office of Afrique Verte (AV) in Mali 
and have been working since then at the national level on raising the value and improving the marketing 
of local cereals by grain farmers. I participated in the process by which AV became independent that led 
to the creation of Amassa in Mali in 2005. I am most interested in the experience of adding value and 
helping to market local grain products through economic organisations, and their impact on food security 
and sovereignty. (afriqueverte@afribone.net.ml) 
DAKOUO Boba: Farmer and member of AOPP. (aopp@cefib.com)
SIDIBE Mady: Technician at AOPP. (smady2@hotmali.com)
COULIBALY Mory: President of the Jèka feeré GIE (Office of Niger).
BATHILY Mamadou: I am an economist by training and a co-ordinator at Amassa Afrique Verte in Mali (AAVM). After a 
fist stint at AAVM (local partner of AV-France), I worked on several occasions for the Commission on 
Food Security to evaluate free food distribution programmes throughout the country, and then with ACF 
to evaluate its programme of food security in the Gao region. Currently I am working with AAVM to carry 
out a programme to support food and nutritional security in the Tombouctou region. I place a high degree 
of importance in the agricultural product marketing, notably in areas of shortage like Timbuktu. (bathily20
03mamadou@yahoo.fr) 
KONE Mamadou Baba: President of the Regional Chamber of Agriculture in Ségou. (konemamadoubaba@yahoo.fr)
N’DIAYE Abdoulaye: Technical Consultant with APCAM. Holding a degree in zoological engineering (University of Mali) 
and a masters in “Information Technology and Development Communication” (Limoges University, 
France), I am particularly interested in Farmer Organisations since my first days at University. That led 
me to write a thesis for a Higher Diploma on “The Role of Professional Organisations in the Promotion of 
the Livestock Commodity”. After beginning with a programme by the cooperative League of United States 
of America  (CLUSA-Mali), I currently work at APCAM where I am in charge of communication, the 
collective system of marketing products, etc. (abdoulaye.ndiaye@apcam.org)
NIGER
HASSANE Ayouba: Director of FUCOPRI, the Federation of Unions of Rice Growing cooperatives. (fucopri@intnet.ne)
GARBA BARTHE Attahirou: Executive Secretary of FUPSN SA’A, Federation of Unions of Tigernut Farmers in Niger. 
(agbarthe@yahoo.fr)
RWANDA
GAFARANGA Joseph: Executive Secretary of the Farmers’ and Breeders’ Union in Rwanda. (imbaragarh@rwanda1.com ; 
gafarangajo@yahoo.fr)
KANTARAMA Cesarie: President of the Network of Farmers’ Organisations in Rwanda. (roparwa@rwanda.com)
BAVUGAMENSHI Jonas: National Coordinator, Union of Rice Growing cooperatives in Rwanda. (ucorirwa@yahoo.fr ; 
jonasbavu@yahoo.fr)
SENEGAL
LY Ousmane: FONGS, regional coordinator in St Louis. I am Senegalese, agronomist/pastoralist and head of an FO in 
the Senegal river valley. I am very interested in the problems of the future for family agriculture in various 
commodity chains: what are the stakes and challenges? (kwirnde@sento.sn ; ouslym@yahoo.fr) 
SOW Malick: FONGS, regional coordinator for Louga. (fapalf@yahoo.fr)
DIAGNE Daouda: In charge of information, communication and training at FONGS Farmer Action, also a founding member 
and administrator of Inter-réseaux. (Daouda.diagne@sentoo.sn)
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